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Abstract
Haywood, Tamara R. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. December 2011.
The Racial Vindication Project of Alain Locke. Major Professor: Bill Edward
Lawson, Ph.D.
In this dissertation I argue that Alain Locke‘s championing of African
American art and culture was not merely an end in itself but rather a part of a
broader strategy to vindicate black humanity. I argue that Locke‘s consistent
attention to culture was an intentional move to utilize culture as a site of
resistance against racist ideology. This move allowed for resistance on two
fronts. First, prioritizing culture over biology allowed Locke to redefine race as a
sociocultural phenomenon, effectively discrediting biological conceptions of race
and their inherent biological determinism that dehumanized African Americans.
Second, Locke‘s promotion of African American cultural products aimed to prove
black humanity by showing African Americans to be producers of culture.
I argue that for Locke race is a cultural product generated by the beliefs,
values, practices and traditions of a group. Race is perpetuated over time
through social, not biological inheritance. Locke was especially cognizant of how
culture and the arts could contribute to racial formation. I argue that art is
significant in Locke‘s vindication project in that it offers a way of redefining
perceptions of black people by means of cultural products. These products
support the vindication of black humanity by showing that black people are
contributors to world culture. Further, I argue that Locke promoted African
American cultural products as a means of engaging in cultural reciprocity with
other groups.
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Finally, looking beyond vindication I examine the concepts of race
conservation and post-racialism in light of Locke‘s conception of race and
commitments to cultural pluralism. The debate over whether or not to conserve
race typically has been framed by W. E. B. Du Bois‘ essay ―The Conservation of
Races.‖ Though Locke was a contemporary of Du Bois and offered his own race
theory, he has been noticeably excluded from debates on race conservation. I
argue that this exclusion is unwarranted. Drawing from his writings on race and
culture I situate Locke within the debate. In closing I examine the concept of
post-racialism and consider the question of conservation of the notion of race in a
―post-racial‖ world.
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Introduction
In my dissertation, I plan to give a more nuanced reading of the
philosophy of Alain Locke as part of an overall project of racial vindication of
African Americans from accusations of racial inferiority. My project was inspired
by the lack of attention that has been given to Locke‘s philosophical writings,
especially his philosophy of race. Locke‘s major works on race, Race Contacts
and Interracial Relations and ―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,‖
have not garnered as much attention as, for example, those of his contemporary
W.E.B. Du Bois. After I became familiar with his race theory, it seemed odd to me
that his primary recognition as a scholar was as the so-called ―philosophical
midwife‖ to the Harlem Renaissance.1 While Locke deserves recognition for his
championing of black artistic products, I maintain that, with the exception of
Leonard Harris, most scholars have overlooked the larger scope of his work. My
project here is to argue for a deeper reading of his philosophical and cultural
writings.
I argue that Locke‘s support of African American artists and their works
was really part of a nuanced argument for the humanity and social equality of
black people that I refer to as his vindication project. ‗Vindication‘ has two
meanings. It is first, the action of defending against slander or calumny and
second, the justification by proof or explanation. My project is to challenge
existing readings of Locke that portray him as engaged in vindication only in

1

Alain Locke, psychograph in American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, eds.
Horace M. Kallen, and Sidney Hook, (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), 312.
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terms of defending African Americans against popular images of inferiority. 2 My
claim is that Locke was engaged in a vindication project in both senses of
vindication: defense against slander or calumny, and justification by proof or
explanation. Locke is usually credited with vindicating black people in terms of
the first sense of vindication. However I argue that Locke was engaged in a dual
vindication project, one whereby he not only defended black people against
slander and calumny but also provided proof of black humanity and dignity. That
is, Locke‘s project was vindicatory not just in the sense that it was defensive but
also in that he argues in such a way as to provide a positive grounding for belief
in black humanity.
I argue that his vindication project is more successful than those of other
scholars, most notably W.E.B. Du Bois, in that he successfully rephrases the
discourse of race and racial groups. Du Bois believed in racial essences
manifested in the ―message‖ each race possessed. While Europeans had given
their message to civilization, he argued that the Negro race had not as of yet
delivered its full message. On the basis of that ―message‖ Du Bois claims Negro
parity with people of European descent, placing blacks at the forefront of a
historical movement, for ―Manifestly some of the great races of today –
particularly the Negro race – have not as yet given to civilization the full spiritual
message which they are capable of giving.‖3 Du Bois sought to show parity

2

Leonard Harris, ―The Great Debate: W. E. B. Du Bois vs. Alain Locke on the
Aesthetic‖ in Philosophy Africana Vol. 7, No. 1 (2004): 15-16. Hereafter GD.
3

W. E. B. Du Bois, ―The Conservation of Races,‖ in The Souls of Black Folk,
eds. David W. Blight and Robert Gooding-Williams, (Boston: Bedford Books, 1997), 232.
Hereafter CR.
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between people of European descent and people of African descent in terms of
civilization and creative genius and argued that such parity necessitated viewing
blacks as equal with whites. As I will argue Locke bypasses that stance entirely,
opting instead to rethink the concept of race as basically a cultural product.
Locke‘s vindication project was an attack on race science and racist
ideology waged on several fronts. Central to all of them is the relationship of
race to culture. First Locke challenged the view that race was causally
connected to culture. Race as a prime determining factor in culture was used to
justify ―the classical evolutionary scheme of a series of stepped stages in an
historical progression of cultural development.‖4 Europeans were at the
vanguard of this progression while Africans (and their descendants) were
considered to be at the back end of cultural development. Since race was
presumed to determine culture, lack of culture was seen as proof of racial
inferiority. Locke sought to challenge this presumed relation and posit a vibrant
African American culture as proof of racial worth and equality of African American
people. Locke‘s first attack on racist ideology and first move in his vindication
project was to revise the concept of race. Race for Locke does not designate a
―physical natural kind‖ but rather emerges as a collective construction, a
―conceptual artifact burdened with discharging various social and cultural tasks.‖5
On his view, instead of regarding culture as expressive of race, race is itself
4

Alain Locke, The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem Renaissance and Beyond,
ed. Leonard Harris (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), 189. Hereafter PAL.
5

Headley, Clevis ―Alain Locke: A Sociocultural Conception of Race‖ in The
Critical Pragmatism of Alain Locke, ed. Harris, Leonard, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc. 1999), 204. Hereafter SCR.
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regarded as a cultural product. This reverses the emphasis of the traditional
relation between race and culture and opens the possibility of culture having
formative power in the concept of race. Located in the realm of culture, the
concept of race can be seen as a malleable cultural artifact, one that is shaped
not by metaphysics or teleological commitments, as in Du Bois‘s concept of race,
but rather the values, intentions, practices and traditions of peoples. Locke‘s
race theory, including his articulation of the problem of race classification, fulfills
the first aspect of vindication: it provides a defense from the slander or calumny
of racist ideology that purported the inferiority of black folk. Locke argued that
race was a cultural product merely one year before he began championing
African and African American cultural products in the New Negro Movement. I
argue that this is not coincidental but that Locke‘s considerable work on
aesthetics can be read as part of his vindication project. Further I argue that
Locke‘s aesthetic theory can be read as an extension of his race theory. Locke‘s
championing of African and African American cultural products was the next step
in providing proof of humanity and dignity of black peoples. This satisfies the
second meaning of vindication; justification by proof or explanation. Finally, I
argue that Locke‘s championing of African and African American cultural
products also served another purpose – the promotion of cultural pluralism and
cultural reciprocity as a mode of engagement with other cultures. By promoting
cultural pluralism and cultural reciprocity, Locke provides a conceptual structure
for maintaining respect for peoples of African descent. Cultural pluralism, by
valuing all cultures, assures the recognition and valuation of African American

4

culture. Cultural reciprocity allows African Americans to share their talents and
thereby participate in world culture. I argue that Locke‘s commitment to cultural
pluralism and cultural reciprocity was also a means of ensuring respect for
African Americans.
In order to situate Locke‘s vindication project, I plan to examine the both
philosophical concept of race and the use of race science at the time he entered
the discussion. Since it would be impossible to understand the ramifications of
Locke‘s race theory and overall vindication project without understanding the
history of racial ideology he was confronting, the first chapter will focus on an
examination of the works of Samuel Morton, Arthur de Gobineau, Josiah Nott,
Frederick Hoffman and Louis Agassiz on race. These authors in particular were
critical in developing the biological notion of race and racial inferiority that Locke
challenges. Locke and other African American intellectuals of his time were
responding to what I call the racial inferiority thesis, a thesis supposedly
supported by natural sciences. Simply stated, the inferiority thesis is the belief
that people of African descent were an innately inferior genus of human beings.
This genus is race. The racial inferiority thesis functions in tandem with
ideologies of biological and racial determinism, holding that not only is behavior
biologically or racially determined, but so are the capacities and abilities of entire
racial groups. My project will show that due to the prevalence of the inferiority
thesis in all aspects of American life at the time Locke was writing, African
American intellectuals were forcefully responding to this thesis. This chapter will
also include some of the African American intellectual responses to the inferiority

5

thesis. I include discussion of works by Frederick Douglass, Kelly Miller and
W.E.B. Du Bois. Leaving the racial inferiority thesis unchallenged would have in
effect amounted to an acceptance of African American existential wretchedness
and political second—or third –class status. Though their challenge to the belief
of African American inferiority by whites did not result in equality and full inclusion
as citizens, it was a necessary step towards these goals.
In the second chapter I offer a biographical and philosophical sketch of
Locke‘s life and works in order to contextualize his writings on race and culture.
In this chapter I try to illuminate the influences that helped shape Locke‘s views
on race and culture. The first part of the chapter is primarily biographical while
the second part chronicles his cultural and philosophical works. In the third
chapter I go into examine Locke‘s race theory in detail, starting from his lecture
series in 1916 on Race Contacts and following with his 1924 essay ―The Concept
of Race as Applied to Social Culture.‖ In this chapter I lay out Locke‘s revision of
the concept of race. Locke‘s concept of race emerges as unique from previous
conceptions because he does not take race to be a biological category, nor does
he take it to be enmeshed in a teleological enterprise. Rather his revision of the
concept of race takes its strength from a new conception of the relation of race to
culture.
In the fourth chapter I examine the greater ramifications of Locke‘s
redefinition of race and further unpack his vindication project. I argue that in his
concept of race are resources to challenge or defend against the main tenets of
nineteenth century racist ideology. In addition I explore Locke‘s understanding of

6

art and aesthetics and their centrality to his vindication project. I argue that
Locke‘s championing of African American artistic products was a way in which to
provide proof of the humanity and dignity of black people. I take up the New
Negro Movement, otherwise known as the Harlem Renaissance, as not only an
artistic movement but as an effort to redefine race as pertaining to African
Americans. The latter part of the chapter is devoted to Locke‘s idea of cultural
pluralism and cultural reciprocity as the favored mode of interaction between
peoples. I argue that Locke favored cultural pluralism and cultural reciprocity as
part of his vindication project as a way of ensuring the ongoing respect for
African Americans and African American culture. It also ensures a way for
African Americans to contribute to world culture and civilization. This is
significant since the lack of contribution to world culture and civilization was taken
as proof of African American inferiority. By advocating for cultural pluralism and
cultural reciprocity Locke was making sure a framework existed for African
American participation in world culture and civilization. Through this participation
they would be recognized as a people on cultural par with other great peoples.
In the final chapter I attempt to apply Locke‘s philosophy beyond his
vindication project to other issues in race theory, namely whether or not the
notion of race should be conserved. The question of race conservation is
typically taken up in light of Du Bois‘s essay ―The Conservation of Races,‖ where
he explicates his notion of race and argues for race conservation. Though Locke
was a contemporary of Du Bois and articulated his own concept of race, he has
been noticeably left out of debates over conserving the notion of race. I attempt

7

to rectify this omission by bringing Locke into those debates. Further I consider
the idea of race conservation in a ―post-racial‖ society.

8

Chapter One:
Nineteenth Century Racist Ideology and African American
Intellectual Response
I.

Foundations of Racist Ideology: Race Science
When Alain Locke entered the debate on race in the early twentieth

century, he had to address ideas that originated long before his birth. As an
American intellectual, he entered the scene when nineteenth century racial
ideology was still dominant. Race was considered to be a biological concept,
meaning that it was believed that groups of people designated by physical
attributes including skin color, hair texture and cranial measurements shared
some essence that not only determined those physical attributes, but determined
non-physical attributes as well. Non-physical attributes like intellect, character,
and customs were believed to be linked in an essential way to physical attributes.
Most thinkers of the nineteenth century ―saw the racial as manifesting itself in
both physical aspects and ‗moral‘ or cultural aspects.‖1 For example, blackness
was viewed as a marker of intellectual inferiority. In describing the attributes of a
Negro carpenter, Kant claims, ―this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a
clear proof that what he said was stupid.‖2 On the group level, this meant that
groups marked as inferior, such as people of African descent, were believed to
be naturally incapable of the ideas, concepts or mindsets necessary for the

1

Robert Bernasconi, ―Ethnic Race: Revisiting Alain Locke‘s Neglected Proposal‖
in Race or Ethnicity: On Black and Latino Identity, ed. Jorge J. E Gracia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2007), 128.
2

Immanuel Kant, ―On National Characteristics,‖ in Race and the Enlightenment:
A Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1997),
55.
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creation of culture. Hegel in particular says of Africa proper: ―It has no historical
interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery in a
land which has not furnished them with an integral ingredient of culture.‖ 3 Hegel
proceeds to discuss how Africa has no history:
Anyone who wishes to study the most terrible manifestations of
human nature will find them in Africa. The earliest reports
concerning this continent tell us precisely the same, and it has no
history in the true sense of the word. We shall therefore leave
Africa at this point, and it need not be mentioned again. For it is an
unhistorical continent with no movement or development of its
own… What we understand as Africa proper is that unhistorical and
undeveloped land which is still enmeshed in the natural spirit, and
which had to be mentioned here before we cross the threshold of
world history itself.4
For black people this amounted to a biological determinism that held them to be
inherently inferior in comparison to whites. As the descendants of Africans,
African Americans were considered naturally incapable of anything that might
pass as significant culture. Culture was considered the product of civilizations,
and prominent nineteenth century theorists posited that while whites were the
vanguard of civilization, blacks occupied the lowest rung of civilization, and as
such had no culture to speak of. This natural inferiority was explained by claiming
blacks were of a radically different natural kind than whites, one that was
incapable of civilization or culture without the white intervention.
Given this understand of humanity the ties between race and culture were
clear. Culture was thought to be the outgrowth the natural endowments of a

3

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, ―Geographical Basis of World History,‖ in Race
and the Enlightenment: A Reader, ed. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, (Cambridge:
Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1997), 124.
4

Hegel, 142.

10

group. A group‘s culture, or lack thereof reflected their innate qualities,
capacities and abilities. In order to challenge the notion that blacks were an
inferior kind, the concept of race and the link between race and culture had to be
broken. To do otherwise would have amounted to accepting a second-class
humanity. Locke sought to vindicate black humanity by clarifying the relationship
of race to culture in a way that did not fall back on biological determinism. In
order to do that he had to address a line of reasoning that posited black inferiority
spanning back three centuries. As a racial hegemony, practical and theoretical
notions of race had been a part of the American consciousness since the
country‘s inception. Racist ideology was a mainstay of American intellectual and
cultural life. Race theory in the United States during the nineteenth century
included theories about the origin and nature of the races and hypotheses about
their future survival or extinction. These theories attempted to explain racial
differences within the schema of white superiority and black inferiority. Because
these theories were inherently biological, Locke would have to dislodge race from
its biological moorings in order to reconstitute it as a cultural, not biological,
product.
Prior to Darwin there were two competing accounts of racial difference,
neither of which was egalitarian.5 The monogenesis explanation conformed to
the biblical account of the world, claiming mankind was descended from a
common origin and that physical differences were a product of environmental

5

Louis Menand, ―Morton, Agassiz and the Origins of Scientific Racism in the
United States,‖ The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education, No. 34 (winter 2001-2002):
111.
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factors. Racial inequalities were due to differing rates of degeneration.6 The
‗degenerationist‘ view, derived from the bible, held that ―man had been originally
created as white and civilized, with the true religion revealed to him, but had in
certain circumstances since degenerated into savagery.‖7 The entire species had
declined since Adam and Eve, though some had declined more than others,
usually as a result of climate. The doctrine of polygenesis, on the other hand,
rejected the degeneration theory and claimed that the vast differences between
the races could not be explained by the biblical account of the world and human
existence. The polygenist view held ―the diversity of human beings was such
that it could only be accounted for by treating the different races of mankind as
different species.‖8 The vast physical differences between humans could not be
explained within such a short period of time. Neither could these differences be
attributed to environmental factors. Instead of positing a single origin of the
mankind, polygenesis posited that there were multiple origins, giving rise to
different kinds of persons. Races were created separately and had been
endowed with different qualities and unequal aptitudes from the very start.9
These qualities necessarily determined differences in physical and cultural
natures of races.

6

Menand, 111.

7

Robert J. C. Young, Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 46.
8

Young, 47.

9

Menand, 111.
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These differences were not simply given; they were given in a specific
context. The nexus of race and culture must be read through the lens of the
social and political concerns of the time. It is impossible to talk about the notion
of race in the nineteenth century without examining the motives and methods of
polygenists. Polygenists did not limit their investigation to the physical
differences that in their minds indicated the diversity of human origins. They also
speculated as to the moral, intellectual and character endowments of racial
groups. These characteristics were seen as governing factors in each group‘s
capacity for culture and the production of cultural products. Thus these
discussions had ramifications not just for human differences in the physical
sense, but in the cultural sense as well. Much of this was couched in talk of
civilization. Craniometrist Samuel Morton used cranial measurements as a
means of understanding differences between races. Though it was never
established and is now widely considered to be false, ―it was assumed in those
days that larger heads always meant larger brains, and larger brains meant
greater intelligence. This link was then tied to civilization: anthropologists
contended that their research showed nonwhite races had smaller brains, were
less intelligent, and therefore incapable of developing advanced civilization.‖ 10
Lack of capacity for civilization amounted to a lack of capacity for culture as well.
Robert J. C. Young argues claims:
A racial hierarchy was established on the basis of a cultural pecking
order, with those who had most civilization at the top, and those
who were considered to have none – ‗primitives‘ – at the bottom.
Civilization and culture were thus the names for the standard of
10

Milford Wolpoff, and Rachel Caspari, Race and Human Evolution (Simon &
Schuster: New York, 1997), 78.
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measurement in the hierarchy of values through which European
culture defined itself by placing itself at the top of a scale against
which all other societies, or groups within society were judged.11
Human differences were attributed to something deep-seated, unchanging
and distinct for each racial group. Both monogenism and polygenism assumed
these racial differences where hierarchical in nature. Both theories ranked
Africans near the bottom rung of humanity. Polygenism in particular had
significant ramifications in the United States. If the races of mankind were
actually discrete entities with inherently different qualities and capacities, one
was neither practically nor morally bound to treat all persons equally. A different
species merited a different treatment. Unequal and exploitative institutions like
slavery could be justified on the basis of the fact that blacks were not people in
the same way that whites were, and therefore that equal treatment was neither
appropriate nor right.
Polygenism reached the American scientific mainstream in 1839 with
Samuel Morton‘s publication of Crania Americana. One of the most notable
adherents of polygenesis, Morton was a Philadelphia physician of the midnineteenth century and is commonly hailed as the originator of the ―American
school‖ of anthropology, which had polygenism at its foundation. This school of
thought concentrated its attention on ―physical anthropology‖ and was thoroughly
devoted to the polygenism. Morton claimed that there were innate differences in
human types that were ―aboriginal,‖ and present from earliest creation.12 These

11

Young, 94.

12

Edward Lurie, Louis Agassiz: A Life in Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1988), 257.
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differences could not be explained by environmental conditions. Morton was
thoroughly convinced that human features were not formed in response to
environment and that the only way to account for human diversity was that the
races of man did not originate from a common beginning but rather were the
product of multiple origins. The different races of man were therefore different
species, and the products of unions between members of different races were
hybrids. Challenging Buffon‘s rule, Morton claimed that though hybrids were
generally contrary to nature, fertile hybrids did exist, especially among
domesticated animals that were crossbred to maximize certain traits.13 He did not
believe interracial fertility was proof that the races of mankind formed a single
species. Overcoming this challenge to their position, polygenesists could
coherently maintain the idea that races were different species even in light of
interracial fertility.
With the publication of Crania Americana, Morton‘s theories gained
prominence. His studies were widely circulated and his results were cited as
authoritative in the United States and Europe.14 Morton believed that objectively
derived data would lead to truth. He believed he provided objective proof of
polygenesis in the form of cranial measurements. Morton believed the size and
shape of crania were as distinctive a feature of race as was skin color.15 The
idea that crania measurements were a distinctive race feature would continue

13

William Stanton, The Leopard’s Spots: Scientific Attitudes Toward Race in
America 1815-59 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 115.
14

Menand, 111.

15

Stanton, 29.
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well into the twentieth century long after polygenism had been discredited.
Morton‘s findings were based on the unproven assumption that larger crania
equaled greater intelligence. The prevailing notion among anthropologists was
that nonwhites had smaller crania and smaller brains and therefore were less
intelligent. This impediment meant that nonwhites were incapable of developing
advanced civilization. Morton calculated cranial volume by pouring birdseed or
lead shot into a skull then measuring the seed or shot in a volumetric cylinder. 16
From these calculations he concluded that the cranial volumes of the races
represented a hierarchy, which placed white Europeans at the pinnacle and
Africans nearly at the bottom. Through cranial measurement Morton graded the
varieties of mankind. His measurements were not merely quantitative but
qualitative. Morton further asserted that brain size was correlated to cultural
development,17 a view that reinforced the notion that culture was an outcropping
of biological race characteristics. This grading of mankind both culturally and
biologically fit in with the 19th century tendency to see ―savage cultures‖ in the
evolution of civilization that naturally culminated with Europeans.18 Ranking
species from lowest to highest forms was an intrinsic part of the European and
American scientific view of the natural world. This view was unsurprisingly
applied within the human species as well. The accepted view both scientifically
and socially was to see white people as the standard of humanity from which all

16

Joseph L. Graves, Jr., The Emperor’s New Clothes: Biological Theories of
Race at the Millennium, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press), 46.
17

Young, 101.

18

Milford and Caspari, 78.
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other races were departures. Basing his judgment on specious evidence19
Morton assessed not only the physical but the ―moral‖ characteristics of each
race. The Caucasian was of ―the highest intellectual endowments‖ while the
group he termed ‗Ethiopians‘ (Africans) were ―joyous, flexible, and indolent; while
the many nations which compose this race present a singular diversity of
intellectual character, of which the far extreme is the lowest grade of humanity.‖20
In 1853 Arthur de Gobineau published The Inequality of Human Races, a
text concerned with civilization and its downfall as caused by race mixing.
Gobineau offers a general definition of civilization as
a series, a chain of events linked more or less logically together
and brought about by the inter-action of ideas which are often
themselves very complex. There is a continual bringing to birth of
further ideas and events. The result is sometimes incessant
movement, sometimes stagnation. In either case, civilization is not
an event, but an assemblage of events and ideas, a state in which
human society subsists, an environment with which it has managed
to surround itself, which is created by it, emanates from it, and in
turn reacts on it.21
On this view of civilization, the progression of ideas is the driving force behind
development. Gobineau claims that that the ability to generate such progressive
ideas is not universal. This is the basic premise of the Inequality of Races.
Some races are able to move up the ladder of civilization, some are not. In
Gobineau‘s conception of history, later to be taken up by many American race
theorists, this ability can be attributed to nothing other than race.

19

Graves, 46.

20

Stanton, 33, Menand, 110.

21

Arthur de Gobineau, The Inequality of Races, (New York: Howard Fertig,
1999), 71. Hereafter IHR.
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According to Gobineau all civilizations hold within them the seeds of their
own destruction. He does not attribute this fall to the commonly supposed
reasons – fanaticism, luxury, irreligion or bad government. He cites the Aztecs
as a civilization that suffered from fanaticism as evidenced by their propensity for
human sacrifice. Even with this failing he claims they were a ―powerful,
industrious and wealthy people,‖ before Cortes and his fellows put an end to their
empire. Luxury or decadence cannot be the reason for the decline of civilizations
because ―men of strong character, men of talent and energy,‖ are found in
greater number in the decadent old age of a civilization than in its youth.22 Lack
of religion does not cause the fall of empires because though there have been
changes in the outward form of religion, the continuity of religious belief has
never truly been broken. Finally bad government cannot be blamed for the
decline of civilizations because the worst governmental administration occurs at
the beginning of an empire, so if that was the death knell civilizations none would
progress beyond infancy. Therefore with all other possible causes dismissed,
Gobineau concludes that the only cause of the decline of civilizations can be
innate in the people themselves in the form of racial character. Inequalities do
not come from institutions. Peoples exist prior to laws and constitutions, thus
these are but emanations of racial character. Fanaticism, luxury, irreligion and
bad government may be part of a peoples demise, but these are merely
derivative, the bloom of a poisonous seed present from inception.
For Gobineau, the rise and fall of civilizations can only be attributed to some
innate factor of a people. His search was for the motive force behind human
22

IHR, 8.
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events that will explain ―the bloody wars, the revolutions, and the break up of
laws.‖23 He came to the conclusion that it is race above all other things that
determines the course of a civilization. The racial question ―overshadows all
other problems of history,‖ and holds the key to them all.24 Race is the single
most important factor determining the destiny of a group. Accordingly, races are
unequal in their capacity for culture and civilization, whites being the most
advanced on the ladder of civilization and Africans being among the least
advanced. On his view, everything great or noble in the works of man in the
realm of science, art and civilization ―derives from a single starting-point, is the
development of a single germ and the results of a single thought; it belongs to
one family alone, the branches of which have reigned in all the civilized countries
of the universe.‖25
There were three racial branches of the human family according to
Gobineau: the white, the yellow and the black. All other groups were ―tertiary‖
races or subgroups of the main three. Gobineau clearly ranks races in terms of
civilization and humanity, ranking whites as the intelligent, beautiful bearers of
civilization and culture at the top of the hierarchy and blacks as ugly, animalistic
and severely limited in intellect at the bottom. Though he describes the races as
radically different, he was not a proponent of polygenism. He believed instead
that all races belonged to the human species, species being defined according to
Buffon‘s rule as ―a constant succession of similar individuals that can reproduce
23
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together.‖26 Indeed this capacity for reproduction that is a central part of his race
theory. Gobineau, similar to Kant, believed that racial differences were fixed
early on in human existence, when racial characteristics were more plastic and
susceptible to environmental influences. Racial differences in the current stage
of human existence were permanent only to be changed through the crossing of
bloodlines.
European whites, as the group that best preserved Aryan bloodlines, were
the bearers of culture and civilization. Blacks, ranking at the lowest point in the
racial hierarchy were believed to be incapable of even the basic ideas necessary
to put civilization in motion.27 Blacks were not capable of civilization, because
they have never created ―a new social order in his own image, putting ideas into
practice and moulding them to his purpose.‖ In Gobineau‘s theory of race,
blackness was constantly linked to innate limitations in intellectual ability, which
translated into an inability to produce ideas necessary for culture or civilization.
Only peoples that have mixed with whites have been able to become civilized
and produce culture. Though it seems implausible, according to Gobineau it is
only through crossings with ―white blood‖ that allowed for any truly civilized
people to come into being. Though these blood crossings strengthened the
inferior non-white races while weakening the superior white races, they were
necessary in order to generate special qualities that neither group would have
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without the crossing.28 The generation of these ―special qualities‖ is vital for a
people to become a nation. Thus race mixing is the crux of Gobineau‘s theory of
civilization. For all his disparagement of the so-called inferior races, intermixing
with them is a necessary step towards being civilized. Not every people has the
capacity to take that step. Some races are more inclined to mixing than others.
Gobineau claims that ―mankind lives in obedience to two laws: one of repulsion,
the other attraction.‖29 Only the groups that are able to overcome their repulsion
for intermixing are able to advance beyond the state of savages. A people that is
unmixed is incapable of civilization, and further are devoid of the ―inner impulse‖
necessary to start them on the path to improvement.30 No external force can
motivate a people to intermixture and without it they remain barren of the ideas
and qualities that would help them advance. According to the law of repulsion,
mankind has an innate aversion to ‗crossing blood‘ with foreign groups.
However, the first step in the transition from tribe to nation is incorporating other
peoples into itself. Tribes that wish to increase their power and prosperity are
compelled by war or peaceful means to ―draw their neighbors within their sphere
of influence.‖31 In doing so they create class distinctions and develop an
industrialized system and grow from a tribe to a nation. Only these groups that
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are able to overcome their natural repulsion for blood crossing are able to be
civilized; ―backward‖ tribes live in complete independence of each other and do
not mix.
Whites had the greatest tendency towards blood crossing and by bringing
foreign groups under their control they were the genesis of all civilization to be
found on the globe. Blacks, Gobineau conjectures, have kept themselves the
most ―pure‖ and thereby the least civilized. He is willing to concede that artistic
genius, which is foreign to the three racial types, only arose after the crossing of
black and white.32 Such genius would have been one of the advantages whites
would have forfeited had the Aryan strain remained pure.
Gobineau repeatedly claims that racial mixing is beneficial, but only to a
point. After some vague tipping point intermixing only creates ―racial anarchy‖
and leads to degeneration. Gobineau‘s use of the term degeneration is different
from the way in which earlier race theorists like Johann Friedrich Blumenbach
used it. For Blumenbach, degeneration simply referred to physical changes
within the human species. Gobineau, on the other hand, characterizes
degeneration as destruction. When applied to a people, degeneration means,
―that the people no longer has the same intrinsic value as it had before,‖ because
it no longer has the same blood in its veins. Thus the ‗degenerate‘ man is a being
very different from a racial point of view from his heroic forefathers at the
pinnacle of their civilization. The heroic blood has run thin, adulterated by foreign
entities and he is only a distant kinsman to those he calls ancestors. Race was
thought to be communicated through the blood, therefore the excessive crossing
32
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of blood equaled the slow decline of a people. After the tipping point even
successive infusions injection of white blood cannot stem the tide of
degeneration, and in fact only worsens the situation. It is no longer imbued with
its natural advantages and increases the ―confusion already existing in racial
elements.‖33 Fully formed civilizations cannot fuse. They can only clash. Only
peoples at the level of tribes can merge to form civilizations. After that point
increasing miscegenation gradually causes decadence and decay.34
Ever lurking in the background of discussions of race was the specter of
race mixing and the effects it would have on the country as a whole. In 1843
Josiah Nott, a doctor from Mobile, Alabama wrote ―The Mulatto a Hybrid –
probable extermination of the two races if Whites and Blacks Intermarry.‖ In this
essay, Nott appeals to his authority as a doctor to claim that blacks and whites
were different species. He ascribes to Buffon‘s rule according of species
identification whereby when a male and female produce fertile offspring, this
shows that they are part of the same species. The mulatto is a hybrid, i.e. the
offspring of two separate species ―as the mule from the horse and the ass,‖ and
therefore not as fertile. Citing statistics on rising mixed race mortality rates and
decreased fecundity, Nott comes to the conclusion that ―at present day the
Anglo-Saxon and Negro races are, according to the common acceptation of the
terms, distinct species, and that the offspring of the two is a Hybrid‖.35 Nott
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compares the intellectual, anatomical and moral characteristics of Caucasian and
African women describing the latter in grotesque caricature, claiming that it is
obvious that they appear as different species. While granting that the ‗mulatto‘
has intermediate intelligence between the white and the black, Nott continues to
reiterate that the mulatto is a hybrid and as such have a tendency to ―run out‖ or
change back to one of the original parent‘s stock. Different hybrids follow
different natural laws and with regard to the white and black hybrid Nott asks,
―…is it not reasonable that the human hybrid may also have its peculiar laws –
may not one of these laws by (which may be inferred from the foregoing data)
that Mulatto or Hybrid is a degenerate, unnatural offspring, doomed by nature to
work out its own destruction.‖36 According to Nott, statistics show that mulattos
are ―much shorter lived‖ and ―more liable to be diseased and less capable of
endurance than whites and blacks of the same rank and condition.‖ He claims
that we should expect nothing less from a faulty stock, one that has been
produced in violation of nature‘s law.
Nott believed that mixed race people have within themselves the seeds of
their own demise. Given that the United States had a growing population of
mixed race people, a people set apart from ―pure‖ African or European, this had
extreme ramifications. If unchallenged, this argument not only predicted the
eventual extinction of African Americans as group largely constituted by the
product of unions between black slave women and white slave owners, but
indicted interracial contact as unnatural and destructive.
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By far the Nott‘s most popular work was Types of Mankind that he co-wrote
with George Gliddon. The volume was dedicated to the memory of Samuel
Morton and published in 1854. The weighty tome was a compendium of existing
anthropological evidence in support of the specific diversity of mankind.37 Types
of Mankind was a polemical book meant to challenge biblical accounts of the
origin of man. The added contribution of Louis Agassiz lent an air of
respectability to Nott and Gliddon‘s work. The work was cited widely in the United
States as well as in Europe as authoritative on to subject of race. Though
Darwin‘s work would eventually make Nott‘s polygenism seem quaint and
irrelevant, the reverberations of his advocacy of racial purity would be felt for
years to come.
This question of race mixing and vitality would persist well into the dawn of
twentieth century. Frederick Hoffman, a leading statistician, wrote, ―Race
Amalgamation and the Future American,‖ in 1896. In accordance with Nott‘s
writing half a century earlier, Hoffman also predicts the extinction of mulatto.
Hoffman is concerned with the influence that the infusion of ‗white blood‘ has had
on the physical, moral and mental characteristics of the colored race. He claims
that ―[t]he cross breed of white men and colored women is, as a rule, a product
inferior to both parents, physically and morally.‖38 Hoffman claims that there
exists a natural antipathy between the races according to Westmark‘s ‗law of
similarity;‘ civilized races do not intermingle with less civilized races. Enmity or a
37
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lack of sympathy due to a lack of common interests, ideas and habits keeps the
races separate and discourages intermarriage. Ignoring institutional and
individual racism, Hoffman claims that intermarriage is rare in this country
because it is ―outside of the pale of the moral law‖ and that there is a ―natural
aversion between some races and that attempts to cross this natural barrier
determined by the ‗law of similarity‘ have invariably lead to the most disastrous
consequences.‖39 Echoing Nott, Hoffman regards the crossing of white and black
a crime against nature, no doubt because the offspring of such unions are the
―inferior of the white and pure black, and as a result of this inferior degree of vital
power we meet with a lesser degree of resistance to disease and death among
the mixed population.‖40 The mulatto is also morally inferior to the pure black,
Hoffman claims, based on his observation that illicit sexual intercourse happens
between white men and mulatto women rather than pure black women. He is,
however, willing to grant that the mulatto is intellectually superior to the pure
black due to the infusion of white traits, including higher brain weight. Even so, in
a footnote Hoffman claims that the intellectual honors and degrees conferred on
blacks are for the most part undeserved and a hindrance to real intellectual
progress ―since the distinction thus conferred is out of proportion to the efforts or
achievements by the person thus distinguished.‖ Thus the more ―subtle and
important effects of education and higher life are lost‖.41 At any rate, the
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intellectual gains from the infusion of white blood are outweighed by the loss of
vitality and fecundity.
On the basis of these facts Hoffman concludes that white and Negro
crossing has been ―detrimental to true progress, and has contributed more than
anything else to the excessive and increasing rate of mortality from the most fatal
diseases as well as to its consequent inferior social efficiency and diminishing
power as a force in American national life.‖ The source of excessive mortality
and diminishing fecundity was due to the low state of sexual morality of colored
peoples since unchaste unions produce inferior stock.
The idea of racial purity still held sway in the intellectual landscape at the
turn of the last century. Though whites themselves were not pure, the ethnic
fiction of purity was still appealing, so much so that they attempted to
manufacture it through legislation and appeal to the ‗natural‘ aversion whites had
to race mixing. Though such tactics might bolster white society‘s conception of
itself, the consequence of these arguments for African Americans was dire.
Being a people of conspicuous mixed race heritage, African Americans
acceptation of arguments about their dwindling vitality, fecundity and talents was
tantamount to accepting a death sentence.
Swiss-born naturalist Louis Agassiz significantly furthered the polygenesis
movement of the United States. Before coming to the United States in 1846
Agassiz had espoused monogenism on religious grounds.42 However,
monogenism was antithetical to his ideas on the diversity of the nonhuman
natural world. Originally Agassiz claimed that humans were the exception to the
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laws of the natural world that fostered such diversity in flora and fauna. Humans
were supposedly set apart from commonplace biological organisms, reinforcing
the idea that mankind was given a unique place in the natural world through the
will of God. In his last set of lectures in Switzerland, Agassiz elucidated his ideas
of multiple creation for flora and fauna but a single, common origin for man. His
theory of ―geographical distribution‖ of species at that time applied only to the
plant and animal kingdoms which, due to divine providence, were created in
specific environments where they flourished. Species were thus limited to
particular geographic ranges. The geographic limits of particular animal species
corresponded to the geographic ranges of human races. But whereas different
environments seemingly spawned different species, in the case of humans it did
not. Agassiz took the lack of human speciation as a sign of superiority. ―Man
alone,‖ he claimed, ―is spread over the whole surface of the earth.‖
Prior to his arrival in the United States, Agassiz did not directly address
human diversity. He asserted the single origin of humans while providing
scientific accounts of the flora and fauna of different regions supporting the idea
of multiple origins. However, after his first encounter with the alterity of American
blacks, Agassiz soon converted to polygenism. This profound experience
coupled with Morton‘s influence helped Agassiz embrace polygenism. He no
longer considered humans as unique in the natural world. Humans, like plants
and animals, must have multiple origins governed by geographical distribution.
Although Agassiz was a religious man, his acceptance of polygenesis put
him at odds with the church. His conversion to polygenism has been
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compellingly portrayed as racism overcoming religious views. 43 This
underscores the depths of his repulsion towards blacks servants he encountered
at his hotel in Philadelphia. In a letter to his mother in 1846 Agassiz discusses
the ―painful impression‖ this contact inspired in him, especially painful since the
feelings it inspired in him were ―contrary to all our ideas about the confraternity of
the human type (genre) and the unique origin of our species…it is impossible for
me to repress the feeling that they are not of the same blood as us.‖ 44
While he was willing to acknowledge that blacks were human, he
nonetheless maintained that they were of a different species than whites.
Agassiz‘s nascent polygenism of 1846 was fully developed by 1854 when Types
of Mankind was published with his contribution ―Natural Provinces of the Animal
World and Their Relation to the Different Types of Man‖. In this essay he
attempts to demonstrate the close connection between the geographical
distribution of animals and the natural boundaries of the different races of man.
Agassiz claimed there were eight regions of the world and that each region
developed its own distinct species of fauna and species of mankind. Humanity,
he now claimed, was not exempt from nature‘s laws: ―…the laws which regulate
the diversity of animals, and their distribution upon earth, apply equally to man,
within the same limits and in the same degree.‖ Agassiz claimed
We must acknowledge that the diversity among animals is a fact
determined by the will of the Creator, and their geographical
distribution part of the general plan which unites all organized
43
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beings into one great organic conception: whence it follows that
what are called human races, down to their specialization as
nations, are distinct primordial forms of the type of man.45
While all men were ―bound by a common structure and sympathy,‖ races were
created as separate species.46. According to Agassiz, the biblical account of
creation through Adam and Eve applied only to the white race. Mummified
remains of ancient Egypt showed that blacks and whites were as distinct racially
3,000 years ago as they were in modern times. If human races were a product of
climate and environment then surely there would have been significant changes
over the course of 3,000 years. Human races were distributed over specific,
discrete geographic areas. They fit Agassiz‘s biological criteria for being
separate species in that they were physically distinct and unchanging over time.
He claimed they must have originated in the same numeric proportion and over
the same area as they occupied now. This meant that human races could not
have a single origin and rather ―must have been created in that numeric harmony
which is characteristic of each species.‖47
As was typical of the cultural and scientific zeitgeist of the time, Agassiz
felt obliged to rank the races of man and ―the relative value of the characters
peculiar to each.‖48 The character of the Negro according to him was
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―submissive, obsequious,‖ and ―imitative.‖ Agassiz blithely consigned blacks to
the bottom of any objective ranking. That Africans historically had congress with
the white race, the originators of civilization, and yet had failed to produce any
civilization or culture of their own was proof of this. Agassiz claimed it would be
―mock-philanthropy and mock-philosophy‖ to assume that all races have the
same abilities, enjoyed the same powers and showed the same natural
dispositions and thereby were entitled to the same position in human society.49
In order to avoid the mistake of treating races equally, whites should be guided
by the innate differences between the races and work to promote the dispositions
most distinctive of them. Given that blacks were characterized as submissive,
obsequious and imitative, they did not, in Agassiz eyes, deserve treatment on par
with that of whites.
Though he advocated legal equality, social equality for blacks was out of
the question. Social equality would lead to miscegenation, which was especially
abhorrent to Agassiz. He claimed blacks retained a childlike mind and did not
have the capacity to live in proximity with whites without causing social
disorder.50 Contact between races cause a special anxiety within Agassiz.
Intermarriage between blacks and whites was especially repugnant to him. In a
letter from August 1860 he writes, ―The production of halfbreeds is as much a sin
against nature, as incest in a civilized community is a sin against purity of
character.‖51 He further claimed that the idea of amalgamation was repugnant to
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him and that he held it ―to be a perversion of every natural sentiment,‖ and that
no effort should be spared to prevent such perversion. In his worldview,
civilization itself was threatened by intermarriage between the races. In a letter
dated August 10, 1863, he frets over the looming possibility of a nation populated
by the
effeminate progeny of mixed races, half Indian, half Negro,
sprinkled with white blood…I shudder from the consequences. We
have already to struggle, in our progress, against the influence of
universal equality, in consequence of the difficulty of preserving the
acquisitions of individual eminence, the wealth of refinement and
culture growing out of select associations. What would be our
condition if to these difficulties were added the far more tenacious
influences of physical disability…How shall we eradicate the stigma
of a lower race when its blood has once been allowed to flow freely
into that of our children.52
Though towards the end of his life Agassiz lost favor in scientific
communities due to the insurgent tide of Darwinism, his impact on the
scientific and social landscape of America in the nineteenth century was
resoundingly deep. He was appointed professor of zoology and geology
in Harvard University in 1847 and founded the Museum of Comparative
Zoology in 1859, serving as the museum's first director until his death in
1873. Few people left a more indelible imprint on Harvard than Louis
Agassiz.
Agassiz couched the denigration and disparagement of black
people in the auspices of objective science, giving it greater authority than
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his opinions would have garnered if he had not been the prominent
scholar he was. He refused to the bitter end to accept Darwinism or
evolution in any form believing there was no evidence to support the idea
of the descent of a later species from an earlier one or of the animal
ancestry of man.53 Since the diversity of species was, to his mind, a
phenomenon present from the very beginning of creation, it was more
likely that species arose from successive acts of creation rather than from
natural selection or any other purely natural development. Agassiz died
believing Darwinism to be an intellectual fad, and with him Darwinism lost
its last distinguished opponent. 54
When it was published, Charles Darwin‘s The Origin of Species put
forward a clear challenge to creationist theories of biological diversity. It
especially challenged polygenesis, as it claimed there was a common
origin of all mankind. Darwin himself never intended to become a
significant figure in the debate on the nature of human races. In reality
Darwin‘s influence on race theory lies not so much in what he said as in
what others made of his work. The Origin of the Species established the
unity if not the equality, of human races. The theory of evolution through
natural selection explained biological diversity in a way creationist theories
could not. Such theories could not account for the development of new
varieties of animals and plants within a species. Nor could creationism
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explain the appearance of new species or the extinction of existing
species.55 Freed from the framework of a biblical timeline the theory of
evolution was able to account for biological diversity, including human
diversity through variations inherited by offspring that played a role in the
survival and reproductive capacity of the individuals that possessed
them.56 The Origin of Species was not concerned with the origin of race or
the varieties of mankind per se but rather with the problem of variation in
biological organisms generally. In the struggle for existence such
variations were seen as part of the process of natural selection through
which organisms that possessed features advantageous to their
environment thrived.
Darwin addressed racial issues more explicitly in The Descent of
Man published in 1871. Naming Agassiz among others from the
polygenesis camp, he recapitulates the general polygenesist argument:
We have now seen that a naturalist might feel himself fully justified
in ranking the races of man as distinct species; for he has found
that they are distinguished by many differences in structure and
constitution, some being of importance. These differences have,
also, remained nearly constant for very long periods of time. He
will have been in some degree influenced by the enormous range
of man, which is a great anomaly in the class of mammals, if
mankind be viewed as a single species. He will have been struck
with the distribution of the several so-called races, in accordance
with that of other undoubtedly distinct species of mammals. Finally,
he might urge that the mutual fertility of all the races has not yet
been fully proved; and even if proved would not be an absolute
proof of their specific identity.57
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Darwin then attempts to refute the major points. Human races, he claims, unlike
ordinary species when mingled together in large numbers, do not remain distinct
and cannot coexist without fusion. As for the distinctive characters of every race
of man, he claims ―[i]t may be doubted whether any character can be named
which is distinctive of a race and is constant.‖ The most substantial argument
against polygenism according to Darwin is the fact that races graduate into each
other outside of intermixture. That is, there are incremental variations that
progress from one extreme of the human form to the other so that one can see
the continuity of the human species. He cites the diversity of opinion with regard
to the number of races. ―This diversity of judgment does not prove that the races
ought not to be ranked as a species, but it shows that they graduate into each
other, and that it is hardly possible to discover clear distinctive characters
between them.‖58 Darwin claims that the application of the term ‗species‘ to
races is somewhat arbitrary with regard to physical differences. Those who
accepted the principle of evolution, he claimed, would doubtlessly feel that all the
races of man are descended from a single ―primitive stock.‖. Current races were
not the result of degeneration, but rather were the products of progression and
development from this primitive stock. Though races undoubtedly differ
physically, the overall structure is not so different as to assume descent from
different species.

57

Charles Darwin, ―On the Races of Man,‖ from The Descent of Man in The Idea
of Race eds. Bernasconi, Robert and Lott, Tommy L. (Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis,
2000), 61.
58

Darwin, 62.

35

Darwin‘s work arguably dismantled one form of racist dogma only to
replace it with another. While he established the unity of the human races, he
did not challenge the idea of superior and inferior races. In the struggle for
existence some races would prevail over others. He attributes the extinction of
groups to ―the competition of tribe with tribe, and race with race.‖ When more
civilized nations came into contact with ―barbarians,‖ the former was usually
victorious. Civilization and superiority was still equated with whiteness. Darwin‘s
theory of evolution supported the idea that superior races would supplant inferior
races, a progressive idea that would be further drawn out by Herbert Spencer.
This was not the only way in which the biological concept of evolution would be
applied to the social realm. Evolutionism in on the societal level would take root
in the movement known as Social Darwinism.
Darwinian evolution was applied not only in biology but also within the
social sciences. Spencer was one of many thinkers that tried to systematize the
implications of evolution in fields other than biology. He believed natural law
applied to social structures as well as to biological ones. Just as living organisms
slowly and inexorably strive for improvement, so did society. Social Darwinism
appealed to conservative tendencies in the United States in the late nineteenth
century. It was those who wished to maintain the status quo that were the first to
pick up on the social arguments that were forged out of Darwinian concepts.59
Darwinism as appropriated by conservative social theorists suggested that nature
would ensure that the best competitors in a competitive situation would win and
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this process would continue leading to continuous improvement.60 Social
Darwinism gave the force of natural law to the idea of competitive struggle. It
also legitimized the conception that all sound development must be slow and
unhurried and could not be forced. Like a living organism, society could only
change at a glacial pace over time.
Proponents of Social Darwinism suggested that attempts to change
society through social reform were not only wrongheaded and futile but would
also lead to the degeneration of a society. Thus social ills like poverty, lack of
education and sickness were seen as natural occurrences and ultimately would
have an ameliorative effect on society. For Spencer evolution meant that
whatever immediate hardships some portion of the population faced, the greater
portion of mankind was moving inevitably toward some ―glorious consummation.‖
Spencer‘s theory of social selection arose out of a concern with population
problems of the time.61 In 1852 Spencer conjectured that the ―pressure of
subsistence‖ on a population benefits the human race as a whole. This pressure
had been the impetus for progress since the earliest human times by putting a
premium of skill, intelligence, self-control and the ability to adapt through
technological innovation. It stimulated human advancement and selected the
best of each generation for survival.62 Spencer argued that human progress was
the result of the triumph of more advanced individuals over their inferior
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competitors.63 Consequently wealth and power were proof of ―fitness‖ while
poverty and disenfranchisement were evidence of natural inferiority. Social
conflict and particularly racial conflict was seen as necessary for progress
because it entailed the constant overpowering of the inferior by the superior
leading ultimately to the evolution of a perfected humanity.
Spencer had worked out much of his version of the theory of evolution
prior to the publication of The Origin of Species. The main thing he took from
Darwin was natural selection, the process through which variation takes place.
Fundamental to his view of sociology was the analogy Spencer drew between
biological organisms and society. Like a living organism, society is subject to
evolution by means of natural selection. Also like living organisms, society has
within it a perpetual striving for improvement. Evolution, after all, was believed to
be good. However this improvement occurs only slowly and cannot be induced
by any other means. It can be argued that Spencer biologized culture in that he
believed that a people could only progress to the degree that their biology would
allow. Spencer accepted a doctrine of biological inheritance originated by JeanBaptiste Lamarck. Lamarck held that the acquired characteristics of an organism
were passed on to its offspring. For Spencer this applied to cultural as well as
physical characteristics. Thus people inherited not only genetic material from
their parents but also culture and general social status.64 Culture again was
conceived of as a consequence of biology.
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For all his belief in the perfectibility of mankind, Spencer still subscribed to
the nineteenth century dogma of innately superior and inferior races. Primitive
peoples were considered to have inferior intellectual capacities and a lower
―mental mass‖ than whites. Nothing could be done to help them because their
level of civilization merely reflected the stage of their biological evolution.65
Primitive peoples did provide insight into previous evolutionary stages. It is
important to remember that in the nineteenth century races were thought to
represent different stages of the evolutionary scale with the white race at the
apex. Social Darwinism sustained the belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority in that
non-white races were perceived as being naturally below whites on the
evolutionary ladder. Spencer‘s belief in natural selection prompted him to believe
that inferior races as such would eventually be wiped out. When referring to
whites, he praised the mixing of Aryan types in the United States. However
when it came to the mixing of dissimilar types he believed it could only lead to
degeneration.66
The notion of race in the nineteenth century was thoroughly biological in
nature. That said, racist ideology of the nineteenth century revolved around
concerns over the origins of races, race mixing, race vitality and the relationship
between character, abilities and capabilities and biological characteristics. None
of the dominant theories of race favored African Americans; they suggested that
blacks were the lowest form of humanity, that they were doomed to extinction
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due to their ―mixed nature,‖ and that their deficient capacities and abilities, they
could never produce any civilization or culture of note. African American
intellectuals had to respond with a counter-narrative of blackness and African
Americanness that would challenge dominant ideology and open a new future,
one beyond that of a wretched existence as an inherently inferior type of being.
Black people deserved a place at humanity‘s table, one through which they
would gain the respect of persons they deserved and be able to contribute to and
participate in world culture. While I argue that Locke most effectively issued this
challenge through his vindication project, he was not alone in this undertaking.
Other African American intellectuals responded to racist ideology and its main
themes.
II.

African American Intellectual Response
While racist ideology did not originate in the nineteenth century, it arguably

reached its peak during that time. By the dawn of the twentieth century this
ideology had indelibly left its mark on the American social and intellectual
landscape. While in the twentieth century the unity of the human family had
gained majority acceptance, racial differences were still seen as a primary
determining factor in culture. This amounted to a racial determinism that
sustained the concept of black inferiority. African American intellectuals
attempted to challenge this conception by both attacking foundational beliefs
about races and redefining the concept of race itself.
Frederick Douglass issued one such challenge when he delivered ―The
Claims of the Negro Ethnologically Considered‖ before the literary societies of
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Western Reserve College, at commencement, July 12, 1854. In it he takes on
various aspects of dominant racist ideology. The first racist myth he addresses is
the ―manhood‖ (or we would say ―humanity‖) of the Negro. Douglass notes that
one major defense of the slave system is based on a denial of the Negro‘s
humanity. The argument claims if the Negro is a man, it is the greatest of wrongs
to hold him as a slave and everyone who holds the ―sentiment of justice‖ must
find repugnant. However the Negro is not a man so any moral or legal
imputations of slavery are moot. Douglass challenges this claim by inquiring into
the nature of manhood itself. In order to establish the manhood of anyone
making the claim, they need not be of exceptional eloquence or intellect, for if
this were the case, very few would meet those criteria. Yet and still this is the
argument against the humanity of the Negro. ―His faculties and powers,
uneducated and unimproved, have been contrasted with those of the highest
cultivation; and the world has then been called upon to behold the immense and
amazing difference between the man admitted, and the man disputed.‖ 67
Exceptional intellect is just that – exceptional among most people. Given that
most whites would not meet that standard of intellect, Negroes should not be
penalized for failing to meet it under much worse conditions. Douglass
addresses the contention that Negroes are outside of the human family and are
actually part of the animal kingdom:
Common sense itself is scarcely needed to detect the absence of
manhood in a monkey, or to recognize its presence in a Negro. His
speech, his reason, his power to acquire and retain knowledge, his
67
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heaven-erected face, his habitudes, his hopes, his fears, his
aspirations, his prophecies, plant between him and the brute
creation a distinction as eternal as it is palpable.68
Douglass explicitly addresses the popular tendency to rank peoples,
dismissing the idea of a ―sliding scale‖ of humanity whereby the members of one
extreme are related to animals (i.e. blacks) and the other to angels (i.e. whites),
―and all the rest intermediates.‖ He knew, however, that simply demonstrating
the place of the Negro among men was not enough for theorists like Nott,
Glidden, Agassiz and Morton to accept a common origin for all peoples. Against
the polygenesists, Douglass claims a common ancestry for all mankind. He
ultimately invokes the bible, claiming that the unity of the human race is too
obvious to admit dispute. The real issue is that concerning the growing
population of people of Negro descent. Descendants of Africans and Europeans
would always occupy the United States as the country populated by ―the most
dissimilar races on the globe.‖ Thus the question of the unity of mankind has
deep and abiding significance. Douglass states ―precisely in proportion as the
truth of human brotherhood gets recognition, will be the freedom and elevation, in
this country, of African descent.‖69 What was at stake in Douglass‘ eyes was
―whether the rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by some ought not to be
shared and enjoyed by all.‖ He points out that the belief in the disunity of
mankind bolsters the privilege enjoyed by whites. Douglass believed that once
the equality of mankind was proven, the arguments in defense of slavery would
become worthless. Therefore, the temptation for white pseudoscientists to ―read
68
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the Negro out of the human family‖ was exceedingly strong. ―For, let it be once
granted that the human races are of multitudinous origin, naturally different in
their moral, physical, and intellectual capacities, and at once you make plausible
a demand for classes, grades and conditions, for different methods of culture,
different moral, political, and religious institutions, and a chance is left for slavery,
as a necessary institution.‖70
After exposing the practical motives behind the theory of polygenesis
Douglass points out the ―Ethnological Unfairness Towards the Negro,‖ bringing
attention to Morton as an example of American ethnologists. The overwhelming
tendency among ethnologists was to venerate Egypt as an ancient site of
learning and civilization but not to count Egypt as African. This was transparently
a way to discredit African and Africans by removing from the continent what was
considered to be the only site of civilization rivaling that of Europe or Asia.
Indeed Egyptian civilization proved troublesome to racist theorists who went
through a great deal of rhetorical trouble to make the Egyptians white. This was
to reinforce the idea that civilization and culture were the domains of Europeans
to the exclusion of people of African descent. Douglass point out how
intelligence in a black man is somehow always to be derived from his connection
to the white race. ―To be intelligent,‖ he claims, ―is to have one‘s Negro blood
ignored.‖71
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Douglass covers numerous other issues in the essay, including the
disparity in iconic representations of blacks and whites. If a phrenologist or
naturalist
undertakes to represent in portraits, the differences between the
two races – the Negro and the European – he will invariably
present the highest type of the European and the lowest type of
Negro. The European face is drawn in harmony with the highest
ideas of beauty, dignity and intellect…The Negro, on the other
hand, appears with features distorted, lips exaggerated, forehead
depressed – and the whole expression of the countenance made to
harmonize with the popular idea of Negro imbecility and
degradation…If the very best type of the European is always
presented, I insist that justice, in all such works, demands that the
very best type of the Negro should also be taken. The importance
of this criticism may not be apparent to all; -- to the black man it is
very apparent. He sees the injustice, and writhers under its sting. 72
Here Douglass is articulating the injustice of the cultural representation of African
Americans. Douglass is right to recognize this as a case of injustice in that
iconography, especially when given the veneer of scientific inquiry, has the
power to influence the cultural perception of a people. Such images affect the
social image of a people, influencing public belief as to whether or not they are
deserving of respect. This would be one of the reasons Locke later utilized art
and visual representations of African Americans as a mainstay of his vindication
project.
Douglass also anticipates some of Locke‘s own arguments regarding
cultural reciprocity and the composite nature of peoples. Disparate nations ―may
be united in one social state, not only without detriment to each other, but, most
clearly, to the advancement of human welfare, happiness and perfection.‖73 As
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an example he points out that England would not have achieved its eminence
without the benefit of successive invasions and alliances with her people.
Douglass ends his talk by hypothesizing that all his argument as to the
unity of mankind could be wrong. Even if this were the case, even if Negroes
could claim no kinship to ―Nubians, Abyssinians, and Egyptians, they would still
be human. As Douglass eloquently puts it ―Human rights stand upon a common
basis; and by all the reason that they are supported, maintained and defended,
for one variety of the human family, they are supported, maintained and
defended for all the human family; because all mankind have the same wants,
arising out of a common nature. A diverse origin does not disprove a common
nature, nor does it disprove a united destiny.‖ Again Douglass prefigures Locke
by articulating a version of the principle of ―unity in diversity‖ that would shape so
much of Locke‘s philosophy. Douglass claims the essential characteristics of
humanity are the same everywhere. Regardless of color, all members of
humanity have a perfect right to freedom, life and liberty.
The line of African American thinkers who challenged racist ideology of
the nineteenth century would be too long to list here. However, this brief catalog
would be left wanting if it did not include some mention of Kelly Miller. Miller was
Miller was a mathematician, sociologist, essayist and newspaper columnist.
Born in 1863, Miller was a significant force in African American intellect life for
almost half a century.
Miller was a prolific writer, publishing articles in many newspapers and
magazines of the day. He was notable for answering many of the main tenets of
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racist ideology in his review of Frederick Hoffman‘s Race Traits and Tendencies
of the American Negro. Miller‘s assessment of Hoffman‘s work was that ―[t]he
main conclusion of the work is that the Negro race in America is deteriorating
physically and morally in such manner as to point to ulterior extinction, and that
this decline is due to ‗race traits‘ rather than to conditions and circumstances of
life.‖74 ―Race traits and tendencies‖ referred to biologically endemic
characteristics of race groups. They were not traits that could be acquired or
discarded but were the stamp of nature upon a people. Since race was
presumed to be a biological attribute intellectuals like Miller were bound to
answer the biological assertions made by race theorists of the time.
Though Hoffman claimed that being a German of foreign birth made him
immune to personal bias against the Negro, Miller claims, ―freedom from
conscious personal bias does not relieve the author from the imputation of
partiality to his own opinions beyond the warrant of the facts which he has
presented. Indeed, it would seem that his conclusion was reached from a priori
considerations and that facts have been collected in order to justify it.‖ Miller
was reacting to the pseudoscientific tendency not to look at data objectively but
to use it to justify already existent conclusions based on racist bias. For
example, with regard to census data on the ―Colored Population of the United
States,‖ Miller notes that Hoffman predicts the ultimate decline and
disappearance of the African American population based not on the general
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trend from 1790 – 1890 but only on the data from 1880-1890, when the African
American increase in population actually declined in comparison to previous
decades. As Miller notes
The author nowhere assigns any adequate cause for this sudden
‗slump‘ in the increase of the colored population. Instead of
attributing it, in part at least, to the probable imperfection of the
eleventh census, he relies wholly upon a blind force recently
discovered and named by him ‗race traits and tendencies.‘ The
capriciousness of this new factor, in that it may suspend operation
indefinitely or break loose in a day, does not seem to have occurred
to the author, at least it does not seem to affect the confident
assurance with which he relies upon it.‖75
Responding point by point, Miller brought attention to these ―capricious‖ factors
affecting the sociological data on African Americans, factors that were seemingly
dormant during slavery but suddenly awakened after Emancipation. Miller
grounded his response to dominant racist dogma by couching his language in the
same terminology, tacitly accepting that race was a biological concept.
The question of ―vitality‖ again reigned supreme. Hoffman considered it
―the most important phase of the so-called race problem,‖ and claimed
indisputable evidence that ―the Negro shows the least power of resistance in the
struggle for life.‖76 This fact is supposedly supported by death rates of the
colored race. Miller points out that the death rate of the colored race is no
greater than that of a corresponding class of whites in the same environment.
Further, the Southern states that had the largest contingent of African Americans
had no greater death rate than Northern states where African American
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population was negligible. As to the death rate for African Americans increasing,
Miller points to the death rates in major Southern cities from 1880-1895, which
clearly show a decrease in death rates for African Americans. Miller claimed that
the data simply did not support Hoffman‘s conclusions.
As previously stated, a mainstay of racist ideology was the idea that race
mixing was disastrous for the peoples involved, generating a product that was
inferior to both constituent parts. Hoffman claimed the crossing of the Negro
race with the white has been detrimental to its true progress, and has contributed
more than anything else to the excessive and increasing rate of mortality from
the most fatal diseases, as well as to its consequent inferior social efficiency and
diminishing power as a force in American national life.‖77 This proposition was of
extreme importance, Miller claimed, because African Americans were a
thoroughly mixed people. Hoffman relied upon a study by Dr. Sanford B. Hunt, a
United States surgeon and pioneer in the field of anthropometrics, as proof that
the mulatto brain weight, while less than whites, was greater than ―pure‖ Negro.
This fact was to substantiate the proposition that mulattos were intellectually
superior to blacks yet inferior to whites. Dr. Hunt was from a line of American
anthropometrists that began with Morton.78 Yet Miller pointed out that the sample
that this proposition was based on was far too small to extrapolate to the wider
population, and that Hunt had no way of knowing the true percentage of ―white
blood‖ such that it could not be concluded that white blood increased brain size.
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Further, Miller lights upon the glaring fact that basing intellectual capacity upon
the shape and size of the skull afforded no certain criterion of thought power or
susceptibility to culture.79 Such was the power of Morton‘s influence on the study
of race traits more than fifty years after the publishing of Crania Americana that
the supposed link between cranium size, race and intelligence was still in some
circles taken for granted. Miller gives the question of intellectual capacity of
different races a great deal of attention because he realized the bearing it had on
issues of educational and philanthropic endeavors. If African Americans were
simply incapable of higher levels of thought, there was little impetus to improve
educational opportunities. However, Miller argues that it is the circumstances,
not the abilities of African Americans that are limited: ―The Negro‘s intellectual
and social environments hang as a millstone about his neck: and when he is cast
upon the sea of opportunity he is reproached with everlasting inferiority because
he does not swim an equal race with those who are not thus fettered.‖80
In ―As to the Leopard‘s Spots: An Open Letter to Thomas Dixon, Jr.,‖
published in 1905 Miller continued to refute racist ideology by addressing another
popular proponent of the ideology. In this instance he was responding to
Thomas Dixon, Jr., the author of The Clansman, a racist and bestselling book of
its time. In the book the Ku Klux Klan are portrayed in heroic terms as the
defenders of white American civilization from black savages seeking to tear it
apart. Dixon‘s first novel, The Leopard‘s Spots, published in 1902 ―capsulized
most of the themes and ideas which would appear in just about all of Dixon‘s
79
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later writings: the innate brutishness of blacks, their natural inferiority, and the
constant danger they presented to American civilization.‖81 Miller‘s response did
not appear until three years later in 1905. Dixon, like Hoffman, was especially
preoccupied with the idea of racial amalgamation, which was a significant source
of anxiety for nineteenth century racists.
No doubt influenced by the popular doctrine of Social Darwinism, Dixon
believed that blacks were inherently bound to a lower evolutionary scale than
whites, and no amount of melioration could bring them up to the level of whites.82
Dixon thought that blacks had an innately limited capacity for civilization, such
that African Americans were not supposedly able to fully partake in American life
and were in fact a danger to American civilization. Miller addresses Dixon‘s
allegations by pointing out that civilization is not the domain of any one race and
that progress is inevitable: ―Civilization is not a spontaneous generation with any
race or nation known to history, but the torch is handed down from race to race
and from age to age, and gains in brilliancy as it goes.‖83 African Americans, he
claims, have progressed in the same way as whites, by taking advantage of all
that has come before them. Groups ascend and descend the ladder of
civilization in relation to each other:
In the course of history the ascendency of the various races and
nations of men is subject to strange variability. The Egyptian, the
Jew, the Indian, the Greek, the Roman, the Arab has each had his
81
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turn at domination. When the earlier nations were in their zenith of
art and thought and song, Franks and Britains, and Germans were
roaming through dense forest, groveling in the subterranean caves,
practicing barbarous rites, and chanting horrid incantations to
graven gods. In the proud days of Aristotle, the ancestors of
Newton and Shakespeare and Bacon could not count beyond the
ten fingers. As compared with the developed civilization of the
period, they were a backward, though as subsequent development
has shown, by no means an inferior race.84
Here Miller not only draws attention to the ―strange variability‖ of race
ascendency but he also explicitly identifies the proof of civilization with aspects of
culture – ―art and thought and song.‖ In his own language Miller does refer to
―backwards‖ races, claiming that their members are not necessarily inferior to
members of more advanced races and that a ―few choice individuals, reinforced
by a high standard of social efficiency…are capable of adding to the civilization of
the world.‖ Capacity for and contribution to civilization are benchmarks of human
civilization. While blacks have not yet made a contribution to world civilization in
his eyes, Miller clearly believes that is on the horizon, for he claims ―The Negro
enters into the inheritance of all the ages on equal terms with the rest, and who
can say that he will not contribute his quota of genius to enrich the blood of the
world.‖85 Contribution to world civilization through culture was of significant
concern for Miller, as it was for other African American intellectuals of the time.
They were aware that cultural contributions were the way in which peoples were
judged. In order to controvert the charge of racial inferiority, African Americans
would have to demonstrate proof of culture.
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Though Miller effectively responds to the mainstays of racist ideology as
articulated by Hoffman and Dixon, he does not reframe the debate outside of the
biological concept of race. That is not to say that his response was not
necessary or effective; it was of the highest importance for African American
intellectuals to respond to the calumny perpetrated by sources of racist ideology.
Though he and Locke differed on the type of language used (Miller favored the
language of the disciplines of biology and sociology while Locke favored the
language of anthropology), they both attempted to unravel the hold racist
ideology had on the popular and scientific discussions of the day. Miller was not
the only one to utilize the authorial voice of science to attempt this. Though
Miller did not attempt to revise the notion of race, he nonetheless presented a
significant challenge to race science and racist ideology. While revising the
notion of race may have been outside of Miller‘s purview, other African American
intellectuals were revising the concept in such a way as to vindicate black people
in both senses of the term.
Both Du Bois and Locke put forward their revisionist concepts of race at a
time when most discussions of race were dominated by appeals to scientific
authority. Strategies opposing racist ideology and science took many different
forms, including ‗transvaluation,‘ whereby some of the terms of the dominant
discourse were accepted but the valuations attached to them are changed.86
This strategy is evident in Du Bois‘s ―The Conservation of Races,‖ in two major
ways. Conscious of the authorial weight of science, he appropriated some of the
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language of scientific racism as a means of transcending the biological notion of
race. Secondly, as an Enlightenment thinker of his time, Du Bois was heavily
influenced by German idealism, especially the work of Georg Friedrich Hegel,
and the Western European concern with civilization and progress.87 Thus Du
Bois appropriated the language and approach favored by Hegel in his philosophy
of history. However, unlike Hegel, he used this framework to put African
Americans at the center of world progress.
By the mid nineteenth century, science had become the authorial
discipline devoted to the neutral apprehension and articulation of facts about
―nature,‖ where much of the discourse on race was located.88 Due to its
methodological foundations and its self-avowed commitment to neutrality and
objectivity, science was regarded as a non-political non-theological, supposedly
unbiased form of knowledge. This made it uniquely poised to arbitrate
discussions of nature and the innate character of all known organisms, including
human beings. By the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, scientific
discourse eclipsed moral and theological discourse in authorial power. From
1870 to 1920,
science became more specialized and authoritative as a cultural
resource and language of interpretation. It began to replace
theological and moral discourse as the appropriate discourse with
which to discuss nature. Science also encroached heavily on
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political discourse, as many political issues were transposed into
the realm of neutral ‗nature,‘ the scientists‘ province. 89
As science solidified its standing with regard to discussions of nature, black
intellectuals found themselves increasingly at a disadvantage when trying to
attack racist science in non-scientific language. Though many black intellectuals
continued to mount moral, theological and political arguments for the
fundamental equality of African Americans, these arguments were less and less
effective. Thus, as an adaptive strategy, they adopted some of the language and
methodologies of the dominant discourse of science.
In ―The Conservation of Races‖ Du Bois begins his discussion of race by
giving using the language typically used in discussion of racial groups. He talks
of the generally accepted racial categories -- Slavs, Teutons, English, romance
nations, Negroes, Semitic peoples, Hindus and Mongolians -- then lists the
smaller groups of peoples classified under these headings. Du Bois is using the
idioms of race as they were discussed during his time. This was a notion of race
that relegates all differences between peoples to the biological and physiological
differences. He acknowledges vast physical differences between races, but
knows that differences in physiology are not enough to explain deeper
differences cohesiveness and continuity of groups.
Du Bois defined race is defined as ―a vast family of human beings,
generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions
and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the
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accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.‖90 Du
Bois acknowledges the ways in which race is popularly conceived in terms of
physical differences and quantified the science of the day. He claims that the
biological evidence usually referred to in scientific discussions of race -- blood,
color, and cranial measurements -- ―play a great part,‖ in how the races of man
are conceived. However, mere physical distinctions cannot explain the ―deeper
differences‖ among the races, those that perpetuate cohesiveness and continuity
of these groups or the spiritual or psychical differences between/among groups.
These deeper differences, Du Bois acknowledges, are ―undoubtedly based on
the physical‖; however, they infinitely transcend them.91 He claims that the true
forces which bind nations are, ―first, their race identity and common blood,
secondly, and more important, a common history, common laws and religion,
similar habits of thought and a conscious striving together for certain ideals of
life.‖92 Du Bois uses the language of science making reference to the biological
criteria favored by scientific racism of the time. However, he changes the values
placed on these criteria, attempting downplaying their importance.
From the outset, it is apparent that Du Bois sought to challenge the
metaphysical underpinnings of the claim that some persons are inferior to others
by virtue of race. He attempted to refute biological determinism or the belief that
the intellectual, rational and moral abilities and capacities of persons are based
upon physical properties they possess. Contrary to the methods employed by
90
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some of his contemporaries, most notably Frederick Douglass, Du Bois did not
attempt to minimize racial distinctions. Instead he acknowledges these
differences and attempts to explain racial distinctions while taking the
deemphasizing physical and biological characteristics by claiming they are not
nearly as important as the ―deeper differences‖ of history and spirit. Du Bois‘s
aim was not to deny that certain loosely defined racial types exist; rather, it was
to deny that racial types indicated the intellectual, moral or psychological nature
of the individuals displaying them. One of the goals of Du Bois‘s project was to
―inquire into the essential difference of races,‖ and to try to elucidate the ―real
meaning of race.‖93
As we can see from his definition of the concept of race, the ―real
meaning‖ of race for Du Bois will go beyond the biological and scientific
conceptions of race. ―The Conservation of Races‖ was Du Bois‘s attempt to
recast the concept of race, specifically African American racial identity, in a way
that would rethink historiography and reveal the noble destiny of a group that has
been chronically written off by the rest of the world.
By turning from the natural sciences to the human sciences (like sociology
and history), Du Bois minimizes the authorial power of biology and physiology to
define the concept of race. ―Conservation‖ challenges biological determinism,
―explicitly rejecting the belief that physical differences…between the races
account for psychological or ‗spiritual‘ differences. Instead [Du Bois] looks to
social and historical factors for an explanation.‖94 In this turn to history, Du Bois
93

CR, 229.

56

draws upon resources from Hegel‘s philosophy of history. By recasting the
historiography of Africa and African Americans, Du Bois seeks to resituate them
as central to world history and progress.
―The Conservation of Races‖ is based on a fundamental belief in racial
teleology. Du Bois is trying to recontextualize the past in order to project a new
future for African Americans. To reveal that future and make public the idea of ―a
heroic people whose time to give the world their particular gift approaches,‖ Du
Bois takes on a reading of history that views the lack of contributions of Africa not
as a sign that African peoples will never contribute to the world history and
human progress, but as a sign that the time for their contributions draws near.
The notion of history Du Bois works from in ―Conservation‖
is teleological and is best understood in terms of an economy akin
to the notion of ―world history‖ that one finds in Hegel. The notion
of history that Du Bois contemplates within the intellectual economy
of ―The Conservation of Races‖ is ultimately worked out on a
spiritual plane where the purposive course of history is organized
not with a view towards the past, but rather with a view toward the
future.95
The history that Du Bois speaks of is not an empirical, linear progression of
events, but the unfolding of the spirit constitutive of a race. Similar to Hegel, Du
Bois recognizes that physical nature plays a part in the developments of history
and of peoples, though neither history nor peoples should be reduced solely to
their physical aspect.
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Like Hegel, Du Bois appears concerned with the progressive development
of human history.96 This may give us some insight as to why he regards race as
a ―most ingenious invention.‖ He claims that, ―[t]he whole process which has
brought about these race differentiations has been a growth,‖ and the great
characteristic of this growth has been the differentiation of spiritual and mental
differences between great races of mankind and the integration of physical
differences.‖97 Du Bois should not be read here as falling back into a form of
biological determinism. He is not making a claim about the mental or spiritual
capacities of racial groups; rather, he is describing or attempting to describe the
deeper, ―spiritual differences‖ that make up racial character. He seems to be
saying that nonphysical differences have grown more distinct as physical
distinctions have blurred. This also reflects certain ideas in German idealism
favored by Fichte and Herder – the idea that racialized identities and their
individual contributions are at the center of history, ―making collective racial
contributions the engine of historical progress.‖98 Hegel‘s influence also seems
evident in the way Du bois conceives of the relation of individuals to race and to
some kind of race-spirit. In Hegel‘s philosophy, individuals are seen as the
offspring of their people at a particular point in development, a development that
is driven by Spirit. Du bois sees the individuals as ―epitomized expressions‖ of
their races. Thus he claims that the achievements of the ―Pharoahs, Caesars,
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Toussaint and Napoleons of history,‖99 are not the achievements of atomized
individuals, but are the individual expressions of a collective spirit. In order for
this spirit to be fully realized for African Americans, they must conserve their
racial identity. Du Bois seems to posit that African Americans are themselves a
part of a progressive teleological development that will yield a revelatory selfconsciousness, and through that consciousness they will be able to finally
contribute their gifts to the world.
Du Bois‘s teleological commitments are what shape his notion of race.
The point of this racial teleology, besides being a means of resisting racial
assimilation and promoting political unity, was to combat the scientific racism and
biological determinism prevalent during Du Bois‘s time. His concept of race is
inextricably linked to an ultimate goal of world historical progress. Indeed, it is
that telos towards which he believed all races aimed. In this he and Locke
differed, which shall be demonstrated in chapter five.
Douglass, Miller and Du Bois are just part of a lineage of African American
intellectual challenges to racist ideology prevalent in the nineteenth century.
They attack some of the core beliefs of racist ideology – polygenism, race vitality,
race capacities and abilities and, of course, racial destiny. Though each of them
addressed an important issue in racist ideology, the issue of race and culture
seemed to be relatively untouched. Du Bois got the closest to tackling the issue
of the relation of race to culture in his attempt to revise the notion of race itself.
However, his notion of race gets bogged down in a dubious metaphysics when
he was unable to liberate the notion of race completely from its biological
99
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groundings. The specter of ―common blood‖ would beleaguer his notion of race
in the eyes of racial irrealists like Kwame Anthony Appiah. For, as Appiah
contends, Du Bois‘s reference to ―common blood,‖ ―dressed up with fancy
craniometry, a dose of melanin, and some measure for hair-curl,‖ amounts to the
scientific or biological notion of race.100 Lucius Outlaw defends Du Bois‘s notion
of race, claiming Du Bois ―seeks to articulate a concept of race that includes both
socio-historical or cultural factors (language, history, traditions ‗impulses,‘ ideals
of life) and biological factors (a family of ‗common blood‘).‖101 Beyond the
inclusion of common blood, there still remains the issue of the racial teleology
expressed in ―Conservation‖ whereby all races have a message they are
destined to give the world. Though salutatory to African Americans at a time of
disenfranchisement and severe oppression, depicting races as teleological
entities does not necessarily depict the true nature of races as sociohistorical
constructions that are necessarily contingent upon circumstances. In his efforts
to secure the status of the concept of race as an integral part of world historical
progress, Du Bois posits races and their race-gifts as foregone and inevitable.
This view translated into Du Bois‘s professional associations, most notably with
his involvement with the American Negro Academy.
Miller, Du Bois and Locke were members of the American Negro Academy
founded by Alexander Crummell in 1897. The Academy was formed to stimulate
100
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black intellectual activity by bringing together black artists and scholars from
around the world. This activity was to be a means of defending of black folk from
racist attacks. At the end of ―Conservation‖ Du Bois proposes an Academy
Creed that demonstrates his teleological commitments: ―We believe that the
Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to make to civilization and
humanity, which no other race can make…We believe in the duty of the
Americans of Negro descent, as a body, to maintain their race identity until this
mission of the Negro people is accomplished, and the ideal of human
brotherhood has become a practical possibility.‖102 While Locke was a member
of the Academy and undoubtedly shared its dedication to the education and
defense of black people, Locke did not share Du Bois‘s teleological that
commitments. Whereas Du Bois proposed that African Americans were divinely
preordained to give a certain message to the world because of their world
historical status, Locke would posit that African Americans had unique gifts to
contribute because of their cultural status as a people with a distinctive history
and experience. Though both Miller and Du Bois both recognized the cachet
cultural products brought to a group, it would be Locke who would explicitly
emphasize the value of African American cultural products as a means of
vindicating black humanity and proving black people capable of culture.
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Chapter Two:
Alain Locke: His Life and Philosophy
I.

Life and Education
Though he was one of the foremost African American intellectuals of the

early to mid 20th century, the life and philosophy of Alain Locke has only recently
garnered the attention they deserve. Alain Locke was born in Philadelphia on
September 3, 1885 to Mary Hawkins and Pliny Locke. Both his parents were
freeborn blacks and distinguished educators. Locke was the beneficiary of
educational advantage, both by birth and by circumstance. His paternal
grandfather, Ishmael Locke attended Cambridge University and taught briefly in
Salem, New Jersey before traveling to Liberia to set up schools for the native
population. In Liberia he met Mathilda Saunders, who was also involved with
providing educational opportunities for Africans. His father, Pliny Locke had a
career as a civil servant and schoolteacher. Locke was also descended from
educators on his maternal side. His grandmother, Sarah Shorter Hawkins also
engaged in setting up schools in Liberia. His mother Mary Hawkins was a
devoted teacher in Camden and Camden County where she supported herself
and her family from her wages. Notably, Mary Hawkins Locke was an adherent
of Felix Adler and was a member of the Society for Ethical Culture, which he
founded. Her dedication to education and her humanist leanings no doubt
influenced Locke who would later claim he was ―more of a humanist than a
pragmatist.‖1
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Compared to other blacks, Locke led a privileged life, especially in terms
of education. Locke attended one of the country‘s best public institutions,
Philadelphia‘s Central High School, and in 1902 entered an extension of the
institution, the School of Pedagogy and Practice.2 At what would be called a
teachers‘ college today, Locke developed an interest in the vocation and
techniques of teaching as well as honed his writing skills through the completion
of a writing-intensive course load. During this time Locke‘s sense of himself as a
scholar began to develop. Being the son of ―native Philadelphians and
schoolteachers,‖ Locke was groomed early on for a professional career. Like
many upper class blacks of the time, Locke was imbued with the notion that
education and a strong sense of propriety would defend against racial prejudice.
Though Locke would face many situations where his cultivated decorum and
respectability did not protect him from the perniciousness of racism, they
nonetheless were features of his personality that would persist throughout his
life.
While at the School of Pedagogy and Practice, Locke wrote an article on
the topic of moral training in school that foreshadowed several issues that would
dominate his later intellectual life. In the article he suggests that education is
moral or it is nothing.3 He further suggests that since school influences conduct
and standards of right and wrong educators should be aware of this and
purposefully work out a set of decisions about ethical questions. In order to
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promote an atmosphere conducive to discussions of ethics calls for the creation
of ―a definite subject matter for moral training; and this is the classification and
study of the moral qualities.‖4 Years later Locke would write extensively on the
theme of values. In addition to calling for the classification of moral qualities,
Locke urges teachers to see the place of moral training in all subjects. Literature
in particular allows the individual to imagine different modalities of being that are
useful in moral training. This anticipates the role he later hopes culture will play
in The New Negro movement.
Locke attended Harvard‘s philosophy department during its so-called
―Golden Age.‖ There he was influenced by luminaries like Hugo Münsterberg,
George Herbert Palmer, Josiah Royce, George Santayana and William James.
Harvard‘s intellectual and cultural atmosphere influenced Locke greatly. He
consciously sought out ways to take advantage of this atmosphere and grow
intellectually and personally. It was the first time Locke had the opportunity to
measure his own sense of himself as a member of the elite with others who were
every bit as elitist as he was. He was aware of Du Bois‘s notion of the ―talented
tenth‖ and his place among them. This sense of self would contribute to Locke‘s
ambition to be a leader of his race. It would also contribute to his sensitivity
regarding how he and other blacks were viewed by American society. Locke was
one of the few blacks who had access to the elite spaces in American life,
environments that were typically dominated by whites. This had the effect of
inculcating him with a certain classism exhibited in his personal comportment that
was often directed to members of the lower classes. Locke was especially
4
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unforgiving of those he deemed ―coarse‖ or crass, especially in the case of (but
by no means limited to) other African Americans with whom he would come into
contact. Believing Harvard to be a ―broad-minded place,‖ he could not abide the
separatist tendencies of some African Americans who segregated themselves
socially. Race and group identity would be an ongoing subject of contention for
Locke. Though Locke was thoroughly African American in his social and personal
identity, he did not feel that group membership precluded interracial contact or
appreciation, a notion that would dominate his personal and professional life.
When given the opportunity to associate with a wide range of people, Locke took
to it in earnest, creating a wide network of associations, most built on academic
interest.5
As an undergraduate Locke pursued courses of study in philosophy and
literature, often mingling the two subjects. It was during this time that his interest
in value theory emerged, an interest that would continue well into the 1930‘s. In
the course of his studies Locke wrote on the distinction between fact and value,
moral perfectionism, and the nature of free will. Though he never took classes
with him, James‘s pluralism and pragmatism seem to have embedded in Locke‘s
consciousness early on. It was another theme Locke would return to in his later
writing.
It was at Harvard that Locke‘s race consciousness and talent as a cultural
critic matured. He addressed literary issues regarding the question of group
representation, the need for moral standards, and the ―right use of a cultural
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tradition.‖6 The need for genuine cultural representation was not lost on Locke
even as a young scholar. Even at this early stage he articulated the need to
participate in and give back to the literary tradition that African Americans are
born to, both by virtue of their Americanness and their uniqueness as a people
with a distinctive history. In particular an essay Locke wrote on Paul Laurence
Dunbar anticipates the themes he would return to in his cultural writings in The
New Negro and his writings on the need for race consciousness. In the essay he
stresses the importance of honoring the unique race tradition that blacks had
inherited. Locke understood that blackness was undervalued and denigrated
and often taken as shameful burden instead of an honored birthright. He claimed
that the price of civilization was becoming civilized and similarly that the price of
the English language was contributing to literature. Giving back to the literary
tradition and to civilization as a whole required the recognition and reverence of a
peoples‘ unique traditions. While tradition was part of African Americans‘
birthright, Locke felt it was not something to be passively had. Self-discipline and
self-cultivation as a means to the realization of that birthright would be an integral
component of his theory of culture.
In 1907 Locke won the Bowdoin Prize, one of Harvard‘s most prestigious
academic commendations undergraduates could achieve. In May of that year he
graduate magna cum laude with a Bachelors degree. He went on to become the
first African American Rhodes scholar. He desired to travel outside of the United
States not only to further his education but to gain perspective on the ―race
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problem‖ outside of the American context.7 His experience at Oxford was mixed
to say the least. He would later refer to Oxford as the ―Imperial Training School.‖
One thing that came of his Oxford experience was his intellectual discourse with
Horace Kallen, a philosopher with whom he would develop a lifelong relationship.
Kallen had been the section instructor in a course with Santayana at Harvard and
was at Oxford as a Sheldon Scholar.8 Out of their conversations about the
significance of ―racial differences‖ came the term ‗cultural pluralism‘ or
‗multiculturalism‘. Though Kallen is most well-known for originating the term, he
credited Locke with helping to develop the idea.
Like all people of color during his time, Locke was aware of racism though
he was not prone to attribute objectionable experiences to his race. While he
was not on the lookout for racism, it nonetheless found him. One of his first
experiences of racism was in regard to his admission to the colleges at Oxford.
Locke‘s application was refused by five of the colleges based on race. Though
he was eventually accepted by Hertford College the question of racial
discrimination loomed over the entire affair. Unfortunately, this would not be the
last time Locke experienced the pernicious racism of Oxford. Two incidents of
racism apparently came out in the press. Both were the precipitated by
American students. The first occurred shortly after Locke arrived on campus.
The American Rhodes Scholars traditionally held a Thanksgiving dinner to which
all American students were invited. At the behest of the American contingent
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from the South, Locke was not invited. The snub wounded Locke deeply. The
second incident reported in the papers occurred when the American Ambassador
extended an invitation to Locke to attend a luncheon at a London hotel. White
students from the South asked Locke not to attend. Ignoring their request, Locke
attended the luncheon anyway. Locke found that America‘s racism extended
beyond its shores. He had entered Oxford as a confirmed cosmopolitan. After
his experiences there, he would leave it as a race conscious intellectual.
Another influence that shaped Locke‘s vision of culture was his
participation in the Cosmopolitan Club at Oxford. The purpose of the club was
―to promote mutual knowledge and sympathy between members of different
nationalities residing in Oxford.‖9 The club was overtly committed to removing
―national or racial prejudices‖ by introducing its members to new ideas and
modes of thought. Many of the members were colonial subjects and Locke‘s
contact with them helped him situate his experience and the problems facing
people of color in a global context.
Locke left Oxford without a degree; his examiners rejected his thesis on
value theory. Though he suspected the rejection was racially motivated, he did
not challenge it for fear that it would adversely affect subsequent black applicants
for the Rhodes Scholarship. He spent 1910-1911 at the University of Berlin.
There he took classes with Georg Simmel, whose emphasis on interpretive
rather than empirical sociology Locke found appealing.10 Two aspects of
Simmel‘s work would influence Locke greatly. First, Simmel‘s distinction between
9
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social formations and concrete content seem to have provided support for
Locke‘s concept of cultural reciprocity. If social forms could be analyzed
independently of their unique content then cultural roles and activities could be
understand as part of an overall cultural framework. If certain roles in one culture
had analogs in another then cultural translation could occur yielding greater
understanding and mutual respect. Second, Simmel‘s conception of subjective
and objective culture would resound strongly with Locke. Objective culture can
be described as the objective world of tools, objects and knowledge that have
been produced in the realms of science, philosophy and art. Subjective culture is
the capacity of individuals to produce, absorb, and control the elements of
objective culture. This capacity is a product of self-cultivation and development.
Locke would encourage is students at Howard University to take on the selfimposed duty to develop their capacity to understand and appreciate higher
forms of art. Commitment to self-cultivation would remain an important feature of
Locke‘s work throughout his life.
Before returning to the United States to teach at Howard University, Locke
attended the 1911 First Universal Races Congress in London. There he heard
Franz Boas present his a paper titled ―The Instability of Human Types,‖ which
would shape Locke‘s own view of race and the impermanence of racial types.
Boas‘ work would aid Locke in formulating his own idea of cultural reciprocity.
W.E.B. Du Bois and Felix Adler also presented. The congress was an
international gathering of eminent speakers on the topic of race and interracial
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relations. For Locke it would serve to confirm a distinct course for him in the
intellectual and conceptual study of race.
In the early months of 1912 Locke went on a six-month tour to learn about
Negro education in the South.11 On this trip he joined Booker T. Washington, the
foremost race leader of the time, whom he had met earlier in 1903. He and
Washington had corresponded the year before, and Washington had taken an
interest in Locke‘s academic career. Venturing into the South Locke experienced
his first close-up view of the poverty and racism plaguing the region. Locke
would later state that it was on this trip that he acquired his ―life-long avocational
interest in encouraging and interpreting the artistic and cultural expression of
Negro life‖ believing in its ―efficacy as an internal instrument of group integration
and morale and as an external weapon of recognition and prestige.‖ 12 Later that
year he took a position at Howard University as an assistant professor at the
Teachers‘ College. There he taught courses in English and Philosophy. Taking
a leave of absence from 1916-1917, Locke returned to Harvard to complete his
Ph.D. He attained his doctoral degree in 1918 with a dissertation entitled ―The
Problem of Classification in Theory of Value.‖ In it Locke offered an alternative
to purely logical theories of value that took human values to be ―well formed and
fixed structures‖ that could be captured by a unified science.13 Instead he
proposed the ―Dynamic and Genetic Theory of Value,‖ that considered all
11
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categories, including those of human values, to be subject to change. Locke
returned to Howard where he would remain until 1953 when he retired.
Bahá’í Influence

II.

One aspect of Locke‘s life that has only recently received attention was his
membership in the Bahá‘í Faith. He converted to the Bahá‘í Faith in 1918 during
the time in which he was finishing his Ph.D. Though Locke was very active in
Bahá‘í-sponsored events, he was not openly Bahá‘í. The Bahá‘í value system
and its promotion of ―race amity‖ held a deep attraction for Locke and ultimately
converted him to the Faith.14 The Bahá‘í Faith is based on the teachings of its
founder Bahá‘u‘lláh (1817-1892) who is considered the most recent ―Messenger
of God.‖ By the time of Locke‘s conversion, Bahá‘ís had distilled their beliefs into
ten or twelve principles that guided their faith. These principles were usually
formulated as:











The oneness of mankind;
Independent investigation of truth;
The common foundation of all religions;
The essential harmony of science and religion;
Equality of men and women;
Elimination of prejudice of all kinds;
Universal compulsory education;
A spiritual solution of the economic problem;
A universal auxiliary language;
Universal peace held up by a world government.15

Locke would dedicate himself the realization of these principles by becoming a
Bahá‘í. Above all Bahá‘ís advocated for universal brotherhood, maintaining that
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humanity is one race. The inclusiveness and commitment to equality would have
appealed to Locke‘s own sense of egalitarianism and fairness. His date
conversion to the Bahá‘í faith was 1918, in year he received his PhD from
Harvard. It was a banner year for Locke, achieving both scholarly and spiritual
enlightenment.
Locke was a ―race man‖ of his time. Indeed race was to be a topic he
would write on copiously. In addition to his scholarly and literary activities on the
race front, Locke was also involved in the ―race amity‖ efforts of the Bahá‘í.
―Race amity‖ was determined that American Bahá‘ís used to describe their public
campaign to promote interracial unity.16 It was an ambitious yet pragmatic
movement for its time. Bahá‘ís sought to bridge the racial divide and promote
healing and social justice. Locke was a part of these efforts. By the early part of
the 20th century racial segregation was institutionalized in the United States.
Races were lawfully separated in every part of civil society. Given such climate
Bahá‘í efforts at ―race amity‖ were quite radical for the time. The Bahá‘í ―race
amity‖ era lasted from 1921 to 1936. Though race amity initiatives work critical
for the development of the American Bahá‘í community, there are many
individuals who, while intellectually committed to racial equality, were not
personally ready for the social transformation racial equality would bring. Locke
had to deal with resistance to social transformation within the Washington DC
Bahá‘í community. He was one of the African-American Bahá‘ís who worked
ardently to put the tenets of the Bahá‘í faith into practice. Though he was
relatively sheltered from the brunt of racism in his youth, he had experienced
16
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racial prejudice as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford and seen firsthand the pernicious
racism of the Deep South on his tour with Booker T. Washington. When Locke
was first introduced to the Bahá‘í faith in 1915, he was shown a vision of the
world transcending the racial intolerance of Jim Crow. It can be argued that the
Bahá‘í vision of race amity reinforced Locke‘s own race theory as articulated in
his 1916 lecture series on race relations. Locke articulated the possibility of
America‘s remaking its racial injustice into racial equality and the creation of a
new racial entity that would not only unite two disparate races but creates a new
racial creativity that neither race would be a capable of by itself. He envisioned
the ultimate unity (but not uniformity) of all races. His philosophical arguments
were the secular analog of his Bahá‘í spiritual ideals.
Locke‘s service in the Bahá‘í faith spanned more than three decades.17
The majority of his work was to promote ―race amity.‖ Locke‘s contributions
came at a critical juncture in early Bahá‘í development. Even though the early
Bahá‘í community was in a constant state of flux, Locke remained steadfast in his
commitment to Bahá‘í principles. Though his activity with the Bahá‘í community
was often sporadic this did not diminish the impact of his efforts. Locke served
on several Bahá‘í race amity committees and participated in numerous race
amity conferences and other Bahá‘í sponsored events. Locke participated in
three race amity conventions between 1921 and 1924. The purpose of race
amity conventions was to open up the possibility for the realization of the Bahá‘í
ideal of racial harmony. These events were cultural affairs. They included
programs of inspiring speeches, music, and poetry. Locke paid particular
17
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attention to the details of these programs, believing that culture was the ―goodwill
ambassador of interracial contacts‖.18 The amity conventions likely reflected
Locke‘s own tastes in that they had a distinct literary and artistic aspect. Just as
he utilized art to promote the cause of African-American cultural equality he also
used it to promote Bahá‘í principles. Locke also served on race amity
committees from 1924 until 1932. In addition to his service on race amity
committees, Locke also spoke at Bahá‘í sponsored events from 1921 to 1952.
Besides his Bahá‘í service, Locke also made two pilgrimages to Haifa, the sites
of the Bahá‘í Faith‘s sacred shrines. His first pilgrimage was in 1923, the
second in 1934. After his1923 pilgrimage Locke wrote his first Bahá‘í publication
―Impressions of Haifa‖ that was reprinted three times.
Locke wrote a total of four essays published in six volumes of The Bahá‘í
World. At the time The Bahá‘í World was the most important Bahá‘í publication
outside of translations of Bahá‘í sacred writings. It was the international voice of
the Bahá‘í Faith. In addition to ―Impressions of Haifa,‖ Locke also wrote ―Unity
Through Diversity: a Bahá‘í Principle,‖ ―The Orientation of Hope,‖ and ―Lessons
in World Crisis.‖ Both ―Unity in Diversity,‖ and ―The Orientation of Hope,‖ were
included by Leonard Harris in The Philosophy of Alain Locke: Harlem
Renaissance and Beyond. In addition to being statements of Locke‘s Bahá‘í
convictions, the essays also touched upon the themes expressed in his
philosophical writings, especially those of reciprocity and equivalence. In ―Unity
Through Diversity,‖ Locke notes that in the midst of the ―negative upsets and
breakdowns in the contemporary world‖ that there is a common trend towards
18
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universalism. He articulates the social dilemma by claiming ―we feel and hope in
the direction of universality, but still think and act particularistically.‖ It is at this
point that unity in diversity becomes relevant to offer ―a spiritual common
denominator of both ideal and practical efficacy.‖19

Unity, he claims, is not to be

confused with uniformity, nor is it to be achieved through forced agreement or
conformity. The task at hand is to learn how to ―discover unity and spiritual
equivalence underneath the differences which at present so disunited and
sundered us,‖ and to ―establish some basic spiritual reciprocity on the basis of
unity in diversity.‖20 The principle of unity in diversity is a basic tenant of Bahá‘í
teachings.

Locke warns against the partisanship arising from promotion of this

principle as exclusively Bahá‘í and instead admonishes loyal Bahá‘í not to stress
the origin of the idea but its practical merit. Reciprocity and equivalence are
mainstays of Locke‘s philosophy of value and cultural pluralism. Though it was
meant for a Bahá‘í audience, ―Unity Through Diversity‖ bears a striking similarity
to Locke‘s philosophical writings, especially his writings on pluralism. In an
interesting move Locke defends the right of oppressed classes and races their
own nascent partisanship as a part of the movement towards social justice.
These groups cannot legitimately be asked to discard their partisan allegiances
until the older partisanship that created them ―abdicate their claims and
presumptions.‖
Locke‘s faith and philosophy coalesce when expressing his admiration for
Josiah Royce‘s principle of loyalty. Loyalty on Royce‘s account is a morally
19
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significant commitment to a cause and a community. True loyalty is loyalty to a
good cause that not only serves you but aids in the furtherance of loyalty in
others. For Locke, Roycean loyalty seems to imply ―equivalence in value‖
between one‘s own loyalty and the loyalty of others. By starting with the
―unequivocal assertion of equivalence and reciprocity between religions,‖ Locke
believes that the Bahá‘í teachings have hit on the heart of the issue, offering a
resolution of ideological strife while respecting differences in belief.

Locke

believed this principle of equivalence reciprocity must be carried into social and
cultural fields because they ―the support and adherence of the most vigorous and
intellectual elements in most societies can be enlisted.‖21 This would have the
effect of translating Bahá‘í principles into secular terms and offer a greater
opportunity for practical application of those principles.
Locke went through periods of estrangement with the Bahá‘í community,
especially during the decline of its race amity initiatives. Even so, he maintained
his commitment to Bahá‘í principles. Though he kept a distinct separation
between his religious and professional lives, it is evident that there were some
points of crossover where his philosophical beliefs and his religious convictions
overlapped, or at the very least, mirrored each other distinctly. His Bahá‘í faith
was one of the driving forces behind his commitment to pluralism and
democracy.
III.

Race, Culture, and Values: A Chronology
Outside of his Bahá‘í writings, Locke‘s work can be roughly divided into

three main themes: race, culture and value. These would dominate his
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intellectual life from the early 1900‘s to the end of his life. The 1910‘s and 20‘s
would be marked by his interest in culture and the concept of race. This is
evident in his 1916 lecture series on ―Race Contacts and Interracial Relations.‖
―Race Contacts‖ was one of his extended examinations of race and racial
formations. It stands as one of his most thorough examinations of the concept of
race. Though race had featured in his writing previously, ―Race Contacts‖ was
the clearest expression of his thinking on race to date. In it he undermines the
scientific basis for both race and racism and puts forth the idea of race as a
cultural construct. He gives a theoretical and practical account of race,
examining the origins of race feeling and explaining how we came to have the
―race creeds‖ that we have today. In his theoretical analysis he argues that purity
of racial type was a myth. Rather all peoples were highly composite, the result
of many crossings and contacts with other groups. The persistence of the race
idea should be explained as a cultural phenomenon, not as a biological
occurrence. Race as applied to social and ethnic groups has no meaning
beyond a sense of kith or kin that can aid in maintaining the unity of ethnic
groups. In a position he would return to in ―The Concept Race as Applied to
Social Culture,‖ Locke claims that race
amounts practically to a social inheritance, and yet it parades itself
as a biological or anthropological inheritance. It really is either
favorable or unfavorable social inheritance, which has been
ascribed to anthropological differences. To the extent, therefore,
that any man has a race, he has inherited either a favorable or an
unfavorable social heredity, which unfortunately is typically ascribed
to factors which have not produced it, factors which will in no way
determine either the period of those inequalities or their
eradication…And although there is a certain factor of permanence
to them, the encouraging thing is that from the minutest biological
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factor to the subtlest social factor there can be discovered no factor
at present which is static – which is not subject to chance and
variation.22
To say that one has the race is really just to say that one has an either favorable
or unfavorable social inheritance. Race inequalities were the result of historical
economic and social causes the, not due to any static anthropological factors. In
his practical analysis of race he argues against the prevailing racialist point of
view regarding ―superior‖ and ―inferior‖ races. Races are conceived of as
―superior‖ or ―inferior‖ depending on their political fortunes and not from any
innate qualities or traits stemming from anthropological factors. ―Superior‖ races
are those that have been the most successful politically. It is political dominance
that generates the idea of racial supremacy. Imperialism is the practical aspect
of ―race practice‖ as opposed to race theory. Modern imperialism is the forcible
imposition or substitution of the dominant civilization for that of the conquered
group. Locke attributes the ―color line‖ to the practice of what he refers to as
commercial imperialism. Commercial imperialism, he claims, is the effort of
Anglo-Saxon nations to further trade dominance by imposing their civilization
onto any alien group they can persuade or force to adopt it.23 Political
dominance usually follows this relation. This dominance reinforces the creed of
race superiority. Locke also pays special attention to the phenomena of race
contacts, attempting to extrapolate the laws that govern these contacts. He
attempts to negotiate the two extremes regarding the conception of race
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contacts: that they are completely automatic or that they are totally deliberate.
While some natural race antipathy is to be expected with the amalgamation of
groups and consciousness of kind, what governs race contacts is determined by
underlying political, social, or economic disparities. Locke debunks modern race
fallacies derived from 19th century racist ideology. At issue is the fundamental
error of identifying race in a biological sense with race in the political and social
sense. Lastly Locke‘s talks about racial progress in race adjustment. Though
imbued with many invidious meanings race the idea that cannot be eradicated,
only superseded by some revised iteration of itself. Race, is ―a word covering so
indispensable, useful, and necessary grouping in human society will never
vanish, ―Locke claims,‖ never be eradicated, and that the only possible way in
which a change will come about will be through a substitution of better meanings
for the meanings which are so no current under the term.‖24 The only concept of
race that is still viable is social race, which he defines narrowly as civilization
type.25

Every civilization produces its type. That is, every civilization manifests

a predominant social structure and institutional framework that its members are
obligated to conform to. Conformity to civilizations types is the prerequisite for
participation as a full citizen. Those who conform to civilizations types must be
admitted into society as full members. This brings up the question of assimilation.
Locke claims that human societies are essentially assimilative and that modern
society cannot really tolerate any great divergence from essential social
conventions. Modern systems seem to require social assimilation. In one of the
24
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more interesting moves of the book, Locke advocates social conservation for
black people as a means of facilitating assimilation into American society at
large. Social conservation helps to develop a representative class that in turn
produces representative products that contribute something unique to the larger
society. While conforming totally to America‘s civilizations type, black people,
through social conservation, can contribute culturally to the richness of American
culture.
In 1923 he published ―The Ethics of Culture,‖ an essay that began as a
lecture given to Howard University freshman the year before. The essay is the
clearest articulation of Locke‘s belief in a normative standard for selfdevelopment. In this essay he regards culture as ―the capacity for understanding
the best and most representative forms of human expression, and of expressing
oneself, if not in similar creativeness, at least in appreciative reactions in
progressively responsive refinement of tastes and interests.‖26 This capacity was
not innate and could not be passively attained. Locke advocated the cultivation
of tastes not strictly out of elitism, though this did play a part in his thinking. He
was concerned that black genius was being produced in excess of the black
community‘s ability to support it. Without support he believed such genius would
wither and die out. Therefore he attempts to persuade his audience to adopt of
the self-imposed duty to be cultured.
Locke refined his redefinition of race in ―The Concept of Race as Applied
to Social Culture,‖ published in 1924. Growing out of the same vein as ―Race
Contacts and Interracial Relations,‖ this essay argues more concisely for a
26
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redefinition of race in terms of culture. It also reflects Locke‘s attempt to utilize
the framework of sociology and anthropology to provide grounding for a concept
of race that would be applicable across disciplines. Emphasizing the role that
human intentions play in conferring meaning upon concepts such as race, Locke
argues again that race is a matter of social or cultural heredity, not biological
heredity.
The work that Locke is most widely known for is his role in the Harlem
Renaissance, also known as the New Negro Movement. Locke was a driving
force behind the cultural movement of the 1920s and 30s, promoting the work of
young black artists like Langston Hughes, Zora Neale Hurston, Countee Cullen
and Claude McKay. He was the editor of the book that was arguably the
manifesto of the movement, The New Negro. The book was an extended
version of an edition of the journal Opportunity: Journal of Negro Life and Survey
Graphic, to which Locke was an avid contributor. Established in 1923, the
journal was an important source of black literature and culture. In 1924 Locke
was asked to produce a special issue focusing on the demographics of Harlem.
The issue ―Harlem, Mecca of the Negro was later remade into The New Negro,
published in 1925. Locke, like other black intellectuals of the time knew that
dominant conceptions of race portrayed blacks as unable to produce culture.
The New Negro openly challenged that presupposition by presenting the
literature, poetry, music and visual art of black people. While the anthology
avoids polemical racial questions, it stood in stark opposition to the racist
conceptions of race and culture. Locke saw artistic expression as a means of
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self-creation and self-definition. In his eyes there was at that point more written
about blacks than by them, a situation The New Negro sought to rectify. One of
the aims of the movement was to foster a positive identity that would establish
black people as able to contribute to the American civilization type and to world
culture. No true self-understanding could be achieved without a radical
redefinition of blackness, and Locke saw the production of unique artistic
products as part of this redefinition.
Though Locke was a prolific writer, he did not publish a formal
philosophical essay until he was 50. ―Values and Imperatives,‖ was published in
1935. The essay harkens back to his undergraduate interest in value theory.
The opening line can be read as a statement of Locke‘s personal philosophy: ―All
philosophies, it seems to me, are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and
not of abstract, disembodied ―objective‖ reality; products of time, place and
situation, and thus systems of timed history rather than timeless eternity.‖27 In
this essay he argues for the rejection of metaphysical absolutism, emphasizing
valuation as a process of transvaluation and transposition. Imperatives, or
compelling rules, guidelines and actions, are not metaphysical absolutes existing
outside of place and time but rather are generated by human intentions and
experience. Thus imperatives are always grounded in social and historical
contexts. This does not diminish the need for absolutes in everyday living but
would place them on the non-absolute ground of human meaning. Locke would
always reject any system based on absolutes in an effort to promote peace and
reciprocity. This theme would continue in his philosophical writings. In ―Cultural
27
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Relativism and Ideological Peace‖ and ―Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy,‖
Locke warns against the perils of absolutism in all its varieties–religious,
philosophical, political, and cultural. He argues that historically unity has been
achieved at the cost of universality, and that absolutism‘s way to unity is through
authoritarian conformity and subordination. He instead proposes a form of value
relativism that allows one to maintain loyalty to one‘s own value system without
demanding conformity of others. Instead of merely asserting that the truth of a
proposition depends entirely upon the entity doing the interpreting, and that no
value-consensus is possible due to the myriad of cultural differences, Locke
proposes a system of cultural interpretation that emphasizes functional
equivalences or ―culture-cognates.‖ In order to recognize these equivalences,
specific cultural forms would be abstracted; consideration of such forms would
not focus on particular instantiations but rather would focus on their function
within a culture. In that way cultural forms could be considered without specific
cultural content. The underlying belief of Locke‘s relativism is that if we look
beyond the particulars of individual cultures we will find functional equivalences
that can be a basis for cultural tolerance and mutual respect. This would achieve
a the ―fluid and functional unity rather than a fixed an irrevocable one, and it‘s
vital norms are equivalence and reciprocity rather than identity or complete
agreement.‖28 Locke's rejection of an absolutist stance and his promotion of
tolerance and reciprocity are hallmarks of his overall philosophy.
Locke contributed liberally to fields outside of philosophy. From more
than two decades Locke wrote literary reviews. In these reviews Locke often
28
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addressed pressing themes in black literature of the time. They also served to
gauge the temperament of an increasingly diverse culture. He also edited When
Peoples Meet: A Study of Race and Culture Contacts, a collection of essays
published in 1942 devoted to the idea that civilization had benefited from the
intercultural contacts and that there was a link between intercultural contact and
the development of civilization. Locke was a tireless advocate of adult education
and wrote extensively on the subject. In his public roles of cultural critic and
race leader Locke was nothing short of Renaissance man. As a philosopher he
was careful and rigorous in his treatises on race, values and culture. His
intellectual legacy reflects his diverse background and interests. That legacy
includes significant contributions to philosophy, cultural criticism, race theory,
aesthetics and adult education.29
Culture featured prominently in almost all areas of Locke‘s interest. Being
a talented polymath, it is difficult to say what was his greatest intellectual
contribution. His role in the Harlem Renaissance has often eclipsed his other
contributions, not the least of which was his conception of multiculturalism, or as
he also referred to it, cultural pluralism or intercultural reciprocity. Culture, for
Locke, was both battleground and olive branch; it was the area in which he
believed African Americans could most readily distinguish themselves while at
the same time it was a means of détente with a dominant group that was often
hostile to their interests. Locke believed that by understanding cultural
equivalences, difference could be rendered intelligible, and unity through
diversity could be achieved. He also understood that it was through the products
29
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of culture that a people would be judged. Locke brought his understanding of the
complexity and significance of culture into all areas of his work, including his race
theory.
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Chapter Three:
Locke’s Theory of Race
I.

Early Race Theory: Race Contacts and Interracial Relations
Because of his education and background, Locke was uniquely situated to

challenge the racism of the early twentieth century. He did this by attacking the
underpinnings of traditional race science. Locke puts forth the main part of his
race theory in his lecture series, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, and in
his essay ―The Concept of Race As Applied to Social Culture.‖ This lecture series
and essay had the aims of demystifying race and racism. Locke begins the
lecture series with what is effectively his purview for the course:
Race is not one thing–it is many things. In fact it has so many
meanings that even were each meaning scientifically correct, there
would necessarily arise conflict among such meanings, which
would precipitate certain problems. When we reflect upon the
possibility of this scientific confusion of meanings, we see that in
this problem of race we are confronting one of the most perplexing
and one of the most baffling of problems that can confront the
social thinker.1
Locke's main interest is in discerning a clear meaning for the concept of race.
Locke credits Gobineau as the inaugurator of race theory. However his entire aim
seems to have been to support the idea of ―superior‖ and ―inferior,‖ races. This
implies a normative standard by which all races could be ranked. This takes
anthropology outside of its appropriate domain as a descriptive science and
instead forces it to take up a normative project, which is outside of its purview.
Anthropological race theory has degenerated into pseudoscience, assuming its
own conclusions while trying to prove them. Locke claims that race science
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pushed anthropology towards supporting the premise that there are ―superior‖
and ―inferior‖ races and applying this conception to the whole of human history.
Locke claims that there is no stable physical basis for the sociological
concept of race. That is to say, physical factors merely register the biological
history of groups but do not have any direct bearing on social culture. Race does
not determine culture as there are ―no parallels between the anthropological
factors of race and its position in social culture or adaptability for social culture,
and any judgment about the influence of biological factors on social culture is a
false and very risky deduction.‖2. Claims that biological factors influence social
culture are on very shaky ground and have little merit. Biological or physical
factors are so variable that attempting to establish a definitive link between them
and cultural factors is impossible. Locke picks up on a point made by later race
theorists like Anthony Appiah, that there is almost as much biological variability
within a race as between races: ―one can find more variability in the
anthropological differences between one class of Frenchmen and another class
of Frenchmen than when you take an average European and compare him with
an average African or a Malay.‖3 As early as 1916 Locke was arguing that the
concept of race could not be based solely upon physical characteristics.
In Locke‘s time as now discussion of race differences also included
discussion of race inequalities. Racist ideology would have us believe race
differences are causally linked to race inequalities when in reality they merely
parallel each other. Locke argues that it is race inequalities that must be
2
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explained in terms of historical, economic and social factors, while race
differences must be explained in terms of anthropological and ethnological
factors. He argues further that there are no static factors of race. The factors
determining race inequalities and differences in social culture do not correspond
to physical factors. Historical factors such as language, customs, habits, social
adaptability, and social survival are the real keys to the fate of a people.
Inequalities are traceable to these factors and not to physical or biological
factors. ―Superior‖ races are simply those that have been more successful than
others due to a myriad of historical factors, not some innate, essential quality, the
presence of which is indicated by physical traits.
In the first lecture of the series, ―Theoretical and Scientific Conceptions of
Race,‖ Locke claims that, ―Really, when the modern man talks about race, he is
not talking about the anthropological or biological idea at all. He is really talking
about the historical record of success or failure of an ethnic group.‖ Biological
race is an ethnic fiction, one useful for group cohesion but without merit with
regard to actual race groups. That does not mean that racial groups do not exist
but it does mean that the features they pride themselves most are not permanent
traits. According to Locke they have "neither purity of blood nor purity of type.
They are the products of countless intermingling of types, and they are the
results of infinite crossings of types.‖4 The meaning of race when applied to
social and ethnic groups is a sense of kind, or rather a sense of "kith and kin"
which can have beneficial effects for group cohesion. Though it may be useful,
this sense is not based in physical uniformity of type.
4
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In his discussion of theoretical conceptions of race Locke articulates a
significant component of his race theory that he will reiterate in his later essays
on race. That is the concept of social inheritance. Social inheritance or social
heredity is the way in which social meaning is passed down from generation to
generation. It is the method by which customs, habits, traditions, and the beliefs
come together to create social forms by which we rendered the social world
intelligible. Locke claims that
race…amounts practically to social inheritance, and yet it parades
itself as a biological or anthropological inheritance. It really is either
favorable or unfavorable social inheritance, which has been
ascribed to anthropological differences. To the extent, therefore,
that any man has race, he has inherited either a favorable or an
unfavorable social heredity, which unfortunately is typically ascribed
to factors which have not produced it, factors which will in no way
determine either the period of hose inequalities or their eradication.5
Locke imports some of the language of biology specifically his use of the term
heredity. While this could be read as an inability to free himself fully from
biological conceptions of race, it is more accurate to say that Locke recognizes
that there are some aspects of our social identities which we do not have control
over and cannot change. These social positions are passed from parent to
offspring in ways that could not be accounted for as mere historical combination.
Although there are certain features of race that have a seeming permanence,
there are actually no features, physical or social, that are static and unchanging.
These features of race are always being formed and reformed. Race is a
persistent social feature that is passed on alongside physical features but should
not be utterly reduced to them.
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Locke focused on anthropology in his analysis of the concept of race
because it was a discipline devoted to the study of humankind and its varieties.
Race theory as such was a naturally part of the burgeoning discipline.
Anthropology would develop along two distinct lines, physical anthropology and
cultural anthropology. At the time Locke was examining its basic tenets
anthropology was dominated by the study of human physical attributes but was
beginning to take up cultural attributes in a more meaningful capacity. It was
Locke‘s affinity for culture that made him look to anthropology and his devotion to
rigor that caused him to challenge its claims regarding scientific nature of race.
II.

The Problem of Race Classification
Locke continues to challenge racial dogma in his essay ―The Problem of

Race Classification.‖ In it he further interrogates the supposed relation of race to
culture by examining the factors that are supposedly indicative of race.6 Race
science of the nineteenth century assumed there were definitive criteria for racial
classification. These criteria were based on physical traits that were considered
stable over time. Locke proposes that the problem is not a lack of facts or data
with regard to racial classification, but rather that criteria for determining race
have been somewhat arbitrarily selected. There was always the question of
exactly which physical attributes were legitimate criteria for determining race and
which were not. Locke claims that to maintain the idea of physical race groups
as was basic to anthropology, then workable criteria for race classification must
be found. If this is not possible then we must abandon the notion of race groups
as ―unscientific.‖
6
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The main difficulty arising from a notion of race based solely in physical
anthropology is that of how to categorize physical differences scientifically in a
way that will explain racial differences. Since the biological notion of race
prevalent in the nineteenth century attempted to define racial criteria in terms of
physical characteristics, such as hair texture, skin color, facial features, cranial
measurements and the like, any ―scientific‖ notion of race constantly ran into the
problem of the heterogeneous nature of physical race criteria. Like Du Bois,
Locke noted that the glaring problem with biological notions of race was that
physical characteristics are notoriously messy and difficult to attribute definitively
to one race or another. For as Du Bois noted, ―Unfortunately for scientists…these
criteria of race are most exasperatingly intermingled. Color does not agree with
texture of hair, for many of the dark races have straight hair; nor does color agree
with the breadth of the head… nor, again, has the science of language as yet
succeeded in clearing up the relative authority of these various and contradictory
criteria.‖ Indeed, anthropologists of Locke‘s time, such as Roland Dixon, whose
book The Racial History of Man Locke reviews in this essay, acknowledged the
lack of definitive criteria for biological and physical definitions of race, yet still
turned to physical data ground their talk of racial types. Locke‘s critique of
Dixon‘s work can be read as a critique of the race theory of his day. Physical
anthropology by the 1920‗s had moved beyond the ideas of the American school.
It was widely acknowledged that ideal racial types did not exist, yet there
remained a tendency to treat them as if they did, and further to attribute to them
stable cultural traits and capacities that allowed them to have the same effect on
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civilization wherever they were found. Even in the work of a modern
anthropologist like Dixon vestiges of Gobineau remain in that the advancement of
civilization was still driven by members of European bloodlines.
In his discussion of racial types, Dixon relied almost exclusively on three
cranial measurements he believed to be unchangeable by environmental
conditions, even over thousands of years. These measurements supposedly
reflected racial heredity. It is notable that Dixon was using the same criteria for
race that Morton used eighty-four years prior in Crania Americana. More than
mere coincidence, this demonstrates how much pseudoscientific racist ideology
of the nineteenth century held sway two decades into the twentieth century. In
choosing the cranial measurements that he did, Dixon was ironically attempting
to be scientifically rigorous when he posited the existence of ‗ideal‘ racial types.
Even while attempting to radically simplify racial criteria, Dixon could not declare
with absolute certainty what would qualify as true criteria of race. This did not
stop him or other anthropologists of the time from offering solely physical criteria
for ideal racial types. Even Dixon himself recognized that the ideal types he
describes, fail to match up to any existent racial groups. Locke mentions that
even Franz Boas, the man often referred to as the father of modern (cultural)
anthropology, took exception to the characterization of these artificial types,
claiming that they did not ―fit the most elastic possibilities of racial cross-breeding
and intermixture.‖7
The paradox of Dixon‘s book is one Locke sees within anthropological
attempts to elucidate the nature of race generally. In confronting the shortfalls of
7
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Dixon‘s book Locke is challenging accepted racial ideology of his day. Locke
takes Dixon‘s book as indicative of a flawed tendency among anthropologists and
race theorists to assert ideal racial types while at the same time acknowledging
that no such types actually exist. This is ironically due to Dixon‘s attempt at rigor,
i.e., his use on cranial measurements. Locke claims,
The paradox of Professor Dixon‘s book is that recognizing so
clearly that the criteria of race-type which he chooses cannot be
expected to conform with descriptive accuracy to the ‗natural racegroups‘, he nevertheless persists in treating them in his conclusions
as historical strains or actual races, with definite cultural traits and
heredity, and responsible for characteristic effects and influences
throughout human history.8
His reliance on physical data is a clear example of how a biological notion
of race will always be untenable and contradictory. Criteria for race types relied
almost exclusively upon anatomy, yet none of the alleged types could be
reasonably expected to conform with any descriptive accuracy to the ―natural
race-groups.‖ By claiming that certain ―historic strains‖ are responsible for
distinctive influences (like the propensity for civilization and culture) throughout
human history, Dixon echoed the belief that race determined culture, even
though his own criteria for race was anything but clear. Dixon‘s talk of ideal race
types then degenerates what Locke calls the ―eulogistic appraisal of the ‗favored
races,‘‖ attributing advances in civilization and culture to certain intermixtures of
racial types. Though racial ideal types did not actually exist he nonetheless
attributes certain cultures with certain racial types. Though he does not go as far
as Gobineau, Dixon does associate cultural development primarily with the
presence a single bloodline, the European ―Alpines.‖ Seeing this as yet another
8
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case of racial dogma derailing true anthropological investigation, Locke claims,
―[t]hus one more anthropologist goes over to the idols of the tribes.‖9 Though
modern anthropology was becoming more attuned to cultural or ethnic
characteristics of groups it seemingly could not completely divest itself of racial
essentialism. Locke claims that the underlying fallacy to Dixon‘s assessment of
groups is the assumption that the culturally dominant group has always coincided
with the physical dominant group. This tendency to identify ―cultural aptitudes
with ability to survive‖ is one that must be resisted10. The position of dominance a
group may occupy is in no way contingent upon physical characteristics. The
group whose physical characteristics have survived is not necessarily the group
that has culturally survived.
In Locke‘s view physical anthropology was confronting its own limitations.
Attempts to classify human beings based on anatomical characteristics were
fraught with problems. At issue was the problem of discovering ―some criteria of
true race,‖ and of ―finding some clue to the interconnection between physical
character and group behavior, psychological and cultural traits.‖11 Lacking any
such indication as to how these factors are related, Locke claims that
anthropology cannot legitimately expand its purview to include the classification
of cultural characteristics. Even further, he claims that anthropology must give
up concrete descriptive references to physical race type, as they do not
correspond to existent forms but rather to a system of ordering human bodies
9
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that does not correspond to the real world. When looking at the history of
human cultural development, Locke claims ―we would divorce the idea of race in
the physical sense from ‗culture-group‘ or race with regard to ethnic traits.‖12 If
anthropology took this point of departure, ethnic or cultural groups would then be
seen as having ―little or no inherent connection with physical race groups.‖
Locke sufficiently appreciates the problems inherent in providing a
coherent notion of race founded upon workable criteria. Even though the
empirical evidence did not support it, the belief that racial types were distinct still
held sway in anthropological and scientific discourses of race. Concomitant to
this view was the belief that each racial type was stable and unchanging over
time regardless of environmental or social influences. This view was somewhat
anachronistic given the prevalence of Darwinism. In opposition to this view,
Locke argues that there is no such thing as ―pure‖ race or type. Racial groups
were the dynamic products of infinite crossings and incalculable intercultural
contacts. Thus purity, as such, was a myth. Racial groups were by nature
complex and composite entities.
Locke found further resources to challenge the view that races were
stable and unchanging in the work of Franz Boas. Boas contradicted existing
racist dogma regarding race and cultural development in his lecture ―The
Instability of Human Types,‖ delivered at the Universal Race Congress in 1911.
In it, Boas addressed presumed links between the ―abilities of man‖ and certain
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stable and unchanging hereditary factors.13 Though he believed that the stability
of race types has a ―fundamental biological importance,‖ Boas claimed that the
absolute stability of racial types is implausible, as was the supposed link between
race and the human abilities. Drawing from data on the changes in physique and
development of individuals born to families in the United States and members of
the same families born in Europe, he concludes that environment is one of the
primary factors affecting mental and physical development. Moreover, Boas
claimed that the physical differences observed in the families indicated a decided
plasticity of human types.14 Though the degree of this plasticity was unknown,
especially with regard to mental capacities that are difficult to quantify given how
much they are affected by social environment, however, Boas claimed ―it is
evident that the burden of proof is shifted upon those who claim the absolute
stability of mental characteristics of the same type under all possible conditions
under which it may be found.‖15 Ultimately, the ―old idea of absolute stability of
human types must…be given up, and with it the belief of the hereditary
superiority of certain types over others.‖ Rejecting the superior-inferior hierarchy
of races, Boas also rejected the belief in a hierarchical scale of culture according
to which various races could be ranked. This view challenged prevailing notions
of scientific racism including the burgeoning political ideology of Social
Darwinism.
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Locke seized upon Boas as an ally in his struggle to dissociate the
concept of race from biological entanglements. Because Boas‘s work in
anthropology emphasized cultural features of groups rather than biological
features, this made him an attractive resource for Locke‘s work on the notion of
race. Building upon Boas‘s conclusions regarding the instability of human types,
Locke argues that race is not a biological concept and that pure race is a fiction.
Attempts to ground a biological notion of race inevitably fetishized racial purity,
holding it up as a previous favorable state or as a desirable goal for the future.
Neither position was legitimate or attainable. Any attempts to define the race
biologically in terms of purity were especially doomed to fail.
III.

Later Race Theory: “The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture”
In ―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,‖ Locke more

explicitly interrogates the relationship between race and culture. In Race
Contacts Locke sought to explicate race and the causes of racism and he did so
almost to the exclusion of culture. The role of culture comes to the fore in ―The
Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture‖ as it focuses on culture as the
content of social heredity. In this essay he attacks the idea that race and culture
are linked in a fixed relationship. Locke claims
In dealing with race and culture we undoubtedly confront two of the
most inevitable but at the same time most unsatisfactory concepts
involved in the broad-scale consideration of man and society.
There is the general presumption and feeling that they have some
quite vital and relevant connection but as to the nature of this or
even as to the scientific meaning of the individual concept there is
the greatest diversity of scientific opinion and theory.16
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The main problem arises from the assumption that the nature of the relationship
between race and culture is fixed or causal. It is Locke‘s contention that ―far from
being constants, these important aspects of human society are variables, and in
the majority of instances not even paired variables, and that though they have at
all times significant and definite relationships, they nevertheless are in no
determinate way organically or causally connected.‖17 Though he takes a firm
stance against the view that race and culture are in a fixed relationship, he does
not go to the opposite extreme and declare that race and culture are discrete
entities with no relationship at all.18 By asserting the variable relationship
between race and culture, Locke was attacking the widely held view that race
determined culture. He claims ―[t]he primary scientific use of this fixed linkage
between race and culture was to justify the classical evolutionary scheme of a
series of stepped stages in a historical progression of cultural development.‖19
That is to say, race was thought to be a determining factor in stages of cultural
development, and that race had a permanent or uniform alignment to culture-type
or cultural stages.20 Citing the work of Robert H. Lowie, Locke dismisses this
view as unsubstantiated. In his book Culture and Ethnology, Lowie observed
that extreme cultural diversity correlated to a relative stability of physical features,
and further that peoples classified as members of the racial group could display
an extraordinary variability in culture within a very narrow space of time. Locke
17
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took this as proof that race and culture had a variable and dynamic relationship,
and that any attempts to cast race as the determining factor regarding culture
were fundamentally in error and pseudoscientific. However, this does not answer
the question of how some culture traits associated with certain human types
demonstrate a kind of stability over time. These traits are by no means
permanent but they do have a substantial, though undetermined, relationship to
each other that could not be explained as ―mere historical combinations.‖ 21
Locke is careful to point out that denying that cultural characteristics are rooted in
inherent, biological, hereditary traits was not the same as denying that certain
cultural traits exist in identifiable racial molds. That is to say, we can assert the
presence of certain more or less distinctive cultural traits in a race without
claiming that those characteristics are biologically or physically determined.
According to Locke, if less emphasis was put on physical characteristics
with regard to race and more on the ethnic (i.e. cultural, religious, linguistic, etc.)
characteristics, a more tenable doctrine of the relationship between race and
culture would have been developed. That way, instead of race being understood
primarily in terms of physical characteristics, it would have been regarded
primarily as ―a matter of social heredity, and its distinctions due to the selective
psychological ‗set‘ of established cultural reactions.‖22 These ―cultural reactions‖
would be the traditions, preferred traits and values operating within the groups
called races. Though they are persistent, demonstrating relative stability over
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time, these reactions are not static. On this view, the stability (or variability) of
cultural traits within racial groups is attributable to social, not biological factors.
Although Locke aggressively undermines the biological notion of race it
would be wrong to assume that he wishes to do away with it altogether. Always a
pragmatist, Locke claims he is ―...fundamentally convinced that the term ―race,‖
the thought of race, represents a rather fundamental category in social thinking
and that it is an idea that we can ill dispense with.‖ 23 While acknowledging that
the future of the concept of race is undecided, Locke maintained that it
functioned as a significant category of social thinking in modern culture, and that
despite its unfortunate history, it should not be done away with as universally
untenable and conceptually bankrupt.
To Locke, race is real in the social or ethnic sense, not in a physical or
biological sense. It is a product of social and historical causes that do not
correspond to the biological causes of the variation of mankind. Race amounts
to a social inheritance that is camouflaged as a biological inheritance. Imposing
a normative standard for races is fundamentally wrongheaded. While it is fair to
say that there are such things as races in the world, it is incorrect to say there are
superior or inferior races. There are groups that have been more successful and
less successful at perpetuating their social culture. More successful groups have
a more favorable inheritance; less successful groups have a less favorable
inheritance. To say that one has a race is merely stating that one has inherited a
favorable or unfavorable social heredity. Race can only be rendered intelligible
through an understanding of cultural conditions and social and historic causes.
23
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Locke effectively inverts the prevailing view of the relation of race to culture. On
his view, race should be regarded as a culture-product.24 ―Instead therefore of
regarding culture as expressive of race, race…is regarded as itself a cultural
product.‖25 This is not to deny race consciousness or a ―sense‖ of race. It is,
however, to acknowledge the fact that race is an ―ethnic fiction‖ and that the unity
of races is artificial. Locke does not deny that the concept of race is a significant
part of cultural heredity. Again he locates it as a center of meaning, one that
determines important values which themselves become the ―conscious symbols
and tradition of the culture.‖26 These values are part of the culture making
process and are what accounts for the seeming permanence of culture traits.
Values in essence determine the social norms to which society conforms. Race
functions as a culture type generated by social norms, not by biology. It is
reinforced by the ―sense of race‖ as the feelings of unity and commonality and
becomes ―an accepted, preferred and highly resistant culture complex that
seems to be and often is self-perpetuating.‖27
Locke claims that:
Race operates as tradition, as preferred traits and values, and
when these things change culturally speaking ethnic remoulding is
taking place. Race then, so far as the ethnologist is concerned,
seems to lie in that peculiar selective preference for certain culture-

24

PAL, 193.

25

PAL, 193.

26

PAL, 194.

27

PAL, 195.

101

traits, and resistance to certain others which is characteristic of all
types and all levels of social organization.28
Race is a cultural product that is based on collective values and practices. In
keeping with his axiology, Locke does not believe that race is an objective entity
transcending place, time and circumstance. Race is a cultural artifact
determined by social and historical circumstances that generate particular culture
traits. The viability and longevity of these traits are always dependent upon the
values, traditions, intentions and practices of groups. While nature determines
the physical qualities of human bodies, it is human intentions and practices that
give meaning and significance to those qualities. One such practice is ―seeing‖
race, i.e. deciding that certain physical traits are constitutive of groups we call
races. As a socio-cultural concept, race need not correspond to an independent,
objective reality to be meaningful within the context of human lives.29 It remains
a legitimate concept to the degree that it is in accord with our values, intentions,
practices, traditions and shared meanings. As these change on a macro level, so
will our understanding of groups in the world we call races.
Although Locke claims the concept of race is a cultural product, he does
not tell us what kind of cultural product it is. That is to say that race seems to be
more than just a cultural product on par with all other cultural products. Race
does not seem to be of the same type of cultural product as a song, a piece of
literature, or an artwork. Rather, race is a conceptual cultural product, one that is
in a reciprocal relationship with other cultural products. Race is generative of
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cultural products like songs, pieces of literature and artworks but they also shape
race as well. In Race Contacts Locke claims that the only way to treat race
scientifically is to regard it as a center of meaning.30 Race is a conceptual
cultural product, a complex of values, intentions, desires, traditions and shared
meanings. These provide the soil out of which other cultural products are created
and molded. Thus race is produced by and productive of culture.
Locke‘s concept of race is appealing for several reasons. It does not
derive its explanatory power from some appeal to suspicious metaphysical
claims of an a priori nature. By understanding race as a cultural product that
must be explained in terms of social and historical causes, this allows us to have
an understanding of the contingent nature of race and racial projects. Races
according to Locke‘s concept of race are not teleological entities. There is no
specific end towards which they are oriented. They are products of time, place
and situation. By leaving out teleology from his concept of race Locke is able to
give an account of racial formation that takes into consideration the contingent
nature of human affairs. No race of people in the world was preordained to be as
it is. Instead races are dependent on socio-historical circumstances. The
creation of African Americans as a group was by no means a foregone
conclusion but was the product of a specific history and a specific set of social
circumstances including slavery, emancipation and Jim Crow. Any attempts to
render intelligible a phenomenology African American blackness will be
fundamentally lacking and prone to failure without some reference to and
understanding of the unique socio-historical circumstances that contributed to its
30
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emergence and the culture produced by those circumstances. This way of
thinking about race also seems to be able to explain the persistence of certain
cultural traits over time without attributing them in some fashion to biological
heredity. The social inheritance of race includes the values, practices, traditions
and beliefs that have not only gone into the actual production of racial groups
entailed in the ‗selective psychological ―set‖ of established cultural reactions‘ and
capacities that are communicated from one generation to another.
Locke‘s foremost concern was with the notion of culture as the ideas,
beliefs, values and knowledge that were transmitted and reinforced over time by
group members. Nineteenth century race science held that these ideas, beliefs,
values and knowledge were transmitted biologically and determined by race.
Challenging this relation would make available a new conception of race that was
historically, socially and culturally situated and not based upon biology. This was
Locke‘s objective: to revise the notion of race in such a way as to free African
Americans from the biological determinism that marked them as inferior. Locke
sought a way to vindicate black humanity by means of culture. By reversing the
emphasis of the culture-race relation, Locke opened up a way for African
Americans to appropriate their racial identities and reject the inferiority conferred
upon them by nineteenth century racist ideology. Shedding the biological
determinism that characterized so much of race theory at the turn of the last
century would not only dispel the idea of innately ―superior‖ or ―inferior‖ races, it
would allow for a real evaluation of cultures that would contrast values and allow
for cultural reciprocity.
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Chapter Four:
Vindication, Art and Cultural Reciprocity
I.

Vindication: Answering Racist Ideology
The act of vindication comes into play in cases where an accusation is

levied or a claim that is widely accepted is challenged. It is an attempt to counter
dominant assumptions or points of view. Vindication is an action taken up on
behalf of or persons, ideas or institutions. Vindication can be defined in two ways.
First, it is the act of defending against calumny, censure or accusation. In this
sense, to vindicate is to exculpate, exonerate or absolve from blame or slander.
Second, it is justification by means of proof or explanation. One can vindicate a
person or idea by presenting a logical proof or by presenting evidence. In ―A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman‖, Mary Wollstonecraft presents a
philosophical argument in favor of the education of women. This is a clear
example of vindication because Wollstonecraft argued that women should be
educated, an unpopular view at that time.
In common usage, vindication is used to describe an action taken on behalf
of something or someone that is unpopular or generally derided to the point of
defamation. Fundamentally it is an action motivated by moral sentiment. If one
attempts to vindicate something or someone, one necessarily feels that the thing
or person in question has been unjustly accused, maligned or defamed. A desire
for fairness motivates one to address and reverse this injustice. Vindication is an
action meant to both meliorate past harm caused by accusation or defamation
and to encourage a more positive conception in the future. When calumny
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dominates the state of affairs, vindication is the only action which can exculpate
the person or thing slandered.
In the early twentieth century African Americans as a people were the
object of derision and defamation. Academic and popular discourse held that
African Americans, as people of African descent, were naturally inferior to whites.
The widespread nature of this belief motivated Locke militate against it by
engaging in a vindication project on behalf of African Americans as a people. His
project can be divided into four major parts. First, he challenged the three major
tenets of nineteenth century racist ideology: the belief in superior and inferior
races, the belief in that race mixing was degenerative and would lead to the
downfall of civilization, and the belief that intellectual ability and capacity for
civilization were linked to phenotypic race. Second, in his revision of the concept
of race, Locke reversed the emphasis of the race-culture relationship. Third, he
promoted the cultural products of Africans and African Americans as proof of
culture in a bid to redefine blackness. Finally, he advocated the adoption of
pluralism and cultural reciprocity as modes of engagement with other cultures to
promote and maintain mutual respect and a more universal understanding
between peoples. I argue that this project is the end towards which Locke was
striving in his writings on race and culture.
As the first part of his two-fold vindication project Locke had to address the
main tenets of nineteenth century racist ideology. In Race Contacts and ―The
Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture‖ Locke advances his project by
positing a revised concept of race and races. He effectively challenges the idea

106

of innately ―inferior‖ and ―superior‖ races that was a mainstay of eighteenth and
nineteenth century race thinking. Locke claims that race science that supports
the designation of races in such a way is at its core pseudoscientific, attempting
to prove that which it has already adopted as a basic assumption. To posit
inferior and superior races is to attribute the occupation of a social position to
innate race characteristics supposedly dictating that position. Instead of
describing groups as having a particular social position in a particular time and
place, the inferior/superior binary imports a normative standard to what should be
a descriptive exercise.
The inferior/superior designation of races is spawned out of race
inequalities. Race differences parallel race inequalities, but that should not lead
us to believe that the relationship between them is causal. Race inequalities are
due to social, historic and political causes whereas physical race differences are
attributable to environmental causes. That the two parallel each other is an
unfortunate but a causal relationship cannot be substantiated, so the idea of
innately inferior or superior races is not tenable.
Locke dissolves any concerns about race mixing by debunking the idea of
the permanency of race types and the idea of racial purity. The concept of race
mixing itself presupposes the static nature of physical race. Utilizing the work of
Boas on the instability of human types, Locke effectively contradicts this
supposition. Further he claims that races are highly composite, the result of
countless crossings of bloodlines and types. Locke shows that belief in racial
purity is fallacious at its core. Physical race integrity does not exist and is not
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possible under current conditions of life.1 The fetish of racial purity is a social
and ethnic fiction. If racial stability and racial purity are fictions, race mixing
becomes irrelevant because all races are already mixed. Race mixing in Locke‘s
philosophy is not degenerative but a natural outcome of interracial contacts.
Further, as I will show later in this chapter, Locke makes the argument that
contact between disparate groups does not contribute to the downfall of
civilization but rather is productive of civilization.
Racist ideology held that only whites were capable of originating civilization.
Whites, as the superior race were supposedly naturally capable of thought and
ideas that blacks were not. Gobineau in particular argued that Africans were
incapable of the ideas needed to bring forth civilization. Locke repeatedly
reiterates that physical traits cannot and do not determine culture or the
production of cultural products, like ideas. The instability of race traits makes the
claim of exclusive ownership of ideas by a single race unjustifiable. Moreover it
is a mistake to assume the group that is politically dominant is also the most
productive culturally or that they alone contribute the best elements of culture,
including ideas motivating civilization. Intellect as an attribute of mankind cannot
with any reliability be aligned solely with whiteness, nor can it be excluded as an
attribute of blackness.
Addressing the three main doctrines of nineteenth century racist ideology,
Locke undertakes his project of vindication in the first sense, defense against
slander or calumny. The three main tenets of racist ideology amount to the
slander of an entire race. In order to vindicate black humanity, Locke had to
1
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have effective rejoinders to the accusations of black inferiority. Through his race
theory Locke attempted to defend black folk from the calumny of racist ideology
by presenting an alternative argument explaining race and race contacts.
Further, Locke presents proof that blacks were not inferior by promoting African
American cultural products in fulfillment of the second meaning of vindication,
justification by proof or explanation. As I have shown, an ongoing argument for
the inferiority of black folk was that they had no culture to speak of. African
American cultural products were proof positive that people of African descent
could have a distinctive culture and therefore contribute more broadly to world
culture. By promoting them Locke was providing grounding for his argument for
black humanity and equality and the ongoing respect of black peoples. Thus
Locke satisfies both definitions of vindication.
II.

Vindication and African American Cultural Products
The second and arguably most important part of Locke‘s vindication project

was his redefinition of the concept of race by reversing the emphasis of the raceculture relationship. The terms race and culture were more fluid at the times in
which Locke wrote and Race Contacts and Interracial Relations and ―The
Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture,‖ than they are now. This is
because the cleavage between biology and anthropology with regard to race and
culture had not yet occurred, and there was still some slippage between the
terms. In the twentieth century race would ultimately be assigned to the realm of
biology and culture would be assigned to anthropology.2 This was a change from
the nineteenth century where questions of human biology still fell under the
2
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purview of anthropology. During this time race was believed to manifest itself
visibly not just in appearance but in ―behavior and in disposition or talents.‖
In the early twentieth century culture was considered by most thinkers to
be determined by race. That is to say, culture was thought to be expressive of
race. If we take E. B. Tylor‘s classical definition of culture as ―that complex whole
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society," we can
appreciate the significance of this relation. Race was considered the motive
principle of the totality of human endeavors beyond mere survival. Capacity for
culture was dependent on race. The race-culture relation offered both an
explanation of and a justification for the social order. It grounded human
capacities and capabilities in the biological concept of race. The movement of
Social Darwinism in particular held that a group could only progress as far as the
limits of their own biology. Attributing culture to race amounted to biological
determinism. Reversing the relation of race to culture therefore had significant
ramifications. By arguing that race is a cultural product Locke takes away the
grounding for biological determinism. Instead of ―race explaining the cultural
condition, the cultural conditions must explain the race traits.‖3 Race emerges as
a unique cultural product, one loaded with meaning that is communicated
through social and cultural heredity. Race groups are products of ―peculiar
selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others.‖4
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Locke‘s redefinition of race and the subsequent reversal of emphasis in the
relation of race to culture are vital parts of his vindication project. By removing
race from the purview of biology Locke opens up the conceptual space for a nonessentialist notion of race. Locke conceives of race as a cultural product that is
made, not given, one that operates as ―tradition, as preferred traits and values‖5
that are subject to change and variation over time. This goes against nineteenth
century conceptions of race that considered race to be a static biological entity.
Locke‘s conception of race frees race from biological entanglements insofar as it
cultural traits take prominence over biological ones. Racist ideology needed to
maintain that race was biological in order to make sweeping pronouncements
about dispositions, talents and abilities of groups. By claiming non-physical traits
were based in biological racial traits, nineteenth and early twentieth century race
ideologues could maintain that black inferiority was a naturalized attribute. .
Without the permanence and stability of biology to ground such claims, they can
be dismissed as merely provisionally true or altogether false. A socio-cultural
notion of race forces us to acknowledge the circumstances under which race
comes into being and is inhabited.
By removing the lynch pin of biological grounding from the concept of race,
Locke effectively nullifies racist ideology. Historic successes and failures cannot
be attributed to any quality ―in the blood.‖ No race has an inborn ―destiny‖ outside
of the one they carve from social, political and historical circumstances. Locke‘s
conception of race frees African Americans from the pernicious historic
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association of blackness and inferiority. Even further, it opens up the future for
self-creation and self-definition.
―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture‖ was published just
one year before The New Negro. In ―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social
Culture‖ Locke argued that race is a cultural product just as he began in earnest
to promote the culture of African Americans through the arts in The New Negro. I
argue that this is not coincidental but part of his overall vindication project, that
Locke‘s aesthetic theory can be read as an extension of his race theory. Locke‘s
championing of African and African American cultural products was the next step
in the providing proof of humanity and dignity of black peoples. Further, Locke‘s
vindication project has ramifications beyond ameliorating the situation of African
Americans. African American vindication enables their cultural contributions to
be recognized and become part of world culture. Contribution to world culture
helps precipitate the optimal relation between peoples would be governed by the
principle of cultural reciprocity. Thus the vindication of African Americans has a
dual purpose: to foster the dignity and humanity of African Americans and to
promote cultural reciprocity.
In The New Negro, Locke championed the emergence of a new
generation of American blacks. This generation was ―vibrant with a new
psychology‖ and a new spirit of self-respect and self-dependence that allowed it
to break out of the stagnant specter of the Old Negro, a reified artifact racial life.
Locke claims that ―for generations in the mind of America, the Negro has been
more of a formula than a human being – a something to be argued about,
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condemned or defended, to be ―kept down,‖ or ―in his place,‖ or ―helped up,‖ to
be worried with or worried over, harassed or patronized, a social bogey or a
social burden…. His shadow, so to speak, has been more real to him than his
personality.‖6 Locke was witnessing a transformation of black society, brought on
first and foremost by a change in material conditions. Blacks were moving from
the South to the North and other parts of the United States and from the rural
countryside to urban centers. For the first time, Harlem put a diverse mix of
people of African descent in contact with each other. In his words, Harlem had
attracted ―the African, the West Indian, the Negro American; [it] brought together
the Negro of the North and the Negro of the South; the man from the city and the
man from the town and village; the peasant, the student, the business man, the
professional man, artist, poet, musician, adventurer and work, preacher and
criminal, exploiter and social outcast.‖7 This societal change echoed ―spiritually in
the life-attitudes and self-expression of the Young Negro, in his poetry, his art,
his education and his new outlook.‖8 Locke was witnessing a pivotal point in the
development of black culture and identity in the United States. The Harlem
Renaissance was an artistic undertaking, a way of shaping the dialogue of race
outside of the political sphere. Locke believed art and culture were powerful
forces that shape attitudes and beliefs about race.
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This brings us to the third part of Locke‘s vindication project. At the writing
of The New Negro Locke had already argued that race was a unique cultural
product, one shaped by the traditions, preferred traits and values of a group. In
this context the production and promotion of black cultural products served
several functions. Ostensibly the purpose of promoting black cultural products
was to promote ―respect for a people suffering from humiliation and selfloathing.‖9 However, on a more basic level it was glaring proof that people of
African descent were capable of producing culture. A mainstay of racist ideology
was that people of African descent, being of an inferior kind, were not capable of
culture because they innately lacked the natural abilities and capacities needed
to produce culture. African and African American cultural products challenged
this notion by providing legitimate proof of a unique culture . This was part of
Locke‘s vindication project in the second sense of vindication, justification by
proof. African American cultural product provided proof of black humanity and
dignity. This subverted claims of black inferiority. Locke‘s promotion of African
American cultural products thus served as a cogent move against the racial
inferiority thesis.
Another important consequence of Locke‘s promotion of African and
African American cultural products was that these products provided a way of
directly shaping the racial concept of blackness. Locke believed that art had a
vital relationship to culture. Not only was it expressive of culture, it also worked
to shape culture. The artist as a shaper of culture also had a central role in
influencing the concept of race. Specifically, African American artists of the
9
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Harlem Renaissance were influential in creating a new concept of blackness that
exploded nineteenth century racist ideology. Their art was ameliorative for the
self-esteem of black people while at the same time fostered a new conception of
blackness as a seat of creativity and moral virtue.
Knowing full well the calumny black people faced regarding their origins,
abilities and potential, creating a new conception of blackness was no small feat.
Locke strategically chose art as a realm of freedom and transformation where
group expression was possible. This was a necessary first step since, as Locke
noted, there was more written about African Americans from the outside than
there was by black people themselves. Art and literature were also useful as a
means of cross-cultural contact between African Americans and the white
mainstream of the America. Cultural rapprochement was and is often more
available in the arts than in politics. That is not to say that Locke did not value
direct political action to advance the cause of black people. However he valued
the power of art to change the cultural discourse.
To remedy the problem of distorted representation Locke introduces The
New Negro as an attempt by black artists to articulate a form of self-definition of
a people at a pivotal point in their cultural development. With the influx of rural
and foreign-born people of African descent converging on America‘s urban
centers, most notably Harlem, what it meant to be black in America was
undergoing transformation. Locke wanted to announce the new developments in
black life. Art was a kind of self-portraiture, one that could be a force in American
social culture.
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Locke‘s call for cultural products that were representative in character was
articulated as early as 1916, though the Harlem Renaissance was not
announced until 1925. These products, he believed, would come out of the
development of a ―secondary race consciousness.‖ In Race Contacts and
Interracial Relations Locke advocated the cultivation of secondary race
consciousness or race pride as a measure to increase group self-respect and
promote self-defense while assimilation is in progress. Secondary race
consciousness is a
counter-doctrine one finds in racial solidarity and culture…It is
necessary for several practical reasons. The group needs, in the
first place, to get a right conception of itself, and it can only do that
through the stimulation of pride in itself. Pride in itself is race
pride…This race pride or secondary race consciousness seems to
be the social equivalent to self-respect in the individual moral life.10
This consciousness is necessary for the group to gain a right conception of itself,
and like W. E. B. Du Bois in the― Conservation of Races,‖ Locke believes this can
only come with the stimulation of pride in itself. Race pride a different type of
loyalty than loyalty to civilization type, though the two are not mutually exclusive.
Secondary race consciousness serves the purpose of preventing the
representative classes from being absorbed into the larger group while joining
them to the subculture that in turn, stimulates the general progress of the
group.11 Unlike W.E.B. Du Bois‘s ―Conservation of Races,‖ this is not a theory of
race isolation or race integrity; rather it is a theory of social conservation ―which
in practice conserves the best in each group and promotes the development of
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social solidarity out of heterogeneous elements.‖ It does not set up airtight
boundaries between mainstream and subculture. The barrier between
mainstream and subcultures is always porous, which is necessary since the two
must remain in contact with each other. Mainstream culture will always have
ingress to subcultures. This artificial barrier does however does dissuade egress
of talent and resources from the subculture until such time as it can be brought
up to the general level of the mainstream. Similar to Du Bois, Locke advocated
for the conservation of the resources of the minority until such time as it can be
socially and politically on par with the majority.
Secondary race consciousness or race pride is necessary for the
development of representative classes within a group. These are classes within
of the group that especially epitomize racial genius and produce ―race
representative‖ products. These products could not be achieved through
assimilation or subsumption in the mainstream, though assimilation is the
ultimate aim of modern societies. While social imitation is to some degree
necessary to achieve this goal, social imitation alone is not enough. In fact, it
can exacerbate social friction in societies where social position is secure.
Secondary race consciousness and similar nationalist movements of minorities,
as paradoxical as it sounds, can aid in assimilation. Culture, for Locke, was not
without its responsibilities. African Americans were obligated to conform to the
American civilization type, which they readily did. The outer objectives of African
American life were ―happily already well and finally formulated, for they are none
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other than the ideals of American institutions and democracy.‖12 However, they
could not achieve true culture-citizenship and incorporation into American
institutions without contributing to American civilization and culture. To that end
the cultivation of group talent and production of representative cultural products
are valued not only for their intrinsic worth but as part of African American
contribution to American joint culture.
African American art and literature thus had much more than a decorative
or entertainment function. They were the necessary third step in Locke‘s
vindication project. They were the means by which African Americans prove
their cultural capabilities are on par with whites and they were the means by
which African Americans can contribute uniquely to American culture. Locke
believed that cultures were necessarily composite in nature. The uniqueness of
African American art was the result of amalgamation of African and American
cultures but also a product of African American‘s marginalized place in society.
Racial themes were the backbone of the Harlem Renaissance. The movement
could be seen as the answer to a call Locke issued in Race Contacts:
Now, the Negro has been denied the positive influence of any racial
tradition because of slavery, which not only has cut him off from his
traditions, but which has engendered in him the attitude to
repudiate it, even though, of course, some of the best efforts of the
next generation must be toward reinstating what is honorable and
what is real of value in that repudiated and artificially amputated
past.13
The Harlem Renaissance was an attempt to recover and revalue that which had
been repudiated in the light of racist ideology. More than that, it was an attempt
12
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to redefine the concept of race on the American scene. Locke believed that
African American art was one way to liberate the American mind from the morass
of racial misunderstanding. He understood that ―it does not follow that if the
Negro were better known, he would be better liked or treated,‖ but he also
believed that mutual understanding was ―basic for any subsequent cooperation
and adjustment.‖14 The Harlem Renaissance used art and literature as the
vehicle for that understanding.
Locke‘s championing of African American cultural products was a
pragmatic response to the hegemony generated out of racist ideology. That is
not to say his was the only response available to African Americans at the time.
However, given his understanding of race as a cultural product, his choice to
promote African American artworks was a way to achieve his vindication project.
African Americans, he argued, were vested in the redefinition of people of African
descent worldwide and that work would take place over time with active
participation in social and political causes. Even so he still claimed ―…but for the
present, more immediate hope rests in the revaluation by white and black alike of
the Negro in terms of his artistic endowments and cultural contributions, past and
prospective.‖15 Revaluation of African Americans in terms of cultural contributions
would issue an effective challenge to racist ideology that claimed people of
African descent were incapable of culture. The New Negro should be read as a
bid for cultural par. It is the proof of African Americans as conscious contributors
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to culture and as ―collaborator[s] and participant[s] in American civilization.‖16 The
necessity of cultural reciprocity is the hallmark of Locke‘s overall philosophy.
African American contribution of cultural products fulfills their obligation to
participate in American culture and civilization, a burden incumbent upon any
people wishing to become part of a society. The status of artists is an elevated
one, for it will be the cultural recognition they receive that will ―prove the key to
that revaluation of the Negro which must precede or accompany any
considerable further betterment of race relationships.‖17
Locke distinguished three stages pertaining to African American cultural
products. In the first phase of African American cultural products, literary
products were self-consciously racial and redemptive whereas the plastic arts
were imitative and derivative of European styles. Literary products especially
engendered a propagandistic quality. Locke considered them self-consciously
racial and redemptive in theme. They were hyper-defensive as they were the first
literary confrontations with racist ideology. These works, in his estimation, were
sermonizing in that they were excessively concerned with confronting
assumptions of inferiority. This preoccupation, while perhaps justified, limited the
depth and meaning of the works. Characterized by ―poetized propaganda and
didactic sentiment,‖18 this phase demanded of African American artists portrayals
of black people merely in a positive light. Racial expression was an obligation
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rather than a natural artistic product of experience. This phase of artistic
expression was a necessary step in African American artistic development. It
provided a counter-narrative to racist ideology in a realm of artistic freedom and
imagination. It was the first articulation of positive images of African Americans.
However it was also a time that Locke considered limiting to artistic creativity in
the zeal to present those types of images. Because they had much to prove,
much these initial forays into the cultural landscape were overly centered on
confronting assumptions of inferiority and dealing with latent inferiority
complexes. This art eschews genuine expression of African American life in its
variety and facets for the undifferentiated template of propaganda.
It might be argued that propaganda would fulfill Locke‘s prerequisite of
contributing to culture in exchange for enjoying its rewards. However,
propaganda fails to make an artistic contribution. To be art and not merely
propaganda, racial themes must be expressed organically as part of the spirit of
the age, not as an oppressive obligation. Though propaganda is better than
insipid imitation, it is not an ideal artistic expression. Propaganda cannot do the
work of racial reconceptualization because it ―perpetuates the position of group
inferiority even in crying out against it.‖19 It is ―too extroverted for balance or
poise or inner dignity and self-respect.‖ Propaganda by nature is a performance
for the outside eye, ever conscious of the message to be delivered. True art in
the best sense is ―rooted in self-expression and whether naïve or sophisticated is
self-contained.‖ It is not reactionary in nature, like propaganda, but self19
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confident. Propaganda always allows the discourse to be set from the outside
and any self-expression of the artist is constrained and molded to fit its message.
Even if delivery of that message is successful, propaganda cannot reframe the
debate. It always ―speaks under the shadow of a dominant majority whom it
harangues, cajoles, threatens or supplicates.‖ Though propaganda seems like a
resource for the minority group, it is one of limited usefulness. Rather than a
stance of self-justification, Locke advocates a position of self-conviction, and ―in
the dignity of this attitude a convinced minority must confront a condescending
majority.‖ African American art that comes out of African American life
unapologetically and confident within itself will speak more convincingly of black
humanity and dignity than propaganda ever will. This stage of African American
cultural products could not adequately or genuinely contribute to the formation of
a concept of race because it was too limited in its portrayal of blackness to be a
real source of conceptual significance. While art alone cannot accomplish this
completely, Locke believes it can lead the way.
The second phase of African American cultural products shed some of this
overt preoccupation with redemptive racial themes and began to be expressive of
race in less artificial ways. This phase was viewed by Locke as the adolescence
of African American cultural products, exemplified by The New Negro. More
mature culturally than the initial phase, it was less propagandistic and more selfassured than self-conscious in its racial expression. It was unapologetic and
confident, more expressive of artists‘ vision than social sermonizing. In this
phase artistic works are more racially representative precisely because artists
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were freed from the obligation of rhetorical racialism. It let the hated caricature of
African Americans wither by not reinforcing it by protesting against it. The New
Negro, as the augur of the second phase of African American culture was the
articulation of the social and spiritual changes in African American life. It
dislodged previous notions of race through the creation of new racial images. It
was the social and cultural remolding of African American-ness made public
through the production of unique cultural products. The New Negro was part of a
cultural movement that intentionally sought to change the traditions, preferred
traits and values to forge a new notion of race. In the process of this remolding
African Americans also gave a valuable contribution to the world and could now
be recognized as participants in world culture. Though the Harlem Renaissance
could rightfully be called the cultural adolescence of African American culture, it
nonetheless marked a moment of racial self-creation and contribution to the
world.
The third phase of African American culture, which Locke took as a sign of
cultural maturity, is self-criticism. This aspect of culture was missing from the
Harlem Renaissance. In its enthusiasm and ―vitality of independence, pride and
self-respect‖ and ―its defiance of prejudice and limitations,‖ it was radical and
groundbreaking.20 However Locke acknowledged later in life that it was perhaps
too much to expect all three dimensions of culture to be exemplified during the
Renaissance. While the creative expressions of the twenties and thirties
exploded previous conceptions of blackness it had not yet acquired true
20
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perspective and self-understanding necessary for the cultural maturity embodied
in self-criticism. By 1950 Locke claimed that African American artistic expression
had finally begun to produce art that was less racially chauvinistic but ―even more
racial in the better sense of being more deeply felt and projected.‖21 He felt that
African American art had capitalized on the commonalities and human universals
between African American experience and that of others. This allowed for a
―third dimension of objective universality,‖ that is the highest aspiration of art that
seeks universal appeal and acceptance. This had been Locke‘s position
throughout his career as cultural critic. Some proponents of the Harlem
Renaissance forecast this third dimension. They maintained that racial themes,
when forcibly imposed on the artist from within or without, impoverish the art
produced and consign it to a cultural ghetto. This type of art also has a limited
efficacy with regard to shaping the concept of race because it is not fully attuned
to African American life. But when these themes are taken up freely and
organically they offer a cultural mother lode. However, this treasure must be
deeply mined as it is not to be gained from the superficial aspects of racial life.
For African American art to count among the ranks of the best and most enduring
art, it must universalize its particularity, engendering themes of African American
life that are accessible by all. Universalizing a particular cultural entity is a theme
Locke returns to in his discussion of cultural reciprocity: ―As both a midwife to
poets and as a sometime philosopher, Locke‘s values were rooted in his feeling
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for cultural expression and what he would come to call the ―third dimension‖ of
culture, a sense of self-awareness that made pluralism and reciprocity
possible.‖22
A major problem of the Harlem Renaissance movement was the racial
chauvinism that developed with regard to cultural products. There was always a
question as to what counted as ―Negro‖ with regard to cultural products. Was it
authorship, theme or idiom? With regard to this project, what exactly would count
as a cultural contribution contributing to the redefinition of race? Locke claims
that identifying African American cultural products solely by the race of the
creator does not do justice to the true scope of cultural influences African
Americans have had on the United States. His archetypal example is the ―Uncle
Remus‖ stories compiled, adapted and published by Joel Chandler Harris.
Though Harris was white his artistic product could clearly be classified as African
American. Even in The New Negro Locke included the work of Winold Reiss
because of the subject matter of his portraiture. In his estimation these works
deserve to be included in any anthology of African American literature. What
matters in determining what is ―Negro‖ to Locke was not the race of the author
but the idiom, theme and style of the work. These are the ―overtones‖ that color
certain fundamental elements of culture. The overtone that Locke especially
values is ―the flavor of idiom‖ in cultural and creative expressions, which in itself
is reason enough not to scrap racialist emphasis.23 African American art is a
subset of American art and as such racial and national themes are not mutually
22
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exclusive. What is African American is in every instance a composite, partaking
of national characteristics as well as racial characteristics. African American
cultural products are by nature hybrids, influenced by and influencing the wider
American culture. Just as a rigorous examination of race dispels the idea of pure
race, so an examination of cultures will dispel the idea of ―pure‖ culture.
Moreover, cultural products are not proprietary; once created they do not belong
to any one group but to the world. Racial chauvinism in this context makes little
sense and cannot be legitimately maintained.
Understanding Locke‘s aesthetics is key to understanding how his race
theory and conception of African American artistic products come together to
form a coherent theory. Locke‘s aesthetics, like other aspects of his philosophy,
were pragmatist in orientation. On aesthetics, W. E. B. Du Bois and Locke
clashed on the whether art should be propaganda or ―art for art‘s sake.‖
According to Du Bois The New Negro was full of propaganda. For him
propaganda involved ―promoting the self respecting images and the need to
promote a racial consciousness for the purpose of agitating against
discrimination.‖24 Du Bois believed beauty in art should have some tangible
social result. In the case of The New Negro that tangible result should be the
liberation of African Americans. In his eyes beauty unmoored from social goals
or art for art‘s sake leads not to liberation but to decadence. Indeed for Du Bois
propaganda was what made the art of The New Negro beautiful. According to
Leonard Harris, Du Bois took the position that ―artworks that fail to perform a
propaganda role are not worth a thimble because they fail to promote a
24
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metanarrative according to which blacks should fight against injustices, have a
sense of self respect and self confidence, and work toward the uplift of the race
and the end of class exploitation.‖25 Locke on the other hand believed artist
should be allowed to conceive of the world in unique ways even if they are not
instrumental for the purposes of racial uplift. The New Negro contributed to the
goal of racial uplift in ways that were subversive, not propagandistic. The art and
literature in the volume presented African Americans as beautiful, intelligent,
creative people with a unique culture. This went against racist ideology that held
that black people could hold none of those traits.
―Art for art‘s sake‖ for Locke was not a license for decadence but rather ―a
deep realization of the fundamental purpose of art and of its function as a tap
root of vigorous, flourishing living…It is the art of the people that needs to be
cultivated, not the art of the coteries.‖26 Locke viewed art as having a vital
connection to the lives of the people. Letting African American artists to express
their artistic vision, even if it showed the less than stellar aspects of African
American life, allowed for the possibility of the development of unconventional
perspectives and new ways of imagining the world. 27 Such unconventional
perspectives included seeing black people as beautiful and sublime in an antiblack world dominated by racist ideology that depicted them as grotesque. In this
way Locke understood that art helped conceptualize the future. The future is
open to unimagined possibilities, ones that have yet been conceived. Art, as a
25
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realm of freedom, allowed African American artists to envision new possibilities
for living that included, among other things, the possibility of African Americans
being afforded the dignity they had in the past been denied.
It is helpful to understand Locke‘s aesthetic propensities through the lens
of pragmatist aesthetics. Pragmatist aesthetics, popularized by Richard
Shusterman, insists on history and its changing social condition as a formative
factor in art. In his essay ―Values and Imperatives,‖ Locke states ―All
philosophies, it seems to me, are in ultimate derivation philosophies of life and
not of abstract, disembodied ‗objective‘ reality; products of time, place and
situation, and thus systems of timed history rather than timeless eternity.‖ 28 This
recognition of situatedness is the guiding principle of Locke‘s axiology. Locke‘s
philosophy of art is not disinterested, coming from some ―objective reality.
Rather it recognizes that history and social conditions are determining factors in
art. These historical and social conditions give rise to particular artistic
expressions that achieve universality when they communicates something
universally human that can be shared by all. In Locke‘s philosophy, universality
in artwork is achieved not through conformity but through the nurturing of
particularity.
Pragmatist aesthetics also ―insists on the practical value of even so-called
pure art.‖29 It appreciates that art is always more than merely beautifully
constructed objects and well-crafted words. Art is ―a purposive activity and
28
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needs to be understood also in terms of its social functions.‖ African American
art served several purposes beyond being merely decorative or entertaining. It
was the cornerstone of Locke‘s vindication project, proving that had a unique
culture on par with whites and further serving to revise the notion of race for
African Americans. African American art of the Harlem Renaissance was also
instrumental changing the image of African Americans, positing them as people
of beauty and dignity. This is not to say that African American artworks were not
beautiful and valuable in and of themselves. Pragmatist aesthetics maintains
that intrinsic and instrumental value are not mutually exclusive. Locke believed
in the intrinsic worth of African American artworks but also understood that they
served a special function in social formation.
In pragmatist aesthetics, the best and highest use of art is the
improvement of life.30 The art of the Harlem Renaissance helped to improve life
by rehabilitating the image of African Americans, demonstrating a vibrant African
American culture and helping to revise the concept of race. However its
ameliorative effects did not end there. The production of art and its appreciation
both hold significant virtue in Locke‘s philosophy as they contribute to the
development of the individual and the group. By taking inspiration from African
artworks, African American artists find not only that they are not ―cultural
foundling[s]‖ without their own inheritance, but also gain ―new technique to be
taken as the basis of a characteristic expression in the plastic and pictorial arts;
incentives to new artistic idioms as well as to a renewed mastery of these older
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arts.‖31 African American artists gain the lesson of ―discipline, style, of technical
control pushed to the limits of technical mastery.‖32 Thus society not only benefits
from African American art and African artistic inspiration, but artists themselves
are enhanced by it, rediscovering and revitalizing a repudiated tradition and
reshaping racial identity through that revitalization. Products of the fine arts that
come out of this revitalized tradition render themselves ―back into personal
refinement and cultivated sensibilities‖ whereby culture ―realizes itself in the
fullest sense, performs its true educative function and becomes a part of the vital
art of living.‖33 Locke‘s pragmatist aesthetics highlights his belief that philosophy
should improve life. His aesthetics and his race theory were oriented towards the
same goal: the vindication of African Americans. This would have the effect of
improving life not only for African Americans but also for America as a whole
because it would engender American ideals of fairness and democracy.
In light of art‘s ―social potential to express and change attitudes,‖
pragmatist aesthetics advocates a distinctively democratic view of art.34 Locke
explicitly endorsed a democratic notion of culture generally which extended to art
as well. Pragmatist aesthetics holds that art should be used for democratic ends,
which means rejecting the view that identifies art with ―elite fine arts as sharply
distinguished from forms of popular culture.‖35 Schusterman writes, ―If a healthy
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democracy needs the productive understanding that comes from a free and richly
interactive contact between its groups, a democratic aesthetic needs the same
sort of open exchange and mutual recognition between different forms of artistic
expression.‖36 Thus a democratic view of art cannot abide a rigid boundary
between high and popular art. Locke himself decried the way art had ―run to
classes, cliques and coteries,‖ away from common experience.37 Locke believed
in the vital link between African American life and African American cultural
products. By valorizing Negro Spirituals and raising them from folk art to high art,
Locke undermined the boundary between artistic expressions, allowing for an
artistically productive meeting of the two forms. Pragmatist aesthetics advocates
for democracy in politics as well as in art. Both are best served by ―open
exchange between different ways of thought and diverse ethnic voices.‖ 38
African American artistic expression must therefore be admitted to American
culture and respected as a vital part of that culture.
By examining aspects of pragmatist aesthetics we can view better some of
Locke‘s aesthetic and political commitments. Locke appreciated that art was a
purposive activity that needed to be understood in terms of its social function,
which, in the case of African Americans was vindication. Aesthetically and
politically he was attempting to improve life for African Americans and in the
process improve life for all Americans. He sought to accomplish this by endorsing
35
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a democratic notion of art that would admit both high and low forms of art. His
endorsement of a democratic notion of art was part and parcel of his advocacy
for democracy generally.
III.

Cultural Pluralism and Reciprocity
Locke made cultural pluralism and reciprocity cornerstones of his

philosophy, from his work on values to his theorizing on the nature of intercultural
contacts. They also featured in the fourth and final part of his vindication project.
Locke encouraged cultural pluralism and cultural reciprocity as the most
productive stance in world engagement. Respect and value for diverse cultures
are core tenets of cultural pluralism, or as we may refer to it today,
multiculturalism. The idea of cultural pluralism or ―the right to be different‖
germinated in discussions Locke had with Horace Kallen at Oxford.39 It would
continue to influence Locke‘s view of cross-cultural contacts. Locke‘s
commitment to cultural pluralism was part of his vindication project in that it
provided the ideological framework for valuing African American culture, which
he had done so much to promote, as a vital part of American culture. Cultural
pluralism as a doctrine ensures the appreciation and preservation of subcultures
like African American culture, while cultural reciprocity promotes productive
engagement between different cultures. Promoting cultural pluralism
controverted racist ideology in that it invalidated the idea of ―superior‖ and
―inferior‖ cultures and instead advanced the idea that cultural equivalences
existed in every culture. These equivalences provided grounding for reciprocity
between cultures, which Locke firmly believed advanced civilization as a whole.
39
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In Race Contacts and Interracial Relations Locke argued that for alien
groups to achieve inclusion in society they must conform to the civilization type of
the society in question. But conformity to civilization type does not and should
not require the homogenization of social cultures. Cultural diversity, in Locke‘s
philosophy, is inherently valuable.40 Though Race Contacts does endorse
assimilation, Locke includes secondary race consciousness as a second
conception of social race. Civilization type or social race is not identifiable with
any single trait traceable to a single group. Rather it is a composite entity, the
result of many contacts and mixings of subgroups. There is a natural reciprocity
that occurs between subgroups and the mainstream whereby each is affected by
the other. This reciprocity is not only natural, but also inherently good for
civilization. For that reason, Locke was a cultural pluralist, advocating the mutual
respect for different cultures. This was also a pragmatic move insofar as
advocating for the mutual respect of cultures would ensure respect for African
Americans in their dealings with the white mainstream.
Locke was deeply committed to pluralism as a strategy for navigating
differences in values and in cultures. He was extremely wary of absolutist
thinking which he credited as the source of ideological and social conflict.
Pluralism offered a means of ideological peace and held the potential for
peaceful rapprochement between peoples. Under value pluralism, value
declaration and adherence would be ―critical and selective and tentative (in the
sense that science is tentative) and revisionist in procedure rather than dogmatic,
final and en bloc…Value assertion would thus be a tolerant assertion of
40
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preference, not an intolerant insistence on agreement or finality.‖ 41 The practical
corollaries of value pluralism – the forerunner of cultural pluralism – are tolerance
and value reciprocity. These are a stronger intellectual foundation for democracy
than value dogmatism. Further, pluralism engenders a greater implementation of
democratic values and promotes tolerance. It fosters better protection and
integration of minorities and non-conformist groups. Pluralism helps the majority
stave off ―illiberalism, bigotry and cultural conceit‖ while helping to mitigate
patriotism and sub-group loyalties.42 Finally, value pluralism posits cultural
pluralism as a liberal basis for democracy. The principles of pluralism and
relativism call for ―promoting respect for difference, for safeguarding respect for
the individual, thus preventing the submergence of the individual in enforced
conformity, and for the promotion of commonality over and above such
differences.‖43
Locke was extremely critical of forced conformity whether it was
ideological or societal. He knew that differences in values were unavoidable.
However, though values may differ from one group or one individual to the next
that does not mean that there must necessarily be strife and discord because of
those differences. Only when we take a dogmatic or absolute position that
cannot abide divergent views do differences in values lead to conflict. His value
pluralism entailed an understanding that ideological values and beliefs are a de
facto part of a people‘s situation. It is not that we should ignore these differences
41
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or try to eradicate them, but rather we should school ourselves not to make so
much of these differences as they are just as much a fact of the matter about a
people as is the more mundane facts about them, like their location or climate.
Locke claims:
This type of understanding, it seems to me, begins in a basic
recognition of value pluralism, converts itself to value relativism as
its only consistent interpretation, and then passes over into a ready
and willing admission of both cultural relativism and pluralism. In
practice, this ideological orientation concedes reciprocity and
requires mutual respect and noninterference. It pivots on the
principle that the affirmation of one‘s own world of values does not
of necessity involve the denial or depreciation of someone else‘s.44
Locke‘s embracing of the term ―relativism‖ is rather unfortunate, as it does not do
justice to his view. His relativism, as Kenneth W. Stikkers shows, was an
instrumental relativism the service of a more authentic universalism. 45 Locke‘s
formulation of relativism was informed by Royce‘s principle of ―loyalty to loyalty,‖
where I can respect that you are as loyal to your value system as I am to my
own. Partisan loyalty ―must grow into an appreciation of other people‘s loyalties
even when they contradict my own.‖46 Otherwise partisan loyalties lead to bigotry
and xenophobia. In Locke‘s instrumental relativism, respecting another‘s
loyalties in this way does not preclude commenting on the values to which they
are loyal, but it does understand that all values are ultimately tentative and
always open to revision in light of new information yielded from a variety of
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perspectives and various cultural traditions. There may still be universal claims
that can be made about humanity. However, to ensure that those claims are
truly universal and are not merely some particularism forcibly imposed to attain
―universal‖ status, a plurality of human experiences must be retained as much as
possible.47 Instrumental cultural relativism can ensure that this plurality is
maintained.
To flesh out his notion of instrumental cultural relativism, Locke provides
three working principles:
1. The principle of cultural equivalence, under which we would more wisely
press the search for functional similarities in our analyses and
comparisons of human cultures; thus offsetting out traditional and
excessive emphasis on cultural difference. Such functional equivalences,
which we might term ‗culture-cognates’ or ‗culture-correlates,‘ discovered
underneath deceptive but superficial institutional divergence, would
provide objective but soundly neutral common denominators for
intercultural understanding and cooperation.
2. The principle of cultural reciprocity, which, by a general recognition of the
reciprocal character of all contacts between cultures and of the fact that all
modern cultures are highly composite ones, would invalidate the lump
estimating of cultures in terms of generalized, en bloc assumptions of
superiority and inferiority, substituting scientific, point-by-point
comparisons with their correspondingly limited, specific, and objectively
verifiable superiorities or inferiorities.
3. The principle of limited cultural convertibility, that, since culture elements
though widely interchangeable, are so separable, the institutional forms
from their values and the values from their institutional forms, the organic
selectivity and assimilative capacity of a borrowing culture becomes a
limiting criterion for cultural exchange. Conversely, press acculturation
and the mass transplanting of culture, the stock procedure of groups with
traditions of culture ‗superiority‘ and dominance, are counterindicated as
against both the interests of cultural efficiency and the natural trends of
cultural selectivity.48
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These principles of culture relations, if put into practice, ―might correct some of
our basic culture dogmatism‖ and ―cure many of our most intolerant and
prejudicial cultural attitudes and practices.‖49 This doctrine, according to Locke,
would rid us of most of the invidiousness of cultural difference and show that
much of what seems to be cultural disagreement on the surface is actually, upon
deeper inspection, functionally similar. Following these principles would remove
or bypass much of what causes cultures to clash, allowing for the appreciation of
cultural viewpoints different from our own. Furthermore, ―tolerance and the
reciprocities of cultural pluralism within the larger, more complex bodies of
culture would become much more matters of course than they are at present.‖
Thus cultural pluralism would be one of the predictable outcomes of adherence
to these principles.
In Locke‘s philosophy cultural pluralism is intrinsically and instrumentally
good. It is intrinsically good because it ensures that human diversity will be
respected in all its forms. It is instrumentally good because it encourages
interaction between culturally divergent groups. Locke argues that it is crosscultural contact that stimulates the growth and development of civilization itself.50
Though cultures develop a level of complexity independently through internal
growth and development, by and large the main source of cultural growth and
development is made through the forces of external contact. Such contacts are
part of the progressive development of civilization. ―Civilization is largely the
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accumulative product and residue of this ever-widening process of culture
contact, interchange and fusion.‖ This means that there is no such thing as a
―pure‖ culture. Under modern conditions where the mechanisms of
communication are varied and ubiquitous, intercultural contacts are more
frequent than in the past. As a result cultures are increasingly composite in
nature. This does not mean a group cannot have a distinctive culture. There is
no contradiction in claiming to have a distinctive culture and at the same time
acknowledging the amalgamated nature of that culture.
Locke claims that in many cases it appears that progress in a society is
proportionately linked to multicultural exposure, and that a variety of cultural
contacts are good for any culture provided it could incorporate them. Cultural
pluralism is one such way of incorporating diverse cultures without obliterating
difference. This is important, Locke argues, because variety and variability are
essential to the growth and development of culture. By ensuring the right to
unique identities within a broader society, cultural pluralism would preserve the
variety and variability of cultures necessary for civilization‘s growth and progress.
Implicit in Locke‘s sense of cultural pluralism was the concept of
reciprocity. Indeed cultural pluralism is the precondition for cultural reciprocity,
one of the mechanisms through which civilization progressed. By prioritizing
cultural difference over homogeneity, Locke was again controverting racist
ideology that venerated purity over diversity. Cultural pluralism was a means to
reciprocity. Cultural reciprocity entails a relationship of mutual influence between
divergent cultures. Culture groups derive and contribute cultural meanings to
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other groups.51 Exposure to foreign elements aids both cultures to progress in
ways they would have been unable to on their own. This is the case in voluntary
or involuntary contacts. Even in the relation of the conquered to the conquerors
there is a mutual influence.
While reciprocity was naturally pervasive based on the mere proximity of
groups, Locke saw the case of African Americans as demanding more than a
merely a passive form of cultural reciprocity. Given that they were members of a
disparaged group that was perceived as having no culture to speak of, there was
a clear burden on African Americans to make their cultural contributions known.
Similar to Du Bois‘s conclusions in ―The Conservation of Races,‖ Locke
advocates the retention of a distinct cultural identity in order to engage in the
reciprocal relationship necessary to advance both African American and
mainstream white cultures. Secondary race consciousness in Locke‘s philosophy
served several purposes, including the development of a unique race
consciousness that would generate a distinctive culture, one that had much to
offer to a society that had derided it socially and culturally. Further, it can be
argued that cultural reciprocity has the greatest benefit when the engaged
cultures are more distinct rather than less. These interactions will yield the
greatest amount of progress for both groups. It was more beneficial then, for
African Americans to develop and retain a more or less distinct cultural presence
in the United States rather than to assimilate as quickly as possible. Through a
reciprocal cultural relationship with mainstream white America, African
Americans could advance their cause on the cultural front, validating their
51
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difference while at the same time demonstrating the ―functional equivalences‖
that existed between African American and mainstream white cultures.
Participating in cultural reciprocity also emphasized engagement rather than
separatism. As in the cultural movements in Europe by ethnic minorities, Locke
believed African Americans would benefit from cultural movements that
expressed secondary race consciousness because through the relationship of
reciprocity with the mainstream they would ultimately be recognized as a
constituent part of the larger national group. Cultural reciprocity was the
exogamous relationship that would allow African Americans to share their gifts
with the world.
IV.

Objections and Concerns
I have argued that Locke‘s championing of African American art served

several purposes in his vindication project. First, it provided proof of African
American culture in a time when it was assumed that people of African descent
had no culture. Second, it provided a means of changing the existing concept of
race regarding the nature of blackness. Third, it provided content to be
exchanged in a relationship of cultural reciprocity between African Americans
and the white mainstream and by extension, the world.
It has been argued that Locke put too much stock in the ability of art to
change the social and political landscape. Indeed some commenters have
charged that the Renaissance failed because societal evils like racism and
bigotry are too much to leave to art and aesthetics for amelioration. To be clear,
I am not arguing that art alone can alleviate racism and bigotry. I do however
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believe Locke was right in seeing art as an important mode of social engagement
in which African Americans could distinguish themselves and partake in cultural
rapprochement with whites. But can Locke‘s aesthetic theory be read as an
extension of his race theory as I suggest?
If race is a cultural product as stated in ―The Concept of Race as Applied
to Social Culture,‖ is it really possible for art to exert a formative force on the
concept of race? If as I claim, am major part of Locke‘s vindication project was
the championing of African American cultural products as proof of culture and a
means of redefining American blackness, how was it within the power of art to do
these things? It may be argued that I make too much of Locke‘s promotion of
African American cultural products and that such promotion was beyond the
scope of his race theory.
If race is a social construction that operates as tradition, preferred traits
and values it is plausible to believe that these are influenced by cultural products
like artistic cultural products Race is a concept that has meaning conferred upon
it by ―human intentions, practices, interests and goals.‖52 However, the same
may be said of art. Race as a conceptual cultural product is ―burdened with
discharging various social and cultural tasks.‖53 It might be argued that
something with such great social salience could not be shaped by something as
circumscribed as art. However this is part of a particular understanding of
aesthetics that places art in an ivory tower, removed from such worldly concerns
as race. Artistic cultural products do not merely refer to works deemed high art
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by ―cliques and coteries‖ (although such art also needs to be understood in terms
of its social function), but also ―low‖ or common art. Artistic cultural products by
nature are situated and purposive, attempting to stimulate the senses and
intellect of the observer. They have the power to generate or change ideas and
to shape perceptions and public opinion. Thus the proposition that Locke
promoted African American artistic cultural products to vindicate African
Americans has merit.
Leonard Harris has said:
Locke‘s emphasis on culture was not something that was used
merely to help set up bright lines around national groups; it was
part of his view of cultural reciprocity that all national sentiment
must eventually lead to a more universal understanding. The theory
of race that he had set out in his lectures on race he now applied to
cultural expression as a force in group identity. 54
Harris clearly sees the continuity between Locke‘s work in art and culture and his
work in Race Contacts. However he does not see the continuity between
Locke‘s cultural work and his essay ―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social
Culture.‖ This could be because Harris believed the essay added little to Locke‘s
existing arguments.55 Harris does not see Locke‘s redefinition of race as a
cultural product or the reversal of historic emphasis regarding the relationship
between race and culture as significant to Locke‘s existing race theory. I believe
this represents a failing in Harris‘s view of Locke‘s theory of race. As previously
stated, the concept of race in Race Contacts was primarily a matter of social
heredity: ―Race…amounts practically to social inheritance. It is really either
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favorable or unfavorable social inheritance, which has been ascribed to
anthropological differences.‖56 Locke claims in Race Contacts that to the extent
one has a race, one has inherited ―either a favorable or unfavorable social
heredity, which unfortunately is typically ascribed to factors which have not
produced it.‖57 However, eight years later in ―The Concept of Race as Applied to
Social Culture,‖ Locke writes, ―Race in the vital and basic sense is simply and
primarily the culture-heredity, and that its blendings and differentiations is
properly analyzed on the basis of conformity to or variance from culture-type,‖58
and further that ―[t]his is what we mean then by this reversal of emphasis, that
instead of the race explaining the cultural condition, the cultural conditions must
explain the race traits.‖59 ―Race,‖ Locke writes, ―seems to lie in that peculiar
selective preference for certain culture-traits and resistance to certain others.‖60
The emphasis changes from social and historical in Race Contacts to cultural in
―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture.‖ Harris claims that ―The
Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture, ―did not add substantially to the
argument he [Locke] had made in his lectures on race contacts, but it does show
how completely he mastered the academic discourse of sociology and
anthropology.‖61 While it is true the essay demonstrates Locke‘s mastery of
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academic discourse of the two disciplines, to overlook the change in emphasis
from Race Contacts to ―The Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture‖ is to
miss a crucial part of Locke‘s conception of race, namely that the concept of race
changes as the preferred traits, values, traditions, and practices of a group
change. That is, race changes when culture changes. Whereas in Race
Contacts race was ascribed to social, political and historical factors, in ―The
Concept of Race as Applied to Social Culture‖ it is ascribed almost entirely to
cultural factors. Locke‘s emphasis on the cultural traits of race indicates an
elevated regard for the formative power of culture with regard to race.
Merely one year after proclaiming that race is a cultural product Locke
begins in earnest to promote the cultural products of African Americans. The
creation of these products is purposive, bent on carrying out a redefinition of
race, specifically the concept of blackness, in American society. The relationship
between cultural products and the concept of race is itself reciprocal. While
cultural products have a distinct influence on the concept of race (and races),
race or racial identity is the ground out of which much of these cultural products
arise. Locke gave the conceptual grounding needed to redefine race generally;
with his promotion of African American cultural products he redefined race
specifically in terms of blackness.
It might be argued that African American culture and cultural products
were not distinct enough from mainstream white American culture to constitute
the reciprocal relationship of different cultures that I am proposing. In 1925
George S. Schuyler, a contemporary of Locke‘s, published an article entitled
61
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―The Negro-Art Hokum.‖ In it Schuyler claims, ―Negro art ‗made in America‘ is
non-existent. He claims that the contributions typically attributed to African
Americans, such as Negro spirituals, the blues and jazz, are products of
economic caste and regional affiliation. While we can speak of ―musical
contributions of the peasantry of the South,‖ he claims, ―Any group under similar
circumstances would have produced something similar.‖62 It is ―merely a
coincidence that this peasant class happens to be of a darker hue.‖
Schuyler argues that the literature, painting, and sculpture of African
Americans is identical in kind as that of white Americans, showing more or less
European influence, while in drama little of merit was written by African
Americans that could not have been written by whites. He points out that most
African American artists and cultural leaders have been educated and trained in
Europe and are no more ‗expressive of the Negro soul‘ than the work of white
artist in the genre of black life. Schuyler claims the reason for this is that ―the
Aframerican is merely a lampblacked Anglo-Saxon.‖ After all, European
immigrants are thoroughly Americanized after a few generations through
participation in American institutions. If they are no longer distinct from the
mainstream, the surely African Americans are no longer distinct culturally having
been in America for centuries. Schuler holds that ―when he responds to the same
political, social, moral, and economic stimuli in precisely the same manner as his
white neighbor, it is sheer nonsense to talk about ‗racial differences‘ as between
the American black man and the American white man.‖ The crux of Schuyler‘s
62
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argument is that African Americans and white Americans have been subject to
the same social and economic forces, absorbed the influences, lived in the same
environment and had the same education and therefore have little to no
difference between them save for color of skin. The idea that African Americans
and whites are fundamentally and essentially completely different is the latest
myth perpetuated by ―Negrophobists.‖ Schuyler claims this myth flatters white
racists who want to believe that African Americans are ―inferior and
fundamentally different‖ and ―peculiar‖ therefore when attempting to portray their
lives must produce a fundamentally peculiar art.63
Schuyler articulates arguments that have surrounding the idea of ―African
American art‖ that are still relevant today, perhaps even more so. However, I
believe there are resources in Locke‘s thought to answer Schuyler‘s objections.
First, Locke‘s position on intercultural contacts and cultural reciprocity would
preclude and claims of a ―peculiar‖ African American culture that was completely
separate from mainstream white culture. The walls of culture are inevitably
porous. He never maintained that African American art was a separate entity
from American art, but rather was detectable in the ―overtones to certain
fundamental elements of culture common to white and black by his adoption and
acculturation.‖64 African American artworks naturally express quintessentially
‗American‘ sentiment because they are thoroughly American in nature. Locke
realizes what Schuyler seemingly fails to; the fact that racial and national
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elements are not mutually exclusive. When dealing with cultures that are highly
composite, there will not be a clear and visible cleave between certain cultural
elements, like racial and national identity. This does not mean however, that
they are one and the same. Locke claims that ―in culture, it is the slightly but
characteristically divergent that counts.‖ In our estimation of cultures we must
realize that ―in all human things we are basically and inevitably human, and that
even the special racial complexities and overtones are only interesting
variants.‖65 Schuyler forgets that differences do not have to be big to be
significant. Further, he overestimates sameness of experience of African
Americans and white Americans seems. The experience of slavery,
institutionalized racism and pernicious bigotry are enough to counter any claims
that African Americans and white Americans were shaped by exactly the same
social forces. Being African American was much more than being a
―lampblacked Anglo-Saxon.‖ While being part of American culture, African
Americans retained enough alterity in their cultural products to warrant a
distinctive subsection of American art.
Locke was quite strident about the uniqueness of African American cultural
products during the Renaissance, a position that would soften with age. In 1950,
years after the Renaissance he would claim that it died due to ―fatal
misconception of the true nature of culture.‖66 Both the creative talent and the
audience of the Renaissance ―were infected with sound and abortive attitudes:
they made culture a market-place commodity and out of this shallow and sordid
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misunderstanding did it to death prematurely.‖67 African American culture and
cultural products were much more than commodities; they performed several
conceptual and ideological functions as I have argued. Locke claimed that
exhibitionism and racial chauvinism infected and weakened the movement.
Though he and other leaders of the Renaissance did not subscribe to these
attitudes they nonetheless took hold. One of his efforts to reform this attitude is
his 1930 essay, ―The Contribution of Race to Culture,‖ where he attempted to
combat racial chauvinism and reconcile nationalism with internationalism,
racialism with universalism. At the time of Locke‘s usage, the term racialism
referred to an emphasis on race or racial considerations. The term later became
synonymous with racism. Universalism referred to universal concerns and more
broadly, a universal humanity. Locke‘s concern is whether the stimulation of race
sense and race consciousness can be compatible with universalism. The
answer, he claims lies in the fact that there always has been and always will be a
natural limitless reciprocity between cultures. Prefiguring his work in When
Peoples Meet, he claims that civilization is an amalgam of cultures and social
dissonances between peoples occur when we fail to recognize this fact. The
solution is to ―do away with the idea of proprietorship and vested interest, -- and
face the natural fact of the limitless interchangeableness of culture goods, and
the more significant historical fact of the more or less constant exchange and we
have…a solution reconciling nationalism with internationalism, racialism with
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universalism.68 Freed from the ―vicious practice‖ of vested proprietary interest in
cultural goods, race is ―free to blossom almost indefinitely to the enrichment and
stimulation of human culture.‖ This is the point the Renaissance did not
comprehend. Culture cannot be ‗owned‘. Locke maintains that once evolved,
culture goods ―are no longer the property of the race or people who originated
them. They belong to all who can use them; and belong most to those who can
use them best.‖69 Once we give up the notion of cultural proprietorship the
conflict between racialism and universalism is resolved in light of the fact of
cultural reciprocity and the mutual indebtedness of cultures. Acknowledgement
that cultures are composite and formed by limitless exchange can help us to drop
the chauvinism that divides us and come to a kind of unity. There can be a unity
of diverse cultures that does not require that we all be the same in order to be at
peace. Divesting ourselves of proprietorship of cultural goods does not mean we
cannot grasp the ―form and flavor of a particular people and place.‖70 Culture,
Locke claims, grows out of the social soil of race. This is again the relationship
of the particular to the universal for Locke. The particular grounding of race can
yield universally accessible products. This was his aim for the art of the
Renaissance, to utilize the fertile ground of racial particularity to create products
that would be universalized by becoming part of world culture.
―The Contribution of Race to Culture‖ stresses the proper understanding of
culture by explaining it with reference to the major themes in Locke‘s philosophy,
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none greater than his notion of cultural reciprocity. Cultural reciprocity is the final
part of Locke‘s vindication project for good reason. Cultural reciprocity and its
attendant value of cultural pluralism are the means to transcend the debate as
dictated by the racist ideology of the time. Cultural pluralism was Locke‘s
―philosophical faith‖ and cultural reciprocity was its divine purpose.
―Compensating for liberalism‘s fixation on freedom, cultural pluralism provides a
philosophical foundation for unity in diversity by extending the idea of democracy
beyond individuals and individual rights to the equal recognition of cultural, racial,
and other group rights.‖71 The philosophical foundation cultural pluralism
provides is built upon by cultural reciprocity by promoting the mutual exchange of
cultural goods. This interaction fosters the discovery of ―functional equivalences‖
in cultures that can serve as a basis for unity without demanding conformity. This
idea of ―unity in diversity‖ is a primary principle in Locke‘s Bahá‘í background. By
promoting mutual cultural exchange, cultural reciprocity stimulates potentially
limitless contacts between peoples. The particular cultural products exchanged
between peoples become universalized as part of world culture. This is the
secularization of Locke‘s spiritual philosophy. Locke believed in the oneness of
humanity but this oneness was not to be achieved or maintained through the
forced imposition of values. On the contrary, the distinctiveness of cultures aids
in the process of development. Progress in the modern world requires ―‘freetrade in culture,‘ and a complete recognition of the principle of cultural
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reciprocity.‖72 Recognizing the principle of cultural reciprocity means recognizing
how every culture has contributed to world culture. One can no longer speak of
―pure‖ cultures because every culture is composite by nature. Civilization can no
longer be seen as proprietary to one people or race but must be recognized as
the product of infinite cultural crossings. En bloc claims of superiority become
nonsensical when the composite nature of race and culture is acknowledged.
In his vindication project Locke challenged racist ideology by redefining race
and the relationship of race to culture, by promoting African American cultural
products as proof of culture, and by positing cultural reciprocity as the
progressive end of cultural interactions. His project effectively invalidated racist
ideology of the day by undercutting theories of white racial and cultural
superiority and supporting the idea of African American dignity and humanity.
By promoting cultural pluralism and cultural reciprocity as basis for intercultural
contacts, Locke theorized a way of maintaining respect for not only for African
Americans but for all cultures.
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Chapter Five:
Beyond Vindication: The Question of Race Conservation and PostRacialism
Races are, by all means, ‗real‘ to Locke, not in the sense of their being
natural kinds, but in terms of being social constructions, products of social,
cultural and historical forces. However, even in light of his definition of the
concept of race as a sociocultural product, the normative question of whether or
not we should keep race still looms. More than a century after the obligation was
posed by Du Bois, at the dawn of a supposedly ―post-racial‖ America, we must
still ask the question: should we conserve the notion of race?
The question of conserving the concept of race or maintaining that there are
real races certainly did not begin with Du Bois. However he did frame the debate
in such a way as to be germane to the lives of African Americans in light of their
social and political status in a white supremacist society. Du Bois posed
questions still relevant to the concept of racial identity in the United States: ―what
am I? Am I an American or am I a Negro? Can I be both? Or is it my duty to
cease to be a Negro as soon as possible and be an American?‖ The question
itself demonstrates the cleave that existed and to some degree still exists
between black and mainstream America. Do African Americans have a duty to
assert one identity over the other or is there a way to reconcile the two? Over a
century after Du Bois wrote ―The Conservation of Races‖ the question is still
relevant: do we have a duty to conserve race? If so, from what ideological,
social or political commitments is that duty derived?
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Du Bois‘s call to conserve races has been a perennial subject of debate in
race theory. As one of the foremost black intellectuals of his time, Du Bois
rightfully receives the attention of theorists on either side of the question of
conservation. However, these debates have neglected to include Locke or his
philosophy of race. This oversight can be attributed to a lack of scholarship on
Locke and to the fact that Locke‘s view of the concept of race has not been
adequately explored in light of the question of whether or not we should keep the
concept of race generally and whether African Americans in particular have a
specially duty to conserve race. In this chapter I intend to frame the existing
debate regarding the conservation of races and show the resources Locke brings
to the table with regard to these questions.
The question of conserving race also takes on an interesting dimension in
the age of ―post-racialism.‖ ―Post-racialism‖ or the idea of a ―post-racial‖ society
came into prominence during the presidential campaign of Barack Obama. The
general idea behind the use of the term is because the United States nominated
(then elected) a black man as president of the United States, we have achieved
the goals of racial progress and have transcended any need to hold the idea or
concept of race as significant socially, culturally or politically. On a practical level
post-racialism means there is no longer a need for race-based decision-making
or remedial measures on the part of the state to address past racial injustices
because race as such is no longer an issue. Ideologically post-racialism is the
latest iteration of colorblindness. In post-racial America, pundits like MSNBC‘s
Chris Matthews can say of Obama‘s January 2010 State of the Union Address:
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"It's interesting; he is post-racial, by all appearances. I forgot he was black
tonight for an hour." In a post-racial society, racial polarization is a thing of the
past, happily thrown onto the dustbin of history. If it is true that America is postracial (and this is a very big ‗if‘), then is the question of whether or not to
conserve race moot? If the point is not moot, would it be somehow a moral
failing to conserve the concept of race in a post racial society? Or does race
conservation have a place in post-racial America? These are some of the
questions I will examine in this chapter.
I. Background: Appiah and Outlaw
To understand current arguments for and against race conservation, it will
be helpful to look at some of the history surrounding the debate. The question of
the reality of race looms over the debate as to whether or not it should be
conserved, for if race is shown to be not real, the question of conservation
becomes a non-issue. Because he was one of the first African American
intellectuals to challenge nineteenth century biological notion of race by
attempting to radically redefining it, Du Bois is a recurrent subject of the debates
as to the reality of race and, if real, whether or not it should be conserved. The
debate over ―The Conservation of Races‖ was popularized by two main figures,
Kwame Anthony Appiah and Lucius Outlaw. In the course of their exploration of
Du Bois‘s notion of race, they examine its tenability and address the some
questions regarding race conservation. This brief examination demonstrates the
difficulties involved in attempting to define race and how those difficulties bear
upon the question of race conservation.
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Appiah‘s position is that Du Bois does not articulate a notion of race that
transcends the nineteenth century biological notion. But Appiah thinks that since
that notion of race has been thoroughly discredited this amounts to a denial of
the reality of race. In his essay ―The Uncompleted Argument,‖ Appiah critically
analyzed W. E. B. Du Bois‘s definition of race as articulated in his 1897 essay
―The Conservation of Races,‖ delivered as the second of the Occasional Papers
of the American Negro Academy. In that essay, Du Bois sought to transcend the
biological conception of race, replacing it instead with a socio-historical
conception. According to Appiah, Du Bois does not achieve this aim. Appiah‘s
criticism of Du Bois arguably changed the debate about the concept of race as
we know it. In the case of Du Bois, Appiah‘s main criticism was that he never fully
succeeded at dislodging the notion of race from its nineteenth century roots as a
biological essence. There are several reasons why Du Bois is vulnerable to
Appiah‘s charges of biological essentialism, a few of which I will explore here.
Du Bois defined race as ―a vast family of human beings, generally of
common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and
impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the
accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.‖1 By
including social and historical criteria in his definition of race, Du Bois attempts to
move away from definitions of race that were considered ―scientific‖ at the time.
Scientific conceptions of race at the turn of the last century focused almost
exclusively on biology and physical anthropology. Race was defined primarily as
a biological essence, one that was determinate of both physical and non-physical
1
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attributes. Appiah contends that Du Bois attempts to transcend the nineteenthcentury biological notion of race in order to combat the racial ideologies of the
Negro race inferiority.2 Accordingly, Du Bois aims to accomplish this by setting a
socio-historical conception of race over and against the biological notion. Appiah
examines the criteria that Du Bois employs while attempting to make sense of
this elusive term. Ultimately Appiah concludes that Du Bois does not succeed at
his appointed task and that his notion of race in the end collapses back into the
nineteenth century biological conception.
In ―The Uncompleted Argument,‖ Appiah employs an analytic
methodology when examining Du Bois‘s definition of race, evaluating each part
of his definition in isolation. Du Bois‘s definition starts with the idea of a ‗vast
family.‘ The concept of family could include the idea of adoption or choice as to
our most primary social groupings, however Appiah claims that this is not the
way in which Du Bois uses the term.3 Instead he reads the reference to family as
referring solely to biological reproduction and genealogical descent, and as such
fails to overcome a biological conception of race. Du Bois falls further away from
a socio-historical notion of race when he claims ‗common blood‘ as part of his
definition. It is this reference to common blood that, for Appiah, hopelessly binds
Du Bois to the nineteenth century biological account of race. For ―if [Du Bois] has
fully transcended the scientific notion, what is the role of this talk about blood?‖4
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Appiah understands the expression of ―common blood‖ as referring to a shared
biological ancestry. A ‗common language‘ is the next criterion of race Du Bois
mentions. However, as Appiah points out, there are Romance languages, but no
Romance races. Also members of different races may speak the same
language, so this criterion fails to hold up under scrutiny. The claim to a
‗common history‘ Appiah dismisses as importing a level of circularity in the
definition. In order to recognize a common history of a group, we must have
already set out some criteria that designate certain people as members of that
group. Further, Appiah uncovers what he believes to be an unstated part of the
common history criterion of race – geographical location. Du Bois, he claims, is
not speaking of the common history of just any group of people, but the history of
people who have lived in the same place.5
The rest of Du Bois‘s criteria for race –traditions, strivings and impulses–
on Appiah‘s view cannot provide a sound basis for race. Members of different
racial groups can practice the same traditions. Impulses are discovered as an a
posteriori characteristic of racial groups and therefore cannot be a basis for
membership in them.6 And as for strivings, those are also discovered through
experience, as they are ―the stuff of history.‖ Indeed, Appiah argues that you can
only identify the traditions, strivings and impulses of a group once the group has
already been defined.
From this we can clearly see Appiah‘s methodology for challenging Du
Bois‘s notion of race is simply to identify each component and evaluate them in
5
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isolation. This reading of Du Bois is not unproblematic; Tommy Lott, Lucius
Outlaw, and others have claimed that this is not the proper way in which to
understand Du Bois‘s argument. However, this reading does reveal certain
weaknesses that cannot be ignored. If Appiah is right, the criteria of family and
common blood are just throwbacks to nineteenth century racialist thinking that
defined race in terms of a biological essence, and all the addition criteria are
fundamentally unsound. Given that a biological conception of race cannot give
distinct morphological criteria for membership in one race that are not shared by
any members of other races, nor can it provide a racial basis for genetic
distinctiveness, such conceptions are fundamentally untenable and ultimately
invalid. Thus Du Bois‘s conception of race ultimately fails to engender a duty to
conserve race because his conception seemingly falls back upon unstable
biological grounding. For Appiah, Du Bois fails to establish race as a distinct
concept and therefore fails to ground a duty to conserve race because his (Du
Bois‘s) criteria for race leaves us with nothing to distinct to conserve biologically
or metaphysically.
Lucius Outlaw argues vigorously for the conservation of race in his defense
of Du Bois. While Appiah takes issue with Du Bois‘s inclusion of ―common blood‖
in his definition of race, Outlaw reads the inclusion differently. He does not take
Du Bois to be attempting a purely socio-historical definition of race. Rather he
reads Du Bois as seeking to ―articulate a concept of race that includes both
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socio-historical or cultural factors (language, history, traditions, ‗impulses,‘ ideals
of life) and biological factors (a family of ―common blood‖).7
Outlaw claims Appiah‘s analytic strategy of analyzing and evaluating each
element of Du Bois‘s definition individually leads to a critical misreading of Du
Bois. As an example Outlaw takes Du Bois‘s inclusion of ―a vast family‖ in his
definition. Appiah claims this inclusion indicates only biological or birth family.
However, Outlaw points out Du Bois‘s identification as black even though he was
of mixed heritage. This implies some level of choice involved with family
membership and alignment. Outlaw reads him as deliberately appropriating his
own way in line with prevailing social conventions ―an otherwise socially defined
and often imposed racial identity linked to a particular line of his complex
ancestry.‖8 Regarding Appiah‘s claim that common history, traditions and
languages are excluded from Du Bois‘s definition due to circularity, Outlaw
claims Appiah is simply wrong, and that this strategy would be circular only if
common history were the only criterion. However, common history is one
criterion among others; it avoids the pitfall of circularity and should not be
excluded.
Appiah, according to Outlaw, misses the true underlying tension of the
essay. This tension is a function of Du Bois‘s attempt to ―capture the same term
reference both to changeable cultural factors (hence, Du Bois‘s focus on the
historical and sociological) and to physical features, themselves varying as a
consequence of race-mixing and of descent with modification, or evolution, as
7
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explained by Charles Darwin.‖9 This is not an insignificant goal. Outlaw argues
that Du Bois was deeply committed to taking culture seriously. His definition of
race reflects that by including language, history, traditions, impulses, and
strivings. However it must be said that Du Bois, as Outlaw reads him, did not
think that biological traits causally determined cultural and moral traits. On his
reading, Du Bois did not describe a race by defining features – physical
characteristics, geography, cultural practices and traditions – as essential and
unchanging. Rather these features are to be read as a ―cluster concept‖ of race.
Race as a cluster concept must be read as ―referring to a group of persons who
share, and are thereby distinguished by, several properties taken disjunctively:
that is, ‗each property is severally sufficient and the possession of at least one of
the properties is necessary.‘‖10 This is the only way to make sense of Du Bois‘s
explicit concern to have his account conditioned by history, sociology, and the
work of Charles Darwin.
For Outlaw, one of the main failings of Appiah‘s reading of Du Bois is that
Appiah seems to take Du Bois‘s project as one of definition and taxonomy, when
in reality it is a political project concerned with altering the negative valorization of
black people. To achieve this Du Bois prescribes norms for the ―social
reconstruction of personal and social identities,‖ and for the ―self-appropriation by
a people suffering racialized subordination.‖11 These norms were meant to help
guide and mobilize group members as they attempt to realize ―emancipatory
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social transformation‖ which would ultimately lead to a ―flourishing humanism.‖12
This positive revalorization would take place in the context of blacks delivering
their ―message‖ to the world. Outlaw clearly accepts Du Bois‘s teleology, though
he couches it in a social-political framework. The ―message‖ of black people
would only be delivered through the cultivation of black genius. This could only
be accomplished through the collective effort of the members of the race. Outlaw
claims this is part of the very grounding of ―The Conservation of Races,‖ and in
order to understand Du Bois‘s redefinition of race, one must understand his
overall project. Du Bois was attempting to mobilize and galvanize black people,
especially the ―talented tenth.‖ His redefinition of race was an attempt to arm
them with a notion of race that could combat the negative valorizations that were
embedded in existing notions of race. To wage this battle, African Americans
would need a shared sense of identity that comes from the recognition and
appropriation of commonalities of a geographic race, commonalities of as history,
language and culture. Since history is made by groups acting together and not
by individuals acting on their own, Du Bois is rightfully concerned with group
cohesion. While groups are made up of individuals, Outlaw claims the survival of
individuals is tied to the well-being of the individual‘s natal group, which itself
requires the collaborative action of individual members to maintain the state of
well-being.13 This collaborative action is guided by ―self-valorizing identities
defined, to some extent, in terms of the group‘s identifying bio-social and cultural
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racial (or ethnic) characteristics.‖14 Outlaw claims it is the ―racial/ethnic life-world‖
that generally supplies the resources and nurturing required to cultivate an
individual‘s talents. As Outlaw reads Du Bois, these talents are the distinctive
contribution that persons can offer to humanity and civilization generally.
Therefore, in order for this contribution to be made, races (particularly the African
race and its ethnies or ethnic groups), must be conserved.
Like Du Bois, Outlaw is committed to conserving race. He takes the position
that even if tomorrow all racism and invidious ethnocentrism were to disappear,
discernable racial/ethnic ―communities of meaning‖ (i.e. races and ethnies) would
still be highly desirable. Like Du Bois, Outlaw remains convinced that
both the struggle against racism and invidious ethnocentrism, as
well as the struggles on the part of persons of various races and
ethnies to create, preserve, refine, and, of particular importance, to
share their ‗messages‘; or cultural productions with other humans,
require that we understand how the constantly evolving groups we
refer to as ‗races‘ can be ―conserved‖ in democratic political
communities that value and promote cultural pluralism constrained
by Liberal principles.15
Conservation is motivated by a desire to nurture, produce and share unique
cultural products. Outlaw acknowledges the changeable nature of race but still,
like Du Bois, insists that races need to be conserved in order to produce their
distinctive ―message,‖ which would be the product of a distinctive culture.
Further, with regard to the issue of justice, Outlaw believes that there are
areas of life where it is important and appropriate to take up race. As long as
reconciling justice with areas of life where race and ethnicity are at issue is a
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subject of concern, Outlaw does not see the need to get rid of the concept of
race, despite the difficulties in definition and the odious ways it has been used in
the past. The challenge, he claims, is to find ways to conserve a revised notion
of race, one that is socially useful and in accordance with a revised notion of
democratic justice. This revised notion of democratic justice would balance
recognizing and valuing racial and ethnic cultural groupings while at the same
time ―preserving the best achievements of modern Enlightenment and the
political revolution of Liberalism.‖16 Racism and invidious ethnocentrism are not
the inevitable outcome of keeping the notion of race. Outlaw believes we should
look to local examples of successful multi-racial, multi-ethnic, unity in diversity,
and that these examples can provide resources for achieving such diversity and
avoiding the pernicious fate racism and invidious ethnocentrism promise.
Appiah and Outlaw offer two very different reading of ―The Conservation of
Races.‖ If, as Appiah reads him, Du Bois was attempting to articulate a strictly
socio-historical concept of race, then we would have to fault Du Bois for including
references to blood and family, since these can be read as throwbacks to the
nineteenth century biological notion of race. However, if we accept that not all
references to biology in race necessarily lead to biological determinism, we can
accept Outlaw‘s reading of Du Bois, i.e. that Du Bois was attempting a definition
of race that included reference to both socio-historical and biological factors. Our
reading of Du Bois will also be influenced by what we see as his overall project.
If it is simply definition and taxonomy then arguably Du Bois failed because he
did not provide a strictly socio-historical definition of race. If his project was to
16
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galvanize and mobilize a people towards fulfilling a noble destiny, then arguably
Du Bois was successful in his tasks. The question of whether or not to conserve
the notion of race is dependent upon what we think that conservation will yield
salutary or unsalutary results. This question has been taken up in contemporary
debates.
II. Contemporary Debates: McClean and Taylor
Appiah and Outlaw provide the background for current debates about race
and its conservation. The arguments against conserving race have typically
turned upon the key point that there is no biological or genetic ‗fact‘ of the matter
when it comes to race. Even so, some who argue against conserving race
acknowledge its reality beyond that of a scientific fact. Some, like David
McClean acknowledge this fact yet still argue against conserving the notion of
race because it ―serves no useful or salutary purpose, particularly in a liberal or
cosmopolitan civilization that has certain philosophical and political commitments
concerning that in which the moral worth of individuals and communities
consist.‖17 The question of conserving race, he claims, should be framed within
our axiological commitments and aspirations. Whether the concept of race
contributes to, detracts from, or is indifferent to our conception of ourselves
should be the basis upon which we decide if it should be conserved. McClean
argues that race is no longer useful or salutary to us given our axiological project,
a project that includes pluralism and democratic practices as first-order social
goods.
17
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McClean claims that all racial typologies have failed in one degree or
another in the light of modern genetics, which has proven that there is no
scientifically tenable notion of race. This undermines racial typologies like Du
Bois‘s that make reference to biology, as Du Bois does in his redefinition of race
by claiming that races share a ―common blood.‖ Echoing Appiah, McClean
claims Du Bois falls back into a biological essentialism of race whereby
sociocultural attributes are predicated on nonexistent biological essences.
Further, McClean takes issue with Du Bois‘s racial teleology, the driving force
behind his notion of race. The idea that ―each race has something special
(spiritual) to offer humanity,‖ is troubling to the pragmatist because ―it is
notoriously difficult to understand the ideals of any more or less coherent
population…as though the ideals are essential features of the members of the
population.‖18 Though a population will have ideals, it cannot be said that those
ideals are fixed or immutable over time. Nor can it be said that those ideals will
not be influenced by interaction with other populations. According to McClean,
even if a race is defined non-biologically, the idea that a race has a particular
spiritual or metaphysical gift to give to civilization suggests bad metaphysics.
Although it may be a useful tactic for stimulating a sense of purpose in a people,
to argue that a race is destined or predisposed to contribute some missing
component to human culture is ―to argue something quite fantastic.‖19 There are
no pre-given components to human culture because there is nothing that humans
are destined to be.
18
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McClean argues that there are no elements of Du Bois‘s concept of race
that are not contingent. He does acknowledge that the belief that those elements
are not contingent can serve certain purposes, namely to serve as a device of
cultural conservatism that slows the rate of cultural change so as to give ―the
illusion of permanence around cultural practices or self-conceptions.‖ He claims
that even pragmatists recognize the benefits that can come from the retarding
power of cultural conservatism for certain populations. In some cases cultural
conservatism can serve to slow the siphoning of resources from outside of the
community. Regardless of the positive or negative effects cultural conservatism
can have, pragmatists hold that the status quo should be critiqued
notwithstanding ―what conservatives may believe about the status of their
cultures or about the world.‖20 McClean claims that racial conservationists
employ this cultural conservative voice ―in their efforts to maintain the legitimacy
of socially constructed racial types in spite of the incoherence and unsavory
history of the idea of race.‖21
Du Bois‘s concept of race, for McClean, illustrates the difficulty with
conserving the notion of race even when that notion is defined nonessentially.
Even though he considers Du Bois‘s conclusions untenable, he does not take
that to mean that race can be dismissed quite so easily. The notion of race is a
part of our thinking, part of our conception of the world. It is therefore injected
into our institutions and social practices. This makes race real even though it is
not a natural kind. This is done, he claims, when race is thought of as socially
20
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constructed. The notion of race does some taxonomic work, but this is not
enough in and of itself to justify keeping it. On his account, the question of
whether a pervasive cultural notion like race should be kept is based on whether
or not it contributes to, detracts from, or is relevant to, the achievement of
broader social and political goals and whether it ―jibes with the moral beliefs that
we, by a consensus reflectively and democratically formed, have come to hold as
central to the kind of people we wish to become.‖22 On this basis of judgment
McClean finds the notion of race to have more disadvantages than advantages.
While race has useful role in our self-descriptions, he claims it is difficult to see
similar positive effects in our democratic projects and intimate relationships.
McClean seems to acknowledge that there are some ways in which race
functions are beyond our control. Nevertheless he argues that those who choose
to be racialized subjects should rethink their stance and examine exactly why
they think they need the notion of race, and examine the levels of ―racialized
reality‖ at work in their lives in order to discern where which levels are
inescapable and which may be discarded.23 The choice to be racialized in light
of what we know of the present discourse of race is a perplexing one for
McClean. After all, given how racialized thinking is under attack, what logically
based reasons would a person have to identify herself racially? In order to deflate
the notion of race he proposes that we shift our descriptions of racial injustice
from talk of ―race problems‖ or ―racism‖ to ―stupid, unpardonable bias
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unacceptable to a civilization like ours.‖24 This is an experiment that has yet to
be tried on the societal level, according to McClean, one that would perhaps
change the pedestrian view that is currently rife with notions of racial
essentialism.
To the objection that getting rid of race and race talk would stymie the ability
to address past or present injustices, McClean retorts that there need not be
such a worry. By replacing talk of ―racism‖ to talk of ―stupid, unpardonable bias
unacceptable to a civilization like ours‖ we can still impugn racist practices.
McClean claims racism could be rephrased as ―illegitimate morphological
parsing,‖ and ―‘race‘ itself would become ‗morphology‘.‖25 Thus moral critiques of
racism could be restyled as critiques of illegitimate morphological parsing. This
move would drop ―race‖ as such but still enable redress of past or present
wrongs.
McClean argues for a more nuanced deflationary approach to racialization
as long as we are ―stuck‖ with the idea of race. He notes that rejection of racial
assignment usually occurs only on one moral level and does not amount to the
complete rejection of racial assignments on all sociopolitical levels. Thus on his
account, an American of Chinese descent, for example, may take a cosmopolitan
view of race such that it holds little bearing on her private choices and
associations. On McClean‘s account, such a person may regard her
morphological characteristics (like skin color, hair texture and facial features) as
part of a her social identity or taxonomy while at the same time, on a more
24
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personal level, regard them as having a ―personal aesthetic significance, as one
might view being a redhead or naturally muscular,‖ and not significant because it
marks her as ―a kind of human.‖26 It is possible for such a person to also
recognize that people who look like her have a history of struggle in the United
States that created certain social conditions and cultural practices. This would
allow such a person to avoid living in a ―psychologically deluded and sociopolitically dangerous state of mind‖ in light of past or continuing oppression.27 In
the acceptance of that particular group history a person can regard her race (or
rather her morphology) as more than merely an aesthetic feature, but in a way
that accepts and revalorizes parts of herself that have been denigrated and
disparaged by Euro-American society.28 Thus this revalorization could take place
without any ostensible reference to races.
The question remains as to why race as a construct and part of cultural
practice ―must‖ remain a category or practice within a culture or ethnie.29 After all,
according to McClean, race is not vital to the survival of ethnic groups or cultures,
so there is the question as to what race adds to culture or identity in the first
place. Regarding self-identity and culture McClean claims: ―I don‘t see how one
would be cut adrift existentially, how one would cease loving one‘s dialect and
language, foods and music and values and tales and spirituality of one‘s ethnic
group, the fact that one is still a son or daughter of Scotland or India if, in the very
26
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next instant, racial thinking and raciation, in every form and manifestation, would
disappear forever.‖30 Race, on his account, is not critical to the survival of a
culture or an ethnic group, however it continues to be a salient social category,
one that shapes the life-worlds of people due to the mythologies and dogmas
that have surrounded the concept for the past two centuries.31 We have been
stuck with race, he claims, whether we wanted to be or not.32
While we may have been stuck with race, McClean sees no reason for it to
continue. For McClean race is a ―nonsalutary encumbrance, an incoherent social
idea,‖33 one that cannot be divested from the invidious results it has historically
produced. According to him, ―the question of whether we should keep or get rid
of race presents the rare opportunity to dispose of a troublesome basis for social
division and strife.‖34 Though he believes race will remain a significant social
category for the foreseeable future, he cannot see any reason one would have to
desire to hold onto race, given its minuses outweigh its pluses. McClean sees
nothing in race worth conserving or preserving outside of a weak taxonomic
system of distinctions. Race on his account does nothing in a civilization like
ours to help us achieve our desired social goals, and thus the burden of
justification falls on those who would retain a notion of race.

30

SCNR, 158.

31

SCNR, 157.

32

SCNR, 157.

33

SCNR, 157.

34

SCNR, 158.

170

Paul Taylor takes the opposite view, arguing for the retention of the notion of
race and race talk. Taylor explains why we should talk about races, as opposed
to using some other term in five points. First ―race-talk is a way of assigning
deeper meaning to human bodies and bloodlines.‖35 Many facts are indexed to
bodies, he claims, and how these bodies are indexed determines certain
probabilities, like whether your ancestors were likely to have been sent to an
internment camp during World War II, or whether they were made to ride in Jim
Crow in the 1940‘s.36 Also distribution of social goods historically has been
connected to morphological traits and bloodlines. Race talk allows us to talk
about past and present inequalities in the distribution of those social goods.
Second, Taylor claims ―race-talk highlights the often poor fit between selfidentification and social-ascription/interpellation.‖37 Invoking the concept of race
indicates how deeply an individual is entrenched in larger social structures that
affect how she gets along in the world. Race talk shows the way in which social
structures may not accord with our self-identification, but are correlated rather
stubbornly with morphological traits. Third Taylor claims ―race-talk highlights the
relationship between sex and the patterned distribution of social goods.‖38 Taylor
lists ―a sense of one‘s own attractiveness, or the encouragement that helps in
developing such a sense‖ and ―access to wide selection of potential mates,‖ as
35
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social goods.39 Retaining race talk allows us to recognize the role that human
differences play in our ―conceptions of the erotic, the beautiful, and the
romantically appropriate.‖40 It allows us to see the patterns that emerge from our
erotic, romantic and aesthetic preferences. Fourth, according to Taylor, ―race-talk
makes an additional level of sociological abstraction available to us, a level
above talk of ethnicity or national origin.‖41 Race talk allows us to discuss the
patterned similarities of different peoples that would not be apparent if taking into
account only ethnicity. African Americans, African immigrants, black Jamaicans
make up different ethnicities but will be categorized as black people once in the
United States. Thus they will be similarly situated when facing the mechanisms
of social and political life. Lastly, Taylor claims, ―as a matter of philosophic
procedure, we haven’t been given a good argument for abandoning race talk.‖42
While Taylor takes seriously the dangers of race-thinking, he proposes a
pragmatist approach to race-thinking in such a way that highlights its virtues
while being mindful of and avoiding its vices. This can be done, he claims, in a
way that ―leaves us poised to engage productively with our social
environments.‖43 In an attempt to distinguish problematic types of racialism from
defensible ones, Taylor elucidates the different modes of race-talk and racethinking. Classical racialism is the name Taylor gives to the view of race
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predominant in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. This view holds that there
are some inheritable essences that determine customs, character, worth and
potential, and that these essences also determine certain physiological
similarities.44 These physiological similarities denote what we call races.
Classical racialism also included the belief that races could be ranked according
to traits that defined them. Responses to classical racialism include
antibiologism (the devaluation of race as an instrument of biological science),
intersectionality (the recognition of the interconnectedness of race and other
social identities like class, gender, national origin and sexual orientation and of
the forces that shape our lives and social identities), identity pluralism (the
rejection of the myth of racial purity and the self-identification as mixed-race
individuals), and finally cosmopolitanism.45 Cosmopolitanism ―harmonizes the
insights of the other three: it underscores the (at least potential) uniqueness of
each individual, of each person who, to borrow the language of the aesthetic
moralists, creates himself or herself at the interface between genetic endowment,
the physical environment, and different registers of the environing social
formations.‖46
Putting aside the question of the persistence of classical race theory, Taylor
focuses on the position of the current generation of what he refers to as critical
race theorists (not to be confused with school of legal studies by the same
name). Critical race theorists like Appiah and McClean who believe race-thinking
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has accrued more errors than merits are ―racial eliminativists.‖ Eliminativists take
race-thinking to have two major errors: metaphysical and moral. The
metaphysical error is the belief that ―race‖ represents a biological population that
is impossible and does not exist. The moral error is the belief that race-thinking
devalues individuality or enables the distribution of social goods based upon
morally irrelevant traits.47 Other theorists that Taylor refers to as ―social
naturalists‖ divest race from its nineteenth century associations and argue that
humans separate themselves into breeding populations.48 Culture features
prominently in social naturalist theories because culture-groups produce
conditions under which human physiology and morphology are reproduced in
loose, but discernible patterns.49 According to this general definition Lucius
Outlaw would be a social naturalist. These theorists believe the concept of race
and race-talk serve to illuminate our social landscape. They also give at least a
partial explanation of the persistence of somewhat physically distinct groups and
how this distinctiveness plays a part in broader patters of group differentiation.50
Finally, Taylor describes the view of neutralists, theorists that believe a rush to
get rid of race-thinking will obscure the ways in which it has structured our
society. The neutralist takes account of the changes in the concept of race in
order to diagnose current conditions. Taylor refers to these theorists as
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neutralists because they tend to be agnostic as to the metaphysical aspects of
race and instead insist upon its value as a social and political category. 51
All of these views, according to Taylor, ―emphasize aspects of our practices
of racial identification that are essential for any adequate account.‖ 52 These
views also have their limitations. Taylor claims social naturalists ―tend to say little
about the specific human contexts, cultural, social, and political, in which distinct
concepts of race take shape: all this threatens to become epiphenomenal.‖53
The neutralists in Taylor‘s eyes are ―disturbingly coy‖ about exactly what races
are. The question gets left to the empirical study of culture practice, ―of how
people in different places in fact comport themselves in the name of race.‖54 The
issue with eliminativists, according to Taylor, is that they are ―locked into
problematic ideas about the semantics of racial identification.‖55 For them
classical racialism gave ―race‖ its meaning. That meaning, they believe, has not
changed. Therefore all race-talk must refer to the impossible populations of the
nineteenth century. Since Appiah has defended this position, Taylor uses him as
the eliminativist interlocutor in his semantic argument. Appiah claims we don‘t
really know what we mean when we talk about race, so we depend on experts to
tell us what race really is. These experts formulated the concept of race in the
nineteenth century, defining it as a biological concept. Though there have been
51
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attempts to redefine race, all these attempts are circular in that they require a
biological account of the populations and agents social sciences should study. 56
Appiah claims we must have race before we can study its history.
Taylor finds two problems with this argument. First, it goes to quickly to the
notion of circularity. Defining races historically could mean
using the concept of race to pick out certain similarities in the social
locations of individuals. Defining race in this way might involve a
counterfactually specifiable susceptibility to certain modes of
treatment, keyed to one‘s appearance and ancestry; or it might be a
way of insisting that centuries of race-thinking have brought into
being groups, or populations, that we should still call races.57
The second problem with the semantic argument in Taylor‘s eyes is that it
provides the only reason not to include people like Du Bois and Locke in the
history of race-thinking.58 Taylor argues that once people like Locke are
included, it is not at all clear that race talk has to attempt to refer to the
―impossible biological populations‖ of the nineteenth century.59 In fact these
attempts to revise the notion of race show how race-thinking is evolving, and
does not have to rely on classical racialism for its definitions or concepts. Taylor
claims that classical racialism was only a stage in our ongoing and improving
attempts to explain human variation. If this is the case, there seems to be little
reason to anchor race to notions generated in the nineteenth century. We could
then say that racialism or the idea of race has evolved from Morton‘s Crania
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Americana into the sociohistorical racialism of Du Bois and Locke.60 Separating
race from its formative modern context allows for new questions of race to come
to the fore, including whether or not revising the term ―race‖ and adapting it to
new uses serves any valuable purposes. Taylor takes this to be a pragmatic
question.
Taylor argues that critical pragmatism‘s call to conserve race is different
from other calls to conserve the concept. Taylor claims that the vocabulary of
race
is a useful way of keeping track of a number of features of our
conjoint social lives all at once – specifically, the features involved
in the histories of systematically inequitable distributions, and in the
continued patterning of social experiences and opportunity
structures. It is a useful device, one that has over the years to
connote registers of human experience – bodies, bloodlines, sex,
and individual embedment – that might otherwise get obscured in
social analysis…61
There are many dimensions to human experience, and while ethnicity, culture,
and national origin receive adequate explanation, the accounts of these
dimensions of experience fail to elucidate specifically racial phenomena involving
―the connections between bodies, bloodlines, and social location.‖ 62 Thus Taylor
claims that there are conditions under which race-thinking reveals things about
the world we are likely to miss without it.
McClean and Taylor present compelling arguments for and against the
conservation of the notion of race based on their views of what conservation or
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elimination of the notion would yield. At issue is whether the pernicious effects of
the race concept outweigh its utility. Is the troubled history of the concept of race
reason truly enough to disqualify it as a useful social concept? As Taylor
illustrates, though the negative historical baggage accompanying the concept of
race is considerable, that does not necessarily preclude it from being useful.
Especially in cases of tracking past and present injustices, race seems to be a
necessary concept, one that identifies the specific modes of oppression tracked
to bodies. While McClean claims that discussions of racism could be changed to
discussions of ―stupid, unpardonable bias unacceptable to a civilization like ours,‖
and in that way, do without the concept of race, this lexical change would not
differentiate racism from other forms of oppression like sexism, classism or
homophobia. McClean fails to explain how doing away with race talk would help
illuminate the social landscape. Mindful of the psychological and social perils that
accompany a mindset that ignores the history of oppression and struggle
associated with particular kinds of bodies, McClean prescribes a construal of
personal and social identity that circuitously avoids the concept of race and race
talk but attempts to take history of oppression and struggle into account. If the
concept to of race can provide the grounding for personal and social identity that
allows for appropriate and productive functioning socially and psychologically, it
is difficult to see why we would want to get rid of it, even in light of its destructive
past.
McClean‘s claims that the concept of race merely does light taxonomic work
and that the term ―race‖ could be adequately replaced with ―morphology‖ are also
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troubling. This characterization of race limits the concept to merely description of
physical attributes without referencing the way those attributes have been
rendered meaningful in cultural, social and political ways. Race has never
amounted to purely physical attributes. McClean claims the concept of race has
shaped our lifeworlds, self-conceptions and worldviews, yet he downplays the
significance of race by limiting it strictly to morphology, divesting it of its social
and cultural meanings. This deracinates the true sense of what we call ―race‖
from its real world context. Further, substituting morphology for race will not
avoid problems of classification, and in fact may cause even more dissonance
between self-identification and the social ascription of race. Race cannot be
reduced to solely to morphology without muddying the waters even more when it
comes understanding the social landscape.
Taylor appreciates the way in which the concept of race helps illuminate the
social landscape. Indeed, if he is correct, there is no other concept that could
perform that function adequately. However, it can be argued that Taylor glosses
over the deleterious effects of the concept of race in order to highlight its utility.
Taylor does not address the pernicious history of the concept but instead
pragmatically assesses it in light of its current functioning. He recognizes the
changes that race has undergone, evolving from a nineteenth century biological
concept to a twenty-first century socio-cultural concept. Taylor believes that a
pragmatist approach to race will highlight the virtues of the concept while
mindfully avoiding its vices. Taylor understands the nineteenth century notion of
race as the origin of the morally odious and undemocratic ways in which race has
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been employed. He acknowledge race‘s troubled past by contextualizing it as
part of classical racialism. However, this does not mean all forms of race
thinking are reducible to classical racialism. Taylor‘s pragmatic racialism
approaches race-thinking within a context of places, times and situations. The
concept of race is by no means limited to its nineteenth century roots but is an
evolving concept, one that reflects its sociohistorical situatedness. Taking this
approach to race allows us to differentiate between forms of racialism that are
defensible from those that are not. Taylor thus addresses the pernicious history
of the concept of race by situating it within a particular form of racialism that is no
longer acceptable in an egalitarian society.
The question of the utility of the concept of race is one that Locke takes up
in his race theory. Though he did not explicitly take up the question of race
conservation, I believe that in his writings on race and culture there are ample
resources to evaluate the question of whether or not we should conserve race.
As a pragmatist and race theorist, Locke was compelled to address these
issues, though, as I read him, he would address the question of conservation by
taking culture more seriously than McClean or Taylor.
III. Locke on Conservation and Culture
The debate over the reality of race and whether or not to conserve it has
frequently focused on Du Bois‘s definition of race in his essay ―Conservation of
Races.‖ Many contemporary philosophers of race still refer to Du Bois‘s
definition when arguing for or against the conservation of race or the concept of
race in general. Arguably this is because Du Bois was one of the first African
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American intellectuals to attempt to redefine race in a way that was not strictly
biological. However, given that Locke offered a non-biological definition of race
as early as 1916, it is curious that he has not been included in the conservation
debate. His omission from this debate is lamentable. It is, perhaps, due to his
thoroughly nuanced sense of race that defies easy categorization. Since his
concept of race does not have obvious biological components like Du Bois‘s,
Locke does not provide an easy target for racial eliminativists. His
acknowledgment of the contingent nature of race and racial categories makes
him a challenge to racial conservationists. But just because Locke‘s race theory
does not fall easily into either camp is no reason to exclude him from the
discussion. Though Locke did not address the question of conservation of races
directly, there are considerable resources within his work provide an added
dimension to the debate.
On first blush it seems that Locke and Appiah may have much in common,
in spirit if not in the articulation of their respective theories. In his 1916 lecture
series, Race Contacts and Interracial Relations, Locke confesses to ―the bias of
a person interested in having the concept of race wrought out to a single clear
meaning.‖63 Later, in his 1923 essay ―The Problem of Race Classification,‖ he
claims that if the proper criteria necessary to make race classifications are not
available or possible that we must ―abandon as altogether unscientific the
conception of physical race groups as basic in anthropology; and throw the
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category of race into the discard as another of the many popular misconceptions
detrimentally foisted upon science.‖64
Both Locke and Appiah have a thoroughgoing distrust of any theory of
race that relies on biological characteristics due to nineteenth century biological
determinism. Appiah would have a more difficult time discrediting Locke‘s notion
of race as a cultural product than he did with Du Bois‘s. Locke eschewed
biological explanations for race precisely because he knew biological and
morphological factors were neither distinct nor permanent over time. A notion of
race based strictly on the body would be untenable, and Locke knew it. So
instead of focusing on morphology and taxonomy, Locke focused on the
sociocultural factors that gave rise to race. Thus instead of race explaining the
cultural condition (as in biological/morphological features anchoring cultural
traits), the cultural conditions explain race traits.65 That is, cultural conditions
including beliefs, values, practices, preferred traits and traditions give meaning to
morphological traits. Race emerges as a cultural product.
Appiah‘s methodology of examining Du Bois‘s elements of race
individually would not necessarily undermine Locke‘s concept of race as a
cultural product. However, Appiah has stated that culture is not enough to
ground a concept of race because members of the same race can have vastly
different cultures. Appiah claims there is no common culture of the United
States. While we may be able to speak of large-scale tendencies within American
life, for such tendencies to be part of what he calls ―common culture” they would
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―have to derive from beliefs and values and practices (almost) universally shared
and known to be so. And that they are not.‖66 However, Appiah does concede
the existence of an American culture. ―American culture‖ describes the ―largescale tendencies within American life that are not necessarily participated in by
all Americans.67 This coincides with how I read Locke on culture. As I read him,
Locke takes culture to be beliefs, values, practices that are generally shared,
perpetuated by participation in a common social structure and institutional
framework. Out of these shared beliefs, values, and practices, our concept of
race is made and remade as changes in these beliefs, values and practices
occur.
McClean‘s arguments for the elimination of race echo Appiah‘s belief that
race is untenable because the concept always boils down to some kind of
biological grounding. Some of McClean‘s arguments against Du Bois‘s
conception of race can be easily dismissed, like his criticism of Du Bois‘s
biological essentialism and racial teleology. McClean‘s claims racial typologies
fail because ultimately they hinge on some biological claim. While Du Bois was
vulnerable to this kind of criticism by including ―common blood‖ among his criteria
for race, Locke goes to great pains to separate the idea of race from biology. For
Locke race ―amounts practically to social inheritance, and yet it parades itself as
a biological or anthropological inheritance.‖68 The idea of racial teleology, a
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driving force in Du Bois‘s concept of race, has no place in Locke‘s philosophy.
Therefore, McClean‘s worry over the dubious metaphysics suggested by such
teleology would be unfounded. McClean‘s claim that all elements of Du Bois‘s
are contingent is a more interesting challenge for Locke. For Locke, races
themselves are contingent entities, historically created by social, cultural and
political forces. Locke would reject the idea that race must be the same at all
times and in all places to be real. But McClean himself does not seem to make
that demand, so it should not be an issue.
What is at issue is whether a pervasive cultural notion like race should be
accepted or rejected. On McClean‘s account cultural notions should be kept if
they contribute the achievement of broader social and political goals and are
compatible with moral beliefs we have come to hold as central to the kind of
people we wish to become. How can race, with its invidious past, help us in
these endeavors? Why, in light of all the negatives associated with race, would
one make the choice to be a racialized subject? Why should we ‗conserve‘ race?
Locke asks the question himself: ―granted that race has been such a factor in
human history, would you today deliberately help perpetuate its idioms at the
cost of so much more inevitable sectarianism, chauvinistic prejudice, schism and
strife?‖69 If race is a cultural product, is it a product we would be better without?
I argue that Locke would be against the elimination of race for three
reasons. First, as a center of meaning, race renders the social world intelligible
beyond mere taxonomy. Locke is ―fundamentally convinced that the term ‗race,‘
the thought of race, represents a rather fundamental category in social thinking
69
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and that it is an idea that we can ill dispense with.‖ 70 Race is a conceptual
artifact.. It is a malleable cultural product that is generated out of the collective
values, practices, traditions and intentions of groups. As such the concept of
race gives us insight into how social forces have manifested in a given society.
Without race talk, we would be unable to explain certain disparities in distribution
of social goods, for example, or how certain groups are construed beyond
gender, class and ethnicity. The concept of race helps explain issues of identity
and social ascription, and the dissonance that can occur between the two. It
allows us to understand persistent forms of oppression tracked to bodies. If we
were to take away race as a center of meaning, these conditions become
unintelligible, vacating the context for values, practices, traditions and intentions.
If the world remained the same while race-thinking was abolished, we would be
losing a center of meaning, which would make navigating the social terrain more
treacherous, not less. On this point Locke prefigures Taylor. By defining race
as, among other things, a center of meaning, Locke anticipates much of Taylor‘s
argument for keeping race-talk. Both he and Taylor see the utility of race for
rendering our social world intelligible.
As I have argued, Locke was involved in a vindication project on behalf of
African Americans. This project includes not only valorizing the contributions of a
disparaged group but also challenging the ideology that was the basis for the
degradation and devaluation of that group. Eliminating race would eliminate the
language in which Locke and other black intellectuals challenged nineteenth
century racist ideology. It would also remove the means by which that challenge
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could be understood. Ideologies run deep, and even if we perform ―lexical
surgery‖ to remove race-thinking and race-talk from our societal behaviors, this
would not guarantee the demise of invidious racism. Without the use of the
concept of race in anti-racist efforts, it is likely that invidious racism would
continue unabated because the conceptual framework with which to address it
would be gone. The concept of race keeps the object of our corrective actions in
sight and allows us to address the specificity of racism and racial oppression.
Second, as a champion of multiculturalism and diversity, Locke would not
seek to do away with race because it that would amount to a flattening of one the
most unique forms of difference. Simply saying that race has been used for
invidious purposes in the past, including fomenting divisiveness is not enough of
a reason to wipe away one of our most socially salient forms of difference.
Excision of race from our conceptual vocabulary would take away a means of
understanding and participating in world culture. As contentious as race can be,
Locke would not want to see its forced demise because he understood that it is
contact between disparate groups that advances civilization. Race has been one
significant way in which humans have grouped themselves therefore it is a
significant point of contact between disparate groups.
Third, Locke as I read him was deeply committed to the positive valuation
and promotion of African American culture, and thus would not approve of the
elimination of the grounding of that culture. Racial eliminativists argue that race
is a pernicious concept, the invoking of which has led, more often than not, to
deleterious effects. However, we must not ignore the fact that some positive
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things have come from race as well. This includes a vibrant African American
culture. Without the concept of race we would not have the African American
music, art and literature that came out of the experience of being racialized in a
hegemonic system. African American culture evolved under the social conditions
of marginalization, exclusion and oppression. There is no question that these
mechanisms of white supremacy should be done away with. However, as I read
Locke, even if these mechanisms were to disappear, there may still be reasons
to keep race around. Locke refers to race as the ―social soil‖ out of which culture
grows.71 If we take culture seriously, we must consider the possibility that the
demise of race might also herald a demise of cultures like African American
culture. McClean claims we could still have culture if race were to end.
According to him we could still enjoy our cultural trappings and love our ethnic
groups and national identities. However, race is not the same as ethnicity or
national identity. It is generative of a unique culture unto itself. Thus getting rid
of race might remove the grounding for cultures such as African American
culture. Certainly if it is possible to love our ethnic and national identities without
invidious results, surely it also be possible to love our racial identities without
invidious results. On my reading of Locke this would indeed be possible. If we
understand race as a cultural product, one that may be critiqued, revised and
overhauled as it becomes necessary, it would be possible for race to evolve into
something beyond its unfortunate history.
Though the question of race conservation has been debated for decades,
Locke has not been included in the discussion. I argue that this is because he
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does not fit as easily into the racial conservationist or eliminativist camps. To this
point I have read him strongly into the conservationist camp. However, I believe
there are certain important differences between Locke‘s position on race and that
of those that other theorists that advocate race conservation. First and foremost
there is the motive for conservation. Du Bois and Outlaw subscribe to a certain
teleology whereby African Americans are destined to give their distinctive
―message‖ to the world. Outlaw reads Du Bois as promoting the conservation of
group resources for the purpose of nurturing group well-being, which in turn
supports the development of individual talents and accomplishments to be
shared with civilization.72 On Outlaw‘s reading all races and ethnies have this
duty to conserve race. This sounds very similar to Locke‘s advocacy of
secondary race consciousness in Race Contacts where Locke also calls for the
representative classes to resist absorption into the larger group and instead
harness their talents to the submerged group so that they may stimulate the
overall progress of the group. Locke claims, ―this is not a doctrine of race
isolation. It is not even a doctrine of race integrity. It is really a theory of social
conservation which in practice conserves the best in each group, and promotes
the development of social solidarity out of heterogeneous elements.‖73 Locke
uses similar language to Du Bois, borrowing from Du Bois‘s idea of the ―talented
tenth‖ as well as the language of ―The Conservation of Races.‖ However he is
not advocating strict racial conservation. Rather he is advocating social
conservation so that African Americans can still maintain their group identity
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while integrating with the mainstream. Locke did not advocate separatism, but
he did see the value of solidarity for group self-defense. His doctrine of social
conservation was not meant to stop the social influence of larger society on the
minority group or limit minority access to wider civilization. Rather it was meant
to help the minority group preserve its best and brightest and to slow their egress
from the group until such time as the lower levels of the group could be brought
up to the general level.74 This differs significantly from Du Bois‘s objectives for
race conservation. His reasons for advocating race conservation were
teleological. Du Bois admonished African Americans to conserve race so that
they might give their ―gift‖ to the world. Locke, on the other hand, advocates
social conservation so that group members on the lower strata might be raised
up to the general level. Both Locke and Du Bois wanted African Americans to
contribute their unique culture to world culture and civilization as a way of
positively valorizing African American people. However, Du Bois‘s teleology
remains a driving factor in his notion of race and his promotion of race
conservation. For Locke there are no teleological commitments, no racial
―destiny‖, only a desire for African Americans to contribute to world culture, and
to be recognized for their contributions.
Outlaw is deeply committed to racial conservation. For him and other
conservationists ―the continued existence of discernable race- and ethnie-based
communities of meaning is highly desirable even if, in the very next instant,
racism and perverted, invidious ethnocentrism in every form and manifestation
would disappear forever.” As I have previously stated, on my reading of Locke,
74

RCIR, 98.

189

he would not want race to be forcibly excised from our thinking. If the world
remained the same yet we had no vocabulary for race we would lose our ability
to render our social world intelligible on many levels. However, if like Outlaw
proposes, the world were to change, and racism and invidious ethnocentrism
disappeared, that would be another matter entirely. If racism and invidious
ethnocentrism were to disappear, that would remove two of the practical barriers
to assimilation of racial minorities. If racism disappeared, one of the formative
forces of racial identification would be gone. Race is a social construction that
has structured a significant part of our social lives and our self-identification
because the hegemonic racial system of the United States forced African
Americans to seem themselves collectively. Should that system be controverted
fully and completely, would there still be the impetus for African Americans to see
themselves collectively as a group? The social and cultural forces acting upon
African Americans would be entirely different. Under such conditions the values,
intentions, preferred traits, practices and traditions associated with race would
undergo a transformation. Thus on Locke‘s reading race itself would undergo a
transformation. Race under these conditions would look very different from race
as it is now. This does not mean it would not still function as a center of meaning,
as Locke claims. However that meaning would substantially change. Sense of
race may be deflated or even wither away all together in a world without racism.
On my reading of Locke, this change in the status of race would be acceptable
because it would occur in response to changes in the social world. If the values,
beliefs, practices, intentions and traditions formative of race change, as I believe
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they would in a world without racism, then race itself would change. If social and
cultural conditions were right, it could disappear completely.
In Taylor‘s account of critical race theorists, Locke would number among
the neutralists who believe ―a rush to eliminativism will obscure the profound
ways in which race-thinking has structured and continues to structure the social
landscape,‖ and who ―subordinate metaphysical questions to sociopolitical
analysis and genealogical inquiry.‖75 Locke would surely be a neutralist given
they ―tend to be ambivalent or agnostic about the metaphysical details while
insisting on the value of race-thinking for politics and social theory.‖76 Neutralists
frustrate Taylor because they are too abstract when talking about race. This
frustration no doubt would extend to Locke as well given his silence on the
metaphysics of race.
Locke and Taylor seem to share some of the same concerns. If racism
were to disappear, some of the reasons Taylor has for keeping race-talk might
also disappear. Distribution of social goods would be no longer be indexed to
bodies, so there would be no need to track that distribution along racial lines. If
the mechanism of white supremacy were longer in place, we would not have to
relate human bodies to broader racialized structures that shape our experiences
in the world. If racism and its attendant normativity of whiteness disappeared,
our somaesthetic preferences would seemingly fall onto different patterns. Our
views of the beautiful, the erotic and the romantically appropriate would also
change without the influence of racism shaping them, perhaps so much so that
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race-talk would no longer be necessary to gain insight into those preferences. If
the distribution of social goods was no longer influenced by racism, this would be
at least one compelling reason for Taylor to give up race-talk. However, even if
this were the case, Locke would give up race talk only if race were no longer a
center of meaning. This might occur in a world without racism, but then again, it
might not
On my reading of Locke, he would not endorse the forcible excision of race
from our conceptual and lexical vocabularies. Because of his commitment to
cultural pluralism and to African American culture, he would not want to see race
as a social and cultural identity fall to the wayside. Further, his pragmatism
would not allow him to sanction the forced cessation of race talk as long as race
is a socially salient category, de facto or de jure. This effectively removes him
from the racial eliminativist camp but it does not make him a racial
conservationist in the strong sense of the term. Unlike Outlaw, there are, for
Locke, circumstances under which he would accept the demise of race. That is,
if and the values, practices, and traditions of the group changed such that race
as such were no longer a socially salient category, race could be deflated or
wither away entirely. Locke holds race to be a cultural product and should the
culture substantially change, then so will race. Locke forces us to take seriously
the possibility of change in the concept of race.
In the end, on my reading, Locke is a qualified conservationist. If Appiah
and McClean represent the racial eliminativist point of view and Outlaw and
Taylor represent the conservationist point of view, Locke would have more in
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common with the latter than the former. While he could not be called a strong
conservationist (such as Outlaw), he would not support the elimination of the
race concept in the way endorsed by Appiah and McClean. Elimination of the
concept of race by fiat would leave a significant gap in our social thinking. Race
conceptually aids in rendering our social world intelligible in a way that other
concepts do not. Locke acknowledges the destructive past that the concept of
race has had, but attributes it to a wrong understanding of the concept. His
revised notion of race, freed from nineteenth century biological entanglements,
avoids the pitfalls of classical racialism and allows for an added dimension in
social thinking that takes into account the beliefs, values, practices and traditions
of a society. Beyond its social utility, race also provides grounding for particular
forms of culture. Given Locke‘s work promoting African American culture and his
cultural pluralism (or as we would say today, multiculturalism), his priority would
be the preservation of cultural difference. However, Locke‘s conservationism is
not absolute. On my reading, there are circumstances under which Locke would
accept the abolishment of the race concept. If in the due to the course of
historical events, the beliefs, values, practices and traditions that make up race
diminished to such a point that it was no longer a socially salient category, Locke
would not object to its removal from our conceptual lexicon. He did not believe
races were permanent. On his view race was a cultural product and races were,
in many ways, cultural groupings.77 Locke would not advocate the conservation
of race at all costs. Only as long as race accords with the beliefs, values,
practices and traditions of society should it remain part of our conceptual and
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lexical vocabulary. His conservationism is qualified by his understanding of the
mutability of culture. Race should be conserved as long as it remains a center of
meaning that allows us to understand the social world. If, someday, that is no
longer the case, race should be allowed to fade away.
That brings us to a point of reflection: is race still a center of meaning in a
supposedly post-racial America?
IV.

Conserving Race in a Post-Racial America
On Tuesday, January 20, 2009 Barack Obama was inaugurated as the

44th president of the United States. In the eyes of many, this signaled a
transformation of America from a racialized society to one that was post-racial.
The term post-racial gained momentum during Obama‘s election campaign.
News pundits and commentators seemed especially enamored of the term
though they did little to define it. Broadly speaking, post-racialism is the belief
that racial progress signals the end of the significance of race.78 Post-racialism
can also be read as an ideology of transcendence, whereby the racialization has
been transcended and we need no longer be concerned with race. Under postracialism, ―race does not matter, and should not be taken into account or even
noticed.‖79
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Post-racialism is the contemporary iteration of colorblindness, fueled by
the zeal behind a singular event – the election of the nation‘s first black president
–signifying transcendent racial progress. It is as if ―the election of President
Obama is a singular event of such magnitude that it has altogether ended racism,
and furthermore rendered racial categories insignificant or even nonexistent.‖80
The rhetoric of racial transcendence is integral the ideology of post-racialism; it is
fulfillment of the ―We Shall Overcome‖ promise, that one day race and racism will
be surmounted and that we can all live in unity and harmony. Post-racial implies
not only that America is post-racial but also post-racist.81 As one commentator
said of Obama‘s candidacy in 2008, ―Racial polarization used to be a dominating
force in our politics — but we‘re now a different, and better, country.82
The post-racial ideal is one of universal harmony where race simply no
longer matters. That is the ―post‖ of post-racialism – the idea that we are beyond
race-thinking. Post-racialism is a hip upgrade from colorblindness. Whereas
colorblindness found traction among older neoconservative whites, post-racialism
targeted centrist-to-leftist whites and youth of all races.83 Colorblindness can be
reduced to the proposition that ―morally irrelevant or illegitimate social identities
should make no moral, social, political, or legal difference in a person‘s life.‖ 84
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Post-racialism presumes the achievement of that proposition, such that race and
racial categories need no longer be brought up. Post-racialism seductively offers
the veneer of accepting difference while at the same time professing that those
differences no longer matter.
On first blush it would seem that post-racialism, if it could live up to its own
ideals (and that is a big ‗if‘), could be a positive force that would allow us to
overcome our differences and achieve unity. However, this unity is achieved at a
price. Post-racialism‘s primary claim is that race no longer matters. Under postracialism, racial identity is something to be transcended, not taken into account.
In this post-racialism is dogmatic. To assert racial identity under post-racialism is
anachronistic, indicative of an unevolved and regressive mentality.
Post-racialism, in essence, calls for a retreat from race and especially
from race-based remedies for inequality. Under post-racialism, racial categories
are eliminated in such a way that disempowers people of color. Post-racialism
makes no move to dismantle racial hierarchies or the mechanism of systemic
racism. Neither does it displace white normativity but rather reinstates that
normativity by erasing non-white identity. Post-racialism
actually bolsters racism, racial hierarchy and white supremacy
insofar as it leaves the myth of white superiority along with
systematic and institutionalized racial domination untouched.
Whiteness is presented as the universal or as non-raced, while
non-whiteness (especially, but not exclusively, blackness) is
presented as raced, that is, as the problem. The post-racial move
does not suddenly universalize non-whiteness or put it on equal
footing with whiteness. Rather, this call to eliminate (or move
beyond) race seems to be a concealed call for the elimination of
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blackness (or more broadly non-whiteness) in a way that reinforces
rather than eliminates racial hierarchies and systems of racial
oppression.85
The retreat from race provoked by post-racialism also serves to obscure the
differential power relations between whites and non-whites, thereby maintaining
white hegemony. Systems of oppression and domination are rendered invisible
by post-racialism and the language with which to call for justice, vacated.
According to law professor Sumi Cho, post-racialism has four main
features: Racial Progress, Race-Neutral Universalism, Moral Equivalence and
Distancing Move. Post-racialism deploys the trope of racial progress, declaring,
―racial thinking and racial solutions are no longer needed because we have
‗made great strides,‘ achieved an historic accomplishment, or transcended racial
divisions of past generations.‖86 The trope of racial progress is an essential
ideological element for what follows: ―the elimination of race-based remedies in
favor of more seemingly universal solutions.‖87 Second, post racialism positions
race-neutral universalism as a normative ideal and political necessity. 88 The
post-racial norm must not advocate for race-based policies or remedies, as these
are seen as partial and divisive, benefiting only those perceived as having
―special interests.‖ The universalism of post-racialism comes from its raceneutral character.89 Third, post-racialism ―draws a moral equivalence between
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‗racialism‘ under Jim Crow which subordinated racial minorities, and the
‗racialism‘ of the civil rights era, which sought to remedy minority
subordination.‖90 ‗Racialism‘ as used by Cho refers to the belief that the state
should carry out race-conscious decision-making. One must understand the
historical context in which moral equivalence operates in order to understand the
appeal of moral equivalence. There are two types of ‗racialism‘ post-racialism
transcends: the racialism of the Jim Crow era and the racialism of the civil rights
era and racial remediation. Retreating from circumstance seen as racially
polarizing, post-racialism ―idealizes a society in which race is no longer a basis
for differential treatment, grievance, or remedy.‖ 91 The final feature of postracialism is the distancing move. The distancing move is frequently undertaken
by proponents of post-racialism to distinguish themselves from civil-rights
advocates and critical-race theorists.92 This feature is important as a hegemonic
device ―because the newness and attractiveness of post-racialism lies with a
release from the strictures of old-school racism, new-school or colorblind racism,
and new-school political correctness and racial obsession.‖93
Race conservation, as a race-based remedy is by definition anathema
under post-racialism. To conserve race for the sake of conserving race or as
instrumental to another cause is to be shunned under post-racialism since it
89
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necessarily involves asserting and embracing racial identity. Race conservation
is in complete opposition to post-racialism‘s guiding principles, violating the raceneutral universalism that gives post-racialism its appeal. As a strategy aimed at
the improvement and advancement of marginalized groups, a post-racialist would
view it as a particular (as opposed to universal) solution benefiting only ―special
interests.‖ Race conservation is contrary to the retreat from race engendered by
post-racialism. More than that, it maintains a conceptual and lexical vocabulary
that post-racialism explicitly seeks to abolish.
On my reading of Locke, he would be critical of post-racialism for several
reasons. First, as a cultural pluralist he was a firm advocate of mutual respect
between what was often disparate groups. Post-racialism maintains an
asymmetrical relation of respect between groups. Whiteness, as unraced and
universal commands respect but non-white racial groups as raced and particular
do not. Locke would not endorse such a one-sided relation. Second, Locke was
constantly worried about the specter of absolutist thinking as the precursor to
social and political tyranny. Post-racialism‘s unequivocal call to eliminate or
move beyond race is absolutist in nature. Any assertion of or reference to race is
denounced as divisive and partisan. Post-racialism holds that race-based
decision-making is always wrong regardless of intention or consequences. This
type of dogmatism was always a concern for Locke because he understood that,
even with the best intentions, dogmatism could easily become authoritarianism.
He counseled against uniformitarian universality, ―a system of beliefs purporting
to convey necessarily true propositions and holding that such truths should be
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held by, or otherwise imposed on, all persons. This notion is applicable to a
philosophical position and the political reality of totalitarian states. ‖94 Sometimes,
―in the zeal of cultural defense, in the effort to bring about the rapprochement of a
united front, we do not always stop to envisage the danger and inconsistency of
a fresh crisis uniformitarianism of our own.‖95 This is the case in post-racialism.
In its efforts to overcome the racial divide, its race neutral universalism amounts
to a forced uniformitarianism under which the demands of submerged racial
groups are silenced. Third, as a pluralist, Locke believed in the vital connection
between pluralism and democracy. Democracy works best when there is an
open and interactive contact between groups. Race, under post-racialism is not
supposed to be noticed. Thus racial groups are also not to be noticed or taken
into account. This amounts to a smothering of racial difference and the
elimination of racial concerns from our political sphere. If racial groups are not
recognized within a society like ours, this will impede the workings of democracy.
Locke claims that, ―Broadening our cultural values and tempering our orthodoxies
is of infinitely more service to enlarged democracy than direct praise and
advocacy of democracy itself.‖96. Post-racialism narrows our cultural values by
effectively excluding racial groups from consideration. Democracy is improved
by more participation, not less. Post-racialism is detrimental to democracy
because it suppresses the voices of racial difference.
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Post-racialism, ushered in by the election of Barack Obama, is a twenty-first
century ideology of racial nullification whereby it is believed that race no longer
has significance in our society and that race-based decision-making on by the
state is no longer necessary for remedial action. Post-racialism reinstates white
normativity by eliminating racial categories that serve to empower people of
color. In a post-racial world, race conservation would be eschewed because it
reiterates non-white racial identity. Locke provides resources for the reject of
post-racialism as an absolutist doctrine that is ultimately bad for democracy.

201

Conclusion
In this dissertation, I set out to give a nuanced articulation of Alain Locke‘s
racial vindication project. Locke is most well known for his work as philosophical
midwife to the Harlem Renaissance, an African American cultural movement of
the 1920‘s and 1930‘s. His championing of African American cultural products
has typically been viewed as separate from his philosophical work. I argue that
Locke‘s promotion of African American cultural products was not merely an end
in itself but part of a broader project to vindicate black humanity. I argue that
this project included not only the sponsorship and promotion of African American
cultural products but also a revisionary notion of race that would liberate black
people from the biological determinism inherent in the nineteenth century
conception of race. On my reading Locke was engaged in vindication in two
senses of the word. First, he sought to vindicate black humanity by defending it
against the slander and calumny of nineteenth century racist ideology. Second,
he sought vindication for blacks by providing proof of black humanity and dignity.
In the first chapter I establish the discourse on race that Locke had to confront in
order to achieve his goal of vindication. This discourse was heavily influenced by
the race science of the day. Although Locke entered the debate in the early
twentieth century, he had to address race science from the nineteenth century.
This included the work of Samuel Morton, Arthur de Gobineau, Josiah Nott and
Louis Agassiz. These figures were especially influential in establishing racist
dogma that proclaimed people of African descent to be a different kind of being
than whites, one that was inherently inferior. Theories abounded regarding the
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supposedly separate origin of races as a way of explaining the innate superiority
of whites and inferiority of blacks. With the authorial voice of science behind
them, these figures further claimed that race amounted to a biological essence,
one that was in a fixed relationship with the capacities and capabilities of
peoples. This doctrine of biological determinism asserted that the moral and
intellectual capacities as well as temperament and disposition were linked to
physical traits. These characteristics in aggregate determined a group‘s capacity
for culture and the production of cultural products. Thus culture was believed to
have a biological basis. In this chapter I also examine some of the African
American intellectual responses to racist ideology.
In the second chapter I give a survey Alain Locke‘s life and philosophy.
Socially and educationally privileged, Locke was uniquely positioned among
African American intellectuals to respond to racist ideology and its claims of black
inferiority. He obtained an exceptional education, attending Harvard during its
―Golden Age‖ and studying abroad in Oxford and Berlin. It was during this time
that he began developing a nascent sense of cultural pluralism or
multiculturalism. In this chapter I focus on Locke‘s conversion to the Bahá‘í
Faith. His commitment to the Bahá‘í belief in the universal brotherhood of
mankind would ground his commitment to racial equality and respect for all
cultures. It was during Bahá‘í ―race amity‖ efforts that Locke first utilized culture
as a tool for social transformation. In this chapter I also examine the major
themes in Locke‘s philosophy, which could be summed up as race, culture and
value. As early as 1916, Locke was proposing a revised notion of race that was
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socio-cultural rather than biological. By 1924 he had refined his theory of race,
claiming it to be a cultural product. Culture would be a central issue for Locke
throughout his life. In 1925 he edited the book that would become the manifesto
of the Harlem Renaissance movement, The New Negro. The anthology stood in
stark opposition to racist conceptions of race and culture. It challenged the idea
that blacks did not have the capacity to be producers of culture and, in that way,
challenged dominant ideology regarding black inferiority. I argue that this was a
crucial step in his vindication project.
In the third chapter I delve deeper into Locke‘s race theory. Locke issued
the main part of his race theory in his lecture series, Race Contacts and
Interracial Relations, and in his essay ―The Concept of Race As Applied to Social
Culture.‖ In those essays he attacks the underpinnings of racist ideology. He
debunks the idea of ―superior‖ and ―inferior‖ races and argues that race is a
social, not biological inheritance. Locke cogently argues that race is not a
matter of biology and that any account that tries to explain race strictly on the
basis of bodies is doomed to fail. He undermines the idea of ―pure‖ races as well
as the idea that races are permanent. Most importantly, he discredits the idea of
a causal relationship between race and culture. Locke reverses the emphasis of
the race-culture relation, arguing that race is expressive of culture, rather than
culture being expressive of race. I argue that race is a higher-order cultural
product that provides the soil out of which other lower-order cultural products are
produced. Above all, race must be understood as a center of meaning.
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In the fourth chapter I lay out the way in which Locke fulfills both meanings
of vindication. First, vindication is the act of defending against calumny, censure
or accusation. In the early twentieth century African Americans as a people were
the object of derision and defamation. Academic and popular discourse held that
African Americans, as people of African descent, were naturally inferior to whites.
The widespread nature of this belief motivated Locke militate against it by
engaging in a vindication project on behalf of African Americans as a people. I
argue that Locke‘s vindication project had four major parts. First, he challenged
the major tenets of racist ideology. Second, he reversed the emphasis of the
race-culture relation. He argued that race was a cultural product. This opened
up the possibility for self-definition and self-creation for African American identity.
This was most clearly seen in The New Negro. Third, Locke promoted African
American art and literature as proof of African American culture. Nineteenth
century racist ideology held that blacks had not culture because they lacked the
innate abilities needed for cultural production. By demonstrating that African
Americans had a vibrant culture Locke proved that they did indeed possess the
capacities and abilities needed to produce culture. This subverted the claims of
racist ideology, for African Americans had to be recognized as being culturally on
par with whites. Locke‘s championing of African American cultural products was
a pragmatic response to the hegemony generated out of racist ideology. It was
an attempt to redefine blackness in a positive way. That is not to say his was the
only response available to African Americans at the time. However, I argue that
given his understanding of race as a cultural product, his choice to promote
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African American artworks was a way to achieve his vindication project. The final
part of Locke‘s vindication project was his endorsement of cultural pluralism and
reciprocity. Cultural pluralism as a doctrine promoted value and respect for all
cultures. I argue that by embracing this doctrine Locke attempted to safeguard
the respect and dignity of African American culture. By promoting cultural
pluralism and cultural reciprocity, Locke set up a framework in which the
uniqueness of African American culture could be preserved and appreciated in
the fabric of wider American culture. Reciprocity as a mode of interaction
between cultures was a means of circumventing cultural chauvinism and
isolationism.
Having laid out Locke‘s philosophy in the framework of his racial
vindication project, in the final chapter of this dissertation I went beyond
vindication to address the question of race conservation. The question of
whether or not race should be conserved has been hotly debated within
philosophy, usually with reference to W. E. B. Du Bois‘s essay ―The Conservation
of Races,‖ in which he attempts to articulate a non-biological concept of race. I
argue that Locke‘s philosophy of race has been unjustly neglected in regards to
the race conservation debate. Further, I argue that within his writings on race
and culture there are ample resources to address the question of race
conservation. I began this chapter by framing the debate by recapitulating the
arguments of K. Anthony Appiah and Lucius Outlaw. Appiah famously
challenges Du Bois‘s notion of race and the supposed duty to conserve race
while Outlaw defends both Du Bois‘s notion of race and the duty to conserve. I
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then move on to some of the more contemporary debates regarding race
conservation, examining the work of racial eliminativist David McClean and
conservationist Paul C. Taylor. I conclude by bringing Locke into the debate. On
my reading of Locke can be categorized as a qualified conservationist. Given his
work on race and culture, I argue that he cannot be considered a racial
eliminativist, however, he could not be called a strong conservationist either.
Locke could not be a racial eliminativist and seek to end race-talk and the demise
of the race concept because he regards race as a center of meaning. Further I
argue that Locke‘s commitment to African American culture would predispose
him to want to keep African American race as the grounding for that culture.
Locke‘s dedication to cultural pluralism would dictate that cultural differences
should be preserved so that civilization can benefit from the unique perspectives
generated by cultural reciprocity between divergent groups. However, on my
reading, Locke would not propose that race must be conserved at all costs.
Locke did not think of races as permanent. Only so long as race remains a
salient social category and a center of meaning should we hold on to the concept
of race. Finally, I examine whether race should be conserved in a ―post-racial‖
world.
The main goals of this dissertation have been achieved. I have been able
to highlight the neglected work of Alain Locke on race and culture. I have
demonstrated that Locke‘s championing of African American cultural products
was part of an overall project of racial vindication for African Americans. Finally, I
have brought Locke into the debate on whether or not race should be conserved.

207

I have also addressed the question of race conservation in a ―post-racial‖ society,
positioning Locke within the current discussion. Locke was a philosopher devoted
to cultural rapprochement and racial equality. This dissertation enhances existing
Locke scholarship by uniting his philosophical work on race with his work as a
cultural critic and introduces Locke to current debates on culture and race theory.
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